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No Senkakus conflict—four reasons:

M. Taylor Fravel, 8/19/2019 (Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program at MIT), “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” https://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/Triangle/7_fravel.pdf

The dynamics of the Senkaku Islands dispute since the 1970s present a puzzle. At first glance, one might expect that this dispute should be fraught with tension and even violence. Territorial disputes often serve as proxies for broader conflicts of interests, especially between states that might be characterized as enduring or strategic rivals, such as China and Japan.21 Although the China-Japan economic relationship has continued to deepen since the end of the Cold War, political relations have oscillated between pe¬riods of heightened friction and relative calm.22 At the same time, both sides see the islands as important real estate, endowed with strategic significance and economic value, characteristics that increase a state’s willingness to use force in a territorial dispute.23 China has also used force in other disputes over offshore islands, most notably over the Paracels in 1974 and the Spratlys in 1988 and 1994.24 Finally, given the history of Japan’s occupation of parts of China, one might expect territorial issues to be especially prominent as a source of friction between the two countries and one that leaders might manipulate to mobilize society, perhaps for diversionary ends.25 Since 1949, however, China has never used force against Japan over the Senkaku Islands, although it did display its potential to use force once, in 1978, during the peace treaty negotiations.26 The fact that armed conflict over the islands has been avoided is a major accomplishment and one that deserves detailed examination because, in many ways, it is unexpected. The analysis below focuses mostly on China for several reasons. First—unlike Japan—China, as noted above, has used force in its other territorial disputes since the end of World War II and in half of its offshore island disputes. Second, as the “challenger” in the Senkakus dispute, force remains a vi¬able option for China to regain sovereignty of the islands to improve its otherwise weak position or to compel concessions from Japan. By contrast, because Japan already occupies and controls the islands, force is not necessary to improve its claim and would only be used to deter or prevent a Chinese attack. Nevertheless, even as the “defender,” the use of force for Japan remains a viable option under certain conditions. In par¬ticular, because Japan already controls the islands, it may be more willing to use force to arrest or reverse decline in its position in the dispute in the face of increasing Chinese provocations, such as the dispatch of mainland survey ships within the territorial waters of the islands in December 2008. Indeed, reflecting concerns about China’s growing military power and naval activities in the East China Sea, Japan’s military drafted a contingency plan in November 2004 “to defend the southern remote islands off Kyushu and Okinawa from possible invasion.”27 Explaining state inaction or the absence of a particular outcome such as the use of force presents a challenge for social scientists. One of the core problems is that patterns of inaction or nonevents are likely to be overdetermined; that is, they are consistent with multiple if not overlap-ping variables and explanations. As a particular behavior is not observed, it is more challenging to identify those factors that vary with inaction as opposed to using force or offering to compromise. Nevertheless, four reasons help explain the absence of violent conflict in the Senkaku dis¬pute since 1972: deterrence, de facto control, regional rivalry, and active dispute management. Deterrence The first and most important reason is deterrence. Put simply, China has lacked the military means to execute a limited-aims operation to seize and defend the islands from any counterattack. Although China did clash with South Vietnam in 1974 and Vietnam in 1988 in other offshore island conflicts, those countries possessed very limited naval power and China was able to achieve victory after short clashes. By contrast, Japan possesses the strongest and most professional navy of any East Asian country.28 More importantly, however, the US alliance with Japan has arguably deterred China from taking any armed action over the islands. Given Article V, use of force over the Senkakus would run the very real risk of conflict with the United States—conflict that China would prefer to avoid. As discussed below in the section on dispute management, public US statements regard¬ing its commitment under the treaty that were issued during moments of tension in the dispute represent subtle deterrent actions. De Facto Control The continuous occupation of the disputed islands by Japan during the period when their sovereignty has been contested is a second reason for the absence of escalation. Continuous occupation by one state in a territo¬rial dispute significantly increases the cost for the other side (in this case China) of using force, as the international community would view any use of force as a clear sign of revisionist behavior. Occupation by one side, in other words, reinforces the status quo bias of the international system. By contrast, although China did use force in the Paracels and the Spratlys, it seized islands and coral reefs that were claimed but not occupied by other states and vacant real estate (with the exception of Pattle Island in the Paracels). In disputes on its land border, China has not seized large amounts of disputed territory through the use of force, especially when contested territory has been occupied by other states. In its 1962 war with India over disputed areas along its southwestern frontier, for example, China won a military victory but then withdrew to the line of actual control that had existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities.29 Regional Rivalry A third reason for the absence of escalation stems from the continuing competition between China and Japan for diplomatic influence within East Asia. For different reasons, both countries likely want to maintain reputations as constructive and benign powers in the region. Escalation or use of force over the Senkakus would tarnish that reputation. In particular, China’s current diplomatic strategy revolves around the notions of “peaceful development” and “reassurance.”30 Belligerence over territory would send a signal to most states in the region that a more powerful China might also be more aggressive, thus increasing