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“Security cooperation in…biotechnology” refers to natural and engineered infectious disease surveillance and response

Gronvall 18 Dr. Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Senior Scholar, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, “Ensuring Biosafety and Security,” Chapter 3 in Building a Smart Partership for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Snowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council, April 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Building-A-Smart-Partnership-for-the-Fourth-Industrial-Revolution-WEB-min.pdf /GoGreen!

The United States and South Korea should expand their security cooperation in biotechnology in the areas of global health, gene synthesis, and medical and pharmaceutical research.

There is an opportunity to expand security cooperation between the United States and South Korea on issues related to biotechnology, to focus on both deliberate and natural biological threats. The United States and South Korea have been demonstrated leaders in taking on the challenges of disease threats. They have participated in biosecurity scenarios (e.g., Able Response, a whole-of government exercise); both countries contributed resources and considerable financial assistance to end the Ebola epidemic in West Africa; and they participate in the Global Health Security Agenda, which aims to reduce global disease risks and supports the International Health Regulations (2005).

Boosting the security quotient of the Global Health Security Agenda. Since its inception in 2014, the GHSA has incorporated a multilateral and multisectoral approach towards strengthening global capacity and nations’ abilities to prevent, detect, and adequately respond to infectious diseases.33 The Ebola epidemic demonstrated how a lack of adequate public health infrastructure could lead to an international crisis, in spite of the International Health Regulations (2005), which call for nations to provide for adequate public health infrastructure. To date, the GHSA has focused on self-assessments (called Joint External Evaluations, or JEE) and there is an opportunity to focus donor country attention where it is most needed.

An unusual aspect of the GHSA—for an initiative that is largely focused on public health—is that from its inception it has included the need to prepare for deliberate threats. Nonetheless, this aspect of the GHSA has not moved forward as much as was initially hoped; while some nations include their departments of defense in GHSA activities, most do not, and in the JEE, biosafety and biosecurity are somewhat mixed together. There is an opportunity for South Korea and the United States to collaborate on efforts that encourage more countries to take a more multisectoral approach through a variety of means, such as holding military-military conferences with other nations from Southeast Asia or developing a JEE supplement with a military focus.

Biosecurity implications of gene synthesis. In the field of biotechnology, DNA synthesis is a valuable research tool for many applications—from medicine to manufacturing—but as with many powerful technologies, it is vulnerable to misuse. One common fear is that DNA synthesis technologies could be used by nefarious actors to procure the genetic material of a variety of pathogens from a commercial supplier, or acquire the capability to do that themselves.34 Once synthesized, the genetic material could be “booted up” like a computer program, becoming actively infectious. “That many viruses can be made from scratch has been demonstrated repeatedly, including in the construction of poliovirus, 1918 influenza virus, and most recently, the virus that causes horsepox,” which is a close cousin to the smallpox virus.35

Over the past decade, measures have been taken to reduce the likelihood of misuse.36 Several gene-synthesis commercial suppliers formed the International Gene Synthesis Consortium to develop protocols designed to allow “individual companies to screen ordered sequences as well as to verify customers.”37 Not all international gene-synthesis companies are members of an industry organization that agrees to either customer screening or sequence screening. There are opportunities for the United States and South Korea to encourage other nations to promote industry-wide screening standards, champion a common code of conduct for suppliers of DNA, and develop mechanisms so that more of the gene-synthesis market performs screening, and has a place to report suspicious orders. There is also the potential for research in this area, as there is no publicly available data about how valuable the sequence screening can be in stopping misuse, or whether screening could be improved.38

Advanced development of pharmaceuticals and other medical countermeasures. There is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the US Department of Health and Human Services, US National Institutes of Health, South Korea’s Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Korea National Institute of Health in which all parties “signed a letter of intent (2015) to enhance biomedical research collaboration, personnel exchange and training cooperation in fields of mutual interest.”39 This can be applied towards the development of vaccines and therapies for biosecurity and health security concerns, from early research and development stages through manufacturing.

For example, there could be joint research projects and funding streams to study a virus that is of mutual concern to the United States and South Korea. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), a respiratory virus that caused a serious outbreak in South Korea in 2015, could be a suitable candidate. Under the MOU, multiple vaccine candidates could be tested in a collaborative fashion, or research tools to help advance MERS-CoV research could be developed and jointly shared between the United States and South Korea.

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