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Integrating innovation networks is key to create economies of scale and cement allied superiority.

Simón 22 — Luis Simón, Argyros Family Foundation Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Director of the Brussels Office of the Elcano Royal Institute (Spain), Research Professor in International Security and Director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance (Belgium), holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of London (UK), 2022 (“Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 12th, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/bridging-us-led-alliances-euro-atlantic-and-indo-pacific-inter-theater-perspective, Accessed 07-15-2022)

An inter-theater approach to capability development can help preserve the dominance of U.S.-led alliances in both theaters. Even though some U.S. capabilities are global, others will be theater-specific and require adaptations. For instance, “theater-range” missiles may need to adapt to specific range or platform requirements (i.e., sea-borne vs. land-borne) depending on whether they are intended for Europe or Asia. This applies to both offensive and defensive missiles. Including allies in U.S.-led capability planning initiatives can generate economies of scale and make it easier for the United States to develop skeleton concepts that can draw on allied support and participation to bring about appropriate adaptations for each theater. Moreover, the need to preserve dominance at sea and in other global commons should also incentivize inter-allied cooperation in developing naval, air, cyber, and space capabilities and technologies.

Strengthening links between U.S.-led alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific in the area of operational planning would give both sets of allies greater insight into the military-strategic picture in each other’s region and how such a picture may affect U.S. and allied planning in real time. It would also allow them to assess possible implications for their home region and identify opportunities to add value in each other’s region, as well as in underpinning U.S. and allied dominance at sea and in the other global commons. Thus, allies could consider the establishment of permanent liaison officers from AP4 countries in Supreme Allied Command Europe and throughout NATO’s command structure, as well as a NATO liaison cell in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and more joint exercises.42

Ultimately, an effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific would help transcend the China first vs. two-front war dilemma and allow the United States and its allies to develop an optimal collective strategy to underpin the geostrategic trinity of their power. This becomes particularly relevant when the United States and its allies face two strategic competitors in two distant regions simultaneously and in light of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. Should one of those competitors collapse, or should there be a breakdown in Sino-Russian ties, the need for alliance bridging may indeed become less evident or urgent. Hence, policymakers should pursue flexible and pragmatic approaches to bridging allies that eschew creating new institutions and respect the primacy of regional frameworks, which are arguably more lasting.

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