Insufficient U.S. support for NIF and DIANA is driving this fragmentation — the plan is key to supercharge NATO-EU cooperation on EDT.
Besch 21 — Sophia Besch, DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform (Germany), Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Europe Center, Ph.D. Candidate in European Studies and Defence Studies at King's College London (UK), holds an M.Sc. in International Relations from The London School of Economics and Political Science (UK) and an M.A. in International Security from Sciences Po (France), 2021 (“Rebooting the U.S.-EU Defense Relationship,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, December 22nd, Available Online at https://www.aicgs.org/publication/rebooting-the-u-s-eu-defense-relationship/, Accessed 07-10-2022)
2. Align EU-NATO work on defense innovation and find new formats of engagement
Both the United States and the EU have an interest in investing in new and emerging defense technologies and to maintain interoperability, particularly in the context of the U.S. technology race with China. The United States, through AUKUS, has established an innovation partnership with just one European ally, the UK (for now). Meanwhile, NATO has launched a new defense innovation fund and a defense innovation accelerator (DIANA). The UK, which post-Brexit has given itself the guidance to ‘Think NATO,’[7] was a supporter of the Fund, but the United States and France are not members. At the same time, France often argues that the EU should be in the lead on emerging technologies and is pushing for the creation of an Innovation Defense Hub within the European Defense Agency. These defense innovation efforts pursued in parallel by both organizations are already leading officials to complain about NATO duplicating the EU and vice versa. Both Americans and Europeans should try to prevent a rehashing of this unproductive talking point.
Parallel to the EU branching out into ‘traditional’ security, NATO has been broadening its own understanding of security to include newer domains such as economic security, disruptive technologies, and disinformation.[8] This development provides clear opportunities for cooperation between the two organizations, but also presents risks of conflict and tension. NATO-EU cooperation today remains largely process-driven. Inter-institutional exchanges are often focused on ‘deconflicting’ rather than building genuine synergies,[9] and the relationship suffers from long-standing political conflict between Turkey and Cyprus and from newer tensions between the UK and France. The concurrent NATO Strategic Concept and EU Strategic Compass processes are an opportunity for the United States and the EU to work together to improve NATO-EU cooperation on innovation. The next NATO-EU joint declaration, which is scheduled to be published soon, could help by acknowledging a new division of labor between the two institutions.
For instance, it would make sense for the two organizations to cooperate on investment screening, research protection, and initiatives to facilitate information-sharing on dual-use export and import controls of critical technology.[10] These joint NATO-EU initiatives could usefully build on the work done by the United States and the EU at the Trade and Technology Council. On defense technology development, the Americans and Europeans could explore different new formats of engagement. For instance, the United States could expand AUKUS to include more European countries with relevant defense innovation profiles, such as France or Estonia. Or, if AUKUS remains too politically sensitive for Paris, the transatlantic allies could explore the possibility of the United States joining selected PESCO projects geared towards defense innovation. The United States may also want to reconsider its decision not to join DIANA.