Any shift from ambiguity causes backlash
Lonergan, 22 -- Army Cyber Institute professor
[Erica, Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, former senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Atlantic Council, and Sara B. Moller "NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea," Politico, 4-27-22, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829, accessed 6-4-2022]
Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.”
Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.”
This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time.