Perceptions of reliability matter – risks from BOTH abandonment and entanglement are real
Henry 20 Iain D. Henry, Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security, 44(4), Spring 2020, pp.45-83, DOI 0.1162/isec_a_00375 /GoGreen!
This interdependence debate has usually focused on adversarial interactions and reputations for resolve, defined as “the extent to which a state will risk war to keep its promises and uphold its threats.” Loyalty is usually assumed to be the obvious “flip side” of resolve, and is not often studied in its own right.8 Some studies of reputation and alliances exist, but are predominantly focused on alliance formation rather than management.9 Because loyalty has not received the significant scholarly attention centered on resolve, alliance interdependence is undertheorized.10 But as the contemporary debate about Taiwan highlights, beliefs about loyalty and alliance interdependence could be a decisive influence on policy today. If alliance interdependence exists, scholars and policymakers urgently need to know how it works.
I argue that both the deterrence theorists and the reputation skeptics are wrong. Alliance interdependence exists—what happens in one alliance can affect others—but this is not determined by a national moral character of innate loyalty. When a state observes its ally's behavior in another alliance, it does not hope to see loyalty per se. Instead, it hopes to see proof that the ally's interests align with its own. In some cases, it will be in the observer state's interest for its ally to fulfill a separate alliance commitment—that is, the state will want its ally to be loyal to the other ally. But in other cases, where loyalty would not be in the observer state's interest, it will want its ally to be disloyal to the other ally. This reasoning contrasts starkly with other theories, which expect that a state will always want its ally to demonstrate inherent, pure loyalty. I argue that the state is unconcerned about whether its ally's behavior is loyal or disloyal in any objective or moral sense. Rather, when the state is confident that its ally's interests align with its own, and therefore the alliance poses no risk of either abandonment or entrapment, then the ally is reliable.11 Observed reliability—not innate loyalty—is what states want from allies. If an ally poses risks of entrapment, abandonment, or both, then it is unreliable, and the state will act to mitigate these risks. Responses could include hedging, diplomatic restraint initiatives, intra-alliance bargaining, threats of defection, attempts to entrap the ally, or, in extremis, alliance abrogation, bandwagoning, or nuclear proliferation.12
Deterrence theory recommends that states fight for reputation, and skeptics urge policymakers not to worry about reputation costs. I argue that adroit alliance management requires understanding how developments in one alliance can affect the reliability perceptions and behavior of other allies. The United States may need to fight—or not fight—to ensure that allies still perceive it as reliable. If the true nature of interdependence is recognized, the United States can manage alliance interdependence without being captive to a “cult of reputation.”13
In the first section of this article, I examine existing theories of reputation, loyalty, and alliance interdependence, and critique the belief that states want their allies to be indiscriminately loyal. In the second section, I explain why the concept of alliance reliability has greater explanatory power than the idea of loyalty. I propose hypotheses on reliability and alliance interdependence and contrast these with deterrence theory and Mercer's reputation-skeptic argument. In the third section, I use process tracing and archival research of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) to test my theory of alliance reliability. I show that although U.S. decisionmakers fretted about being perceived as disloyal to the Republic of China (ROC, or Nationalist China), most allies actively encouraged the United States to compel an ROC withdrawal from disputed territories and thus reduce the risk of conflict. In the final section, I summarize my findings and explain their implications for theory and policy.