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Effective SC-driven partnerships are independently key to prevent escalation to extinction from BOTH abandonment AND entanglement risks

Frühling 21 Stephan Frühling, Associate Dean, Partnerships and Engagement in the College of Asia and the Pacific at The Australian National University, former ‘Partner across the Globe’ research fellow in the research division of the NATO Defense College; and Andrew O’Neil, Acting Dean of the Graduate Research School and Professor of Political Science at Griffith University, formerly worked with Australia’s Department of Defence; “Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation,” Chapter 1, Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century, eds. Frühling & O’Neil, ANU Press, 2021, ISBN 9781760464912, pp.1-5 /GoGreen!

As great power competition once again assumes a central place in international relations, alliances have taken on renewed importance in the security calculations of Australia and other US allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Deterrence of an attack on allies is a core function of US alliances, as are mechanisms through which states seek to manage the risk of escalation—the movement through increasing intensity of conflict up to, in the extreme, global nuclear war.1 Alliances seek to prevent escalation in the form of an attack on its members through strategies of deterrence and extended deterrence that are themselves predicated on credible threats of escalation. Nuclear weapons are central to deterrence and escalation considerations and form a key component of America’s strategic toolkit to reassure Japan, South Korea and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the Euro-Atlantic.

However, allies cannot afford to be passive actors in their interactions with Washington. They need to prepare for and seek to manage escalation in a broader geostrategic, technological and political context that shapes the ability of alliances to adapt to a new security environment. While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US alliances differ. This volume brings together contributors from Europe, North-East Asia, the United States and Australia to better understand these challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence in twenty-first century alliances. It focuses on nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and strategic competition between the US and China; the role of non-nuclear US allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe in supporting US extended nuclear deterrence; political-military challenges in alliance plans for escalation; allied perspectives on the consequences of new non-nuclear capabilities, including cyber and hypersonic weapons, for deterrence and strategic stability; and lessons on how the US and allied nations can better engage their respective publics on questions relating to nuclear deterrence.

Alliances, Escalation and Nuclear Weapons

How to manage escalation is an inherently political question. The costs and benefits of support in case of attack and of achieving security against specific challenges will differ between allies. The credibility of extended deterrence threats rests on the commitment of certain allies, especially the US, to provide security to other allies who find themselves under more immediate threat. The asymmetric nature of an extended deterrence relationship thus creates anxieties of abandonment on the part of the threatened ally and fears of entrapment by all allies in conflicts in which they have little direct stake. For deterrence to be effective, allies nonetheless have to find ways to agree and credibly commit to what they are willing to do for each other.

Nowhere is this more important than in relation to the role of US nuclear weapons in America’s alliances. While some US allies have previously expressed sympathy for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), none today is willing to sign it, as their focus has turned to the challenge of managing escalation in potential great power conflicts in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Moscow’s penchant for nuclear sabre-rattling in crises with NATO and Ukraine, Beijing’s ambitious nuclear force modernisation, North Korea’s development of a thermonuclear and intercontinental range arsenal, and the development of new capabilities— including hypersonic missiles designed to confer escalation advantage over the US and its allies in regional conflicts—have all roused nuclear strategy from its post–Cold War hibernation. From 2011, the Obama administration established extended deterrence dialogues with North-East Asian treaty allies, Japan and South Korea, in response to growing concerns about North Korea and China. Since 2014, the NATO alliance has paid far greater institutional and political attention to the strategic role of its nuclear forces, and to the possibilities of escalation more generally after the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Under the Trump administration, US nuclear policy was notable for how little controversy it attracted among US allies, despite the administration’s decision to introduce the first new (low-yield) warhead variants since the end of the Cold War.

However, the existential dependence of US allies on decisions taken in Washington about US nuclear strategy has been a constant element in the history of US alliances, and key to grasping their inherent tensions: from US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s challenge to NATO’s nuclear strategy of massive retaliation in the early 1960s, to concerns about US– Soviet arms control undermining the security of Western Europe in the 1970s and the late 1980s, to President Obama’s declared commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US defence posture in the face of rising nuclear threats to North-East Asian allies. Throughout the Cold War, arguments about nuclear strategy were staple fare for official and academic debates, especially regarding the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. How to interpret and implement the concept of flexible response after its adoption in 1967 was the subject of often acrimonious debate in NATO, as allies sought to balance fears of abandonment, entrapment and a Soviet Union that threatened them all, but in different ways depending on their geographical position. In Asia, forward-based US nuclear forces on the Korean Peninsula were a central element in deterring North Korea until their withdrawal in 1992, and Japan carefully balanced its public aversion to nuclear weapons with practical support for the operation of US nuclear forces as a deterrent against the Soviet Union and China. In Australia, the role of the ‘joint facilities’ in US nuclear operations was a central element of the alliance in the second half of the Cold War.

Managing Escalation in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic Areas

At the 2021 Munich Security Conference, President Biden declared that ‘America is back’, and that ‘the United States is determined … to earn back our position of trusted leadership’.2 However, while it is clear that public division and disagreement among allies about how to manage escalation and deter threats are undesirable, the US and its allies still have a long way to go in either the Indo-Pacific or the Euro-Atlantic areas to develop viable and commonly accepted political-military strategies for the new era of great power competition.3 Significant differences remain between the challenges of escalation at either end of Eurasia, but the basic problem— how US allies can achieve political agreement on credible threats of military escalation, including through the use of nuclear weapons, to deter attacks by nuclear-armed powers—remains the same. Hence, the value of exchanging ideas between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic areas is also far greater than it has been in the past.

In the 1980s, a US official reportedly observed that exchanges between NATO and Japan throughout the INF negotiations had ‘taught the Japanese to speak German’.4 The Reagan administration’s decision to abrogate US obligations towards ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty) ally New Zealand was also in large part motivated by sending signals to Washington’s Scandinavian allies, some of whom at the time were flirting with anti-nuclear initiatives.5 However, the institutional and geostrategic context of US alliances in Europe and the Asia-Pacific was sharply different during the Cold War, as was their manner of engagement on questions of escalation and nuclear strategy. Today, these differences are far less pronounced, and the US, its Indo-Pacific allies and NATO are rediscovering the political-military challenges of escalation management at the same time. In the context of China’s rise, North Korea’s nuclear tests and the US retirement of its nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise missiles in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Japan and South Korea pressed US officials for ‘more NATO-like’ extended deterrence arrangements.6 NATO allies, for their part, increasingly recognise the relevance for their alliance of a possible conflict with China.7 For several years, NATO’s institutional architecture has been explicitly drawn on by Japanese security analysts to support proposals to strengthen nuclear deterrence and reassurance in the US–Japan alliance.8 Even in Australia, former prime minister Kevin Rudd—whose government in 2008 co-sponsored the Australian–Japanese International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—joined calls in 2021 for an ‘Asian Nuclear Planning Group’ that would allow the US, Australia, Japan and South Korea ‘to discuss specific policies associated with US nuclear forces and conduct war games and exercises, including those involving the highest political-level participation’.9

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