suspicion and uncertainty about China’s long-term intentions. Active Dispute Management A fourth and underexamined reason is how both sides have sought to manage the dispute to avoid unwanted spirals of hostility and tension that might culminate in the use of force. Several aspects of dispute management must be stressed, as they have received little attention in analyses of the Senkaku dispute or, for that matter, in the international relations scholar¬ship on territorial disputes. Even if China has been deterred by US power, Japanese control of the disputed islands, or potential reputational costs, the management of tensions in this dispute is also important. All three countries have played a role in the successful management of the dispute, where success is defined as the absence of conflict. Limited Access Perhaps the leading source of friction in the dispute over the past two decades has been efforts by citizen activists to land on the islands to demonstrate their countries’ sovereignty claims. These ac-tions then compel governments to get involved in the dispute, increasing the potential for armed conflict. In the 1990s, several crises over the is¬lands occurred when activist groups from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan journeyed to the disputed rocks. Japanese activists, most notably from the Japan Youth League, frequently visited the islands in the 1990s to main¬tain a lighthouse on Uotsuri (Diaoyu) Island that was first built in 1978.31 In response, individuals from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China sought to land on the Senkakus to support China’s claims. In 1996, a Hong Kong citizen, David Chan, drowned as he attempted to land and plant a flag on one of the islands.32 A number of other unsuccessful attempts have also been made by groups supporting China’s claim, but in 2004, activists from Mainland China successfully landed on the islands. As a private citizen owns three of the five main islands, the Japanese government was unable (or perhaps just unwilling) to prevent its own citi¬zens from making symbolic visits and increasing the potential for conflict in the dispute. Since 2002, however, the Japanese government has taken a number of steps to enhance its control over the islands and limit access by Japanese citizens, thereby reducing incentives for Chinese patriotic groups to land on the islands in response. First, in April 2002, the Japanese government entered into a lease for the three islands remaining outside of government control. This placed all of the disputed features under the direct control of the Japanese government, and because the government became a leaseholder, it could both prevent the sale of the islands to activists who might seek to make use of them for political goals and block activists from all sides from landing on the islands.33 Second, just one month after the first successful landing on the islands by Mainland Chinese activists in March 2004, the Japanese government decided to station two Coast Guard vessels near the islands in order to prevent individuals from landing on them in the future.34 Third, in February 2005, Japan further consolidated control over the islands when it announced that it had assumed control of the lighthouse on Uotsuri that had been built and maintained by the Japan Youth League. These actions elicited sharp protests in Beijing and Taipei as they were viewed as unilateral assertions of sovereignty over contested territory and consolidation of Japanese control. Nevertheless, they lowered tensions by removing perhaps the greatest irritant in the dispute, the actions of activ¬ist citizens. In the past, the rationale for these visits by Japanese activists was the need to maintain the lighthouses and replace their solar-powered batteries. Indeed, according to public news sources, no Japanese activists have successfully landed on the islands since 2003.35 Although this has not prevented subsequent attempts by Chinese and Taiwanese patriotic groups to land on the islands, the Japanese government has been able to intercept these ships rapidly through the deployment of Coast Guard ves¬sels in surrounding waters. Similarly, the Chinese government has sought to restrict the activities of its own citizens around the islands. For most of the 1990s, only activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan, not Mainland China, sought to land on the islands in protest. In 2003, however, a mainland-based group, the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands, began preparations for a voyage to the islands.36 After several reconnaissance trips, the federation landed seven members on Uotsuri in March 2004.37 These individuals were detained by the Japanese Coast Guard and deported to China 48 hours later. Although it is not clear what the Chinese government’s policy toward such groups was before this landing, since then it has sought to prevent any further landings or maritime excursions to the islands by its citizens from Chinese ports. In July 2004, local officials in Fujian prevented members of the federation from using Chinese fishing vessels for noncommercial purposes such as traveling to the islands.38 And, following anti-Japan protests in April 2005, the government raided the federation’s offices in Beijing in July 2005.39 In October 2007, four members of the federation who had entered Japanese territorial waters in an attempt to land on the islands were placed under house arrest when they returned to China.40 Avoidance of Social Mobilization A second aspect of dispute manage-ment that deserves mention is that China has avoided mobilizing the public around the dispute. Indeed, despite its potential to rally people around the flag and its role in past patriotic education campaigns, the Senkakus dispute rarely appears in official newspapers. As figure 1 demonstrates, the total number of articles that refer to “Diaoyu Dao” (Senkaku Islands) in the title that have appeared in the People’s Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao) and the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) since 1987 is low. In some years, no articles appeared at all. Moreover, as shown in figure 2, the frequency of articles on the Senkakus is roughly one-tenth of those published on the Spratlys and an even smaller fraction of those concerning Taiwan. No clear trend exists in the frequency or timing of articles on the Senkakus either. Analysis of individual news reports suggests that the publication of articles is caused by events linked to the dispute, especially activists’ attempts to land on the islands as well as Japan’s own administrative actions.

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