Counterterror cooperation is why cause-of-death stats don’t reflect the inevitability of nuclear terrorism – motive, means, opportunity, and organizational capacity are all growing
Allison 18 Dr. Graham Allison, Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy School, “Nuclear Terrorism: Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them?” PRISM, 7(3), 5-15-2018, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1507316/nuclear-terrorism-did-we-beat-the-odds-or-change-them/ /GoGreen!
Not surprisingly, the book attracted critics as well. The most common objection focused on what skeptics argued was an irresolvable contradiction between the core claims of “inevitable” and “preventable.” If something is preventable, then it cannot be inevitable, they said.
My attempt to answer their point was proving largely ineffective, since for the most part, I just kept repeating the argument stated in the book. But fortunately, I was rescued by none other than Buffett himself. In making judgments about buying stocks, and even more in owning and running several reinsurance companies, Buffett had become a legendary oddsmaker. Those businesses had also forced him to think seriously about nuclear terrorism as one of what investors call “fat tail” risks. He had concluded that such an event was virtually inevitable and that the consequences would be devastating. Thus he prohibited his companies from writing insurance against nuclear terrorism.
The following two charts clarify Buffett’s argument. Chart 1 demonstrates that if the probability of a successful nuclear terrorist attack in the year ahead is 10 percent, and if that condition persists for 50 years, the likelihood of nuclear terrorism occurring is almost 100 percent (99.5 percent to be precise).3
[CHART 1 OMITTED]
Chart 1: Probability of Nuclear Terrorist Attack if Annual Odds are 10 percent.
But as Chart 2 illustrates, if actions were taken to reduce that likelihood from 10 percent a year to 1 percent, the probability that in the next 50 years there is no successful nuclear terrorist incident rises from almost zero to 60.5 percent. These extrapolations are, as Buffett explains, simple probability calculations.4
[CHART 2 OMITTED]
Chart 2: Probability of Nuclear Terrorist Attack if Annual Odds are 1 percent.
Prior to publication, a number of referees pointed out that even if one agreed that the risks of nuclear terrorism were much greater than had been previously recognized, the policy community would ask: how likely is such an event, now? As one wag put it, what moves most Washingtonians are consequences that could happen on their watch. Even those who found Buffett’s response analytically correct argued that it was too “academic” for many participants in the policy debate.
Thus at their urging, in the final published text of Nuclear Terrorism I offered my best judgment. Specifically, I wrote that on the trajectory we were following in 2004, absent significant additional preventive actions, the likelihood that terrorists would successfully explode a nuclear bomb somewhere in the world in the decade ahead was “more likely than not.” As a leading advocate of what I call “betable propositions”—putting one’s money where one’s mouth is—I made a number of bets with colleagues who were more skeptical.5 Operationalizing my estimate, I bet $51 of my money against $49 of theirs that before December 31, 2014 we would see an act of nuclear terrorism. Needless to say, I was happy to lose these bets.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is fair to ask whether my 2004 assessment of the risk was wrong. To begin to try to answer that question, it is necessary to start with candor about the larger question of which it is a component. The cosmic question is why there has been no mega-terrorist attack on the United States since September 11, 2001 when al-Qaeda operatives crashed commercial airliners into the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
In the wake of that attack, anyone who had offered to bet that 16 years on there would have been no terrorist attack on the United States that killed more than 100 people would have been able to get 1000:1 odds. In each of the years since that attack, the annual threat assessment from the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has ranked terrorism as among the top three threats to the United States. Polls find that more than 80 percent of Americans expect another major terrorist attack in the near future.6 Half of Americans expect that they or a member of their family will be killed by terrorists.7
How can we square these expectations with what has actually happened? Who or what has actually killed Americans here in the United States during the decade and a half since the al-Qaeda strike on 9/11? On the record, tree limbs and other falling objects have killed 100 times more Americans than terrorist attacks. As Chart 3 demonstrates, apart from old age and disease, the leading causes of death for Americans here at home have been opioid overdoses (40,000); car accidents (39,000); and suicide (38,000).8
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Chart 3: Average Annual Deaths in the United States by Method of Death.
Thus, to put it bluntly, it is hard to deny the gap between the expectations of the intelligence and policy analytic community who have been trying to understand terrorism and counterterrorism, on the one hand, and the brute facts, on the other.
In attempting to understand the challenge of terrorism, analysts have used versions of Sherlock Holmes’s framework of “MMO”—motive, means, and opportunity. Identify actors who have the motivation, means, and opportunity to commit an act of terrorism, and one has the suspect list. My modified version of Holmes includes an additional “O” for organizational capability. Individuals or groups motivated to take an action but lacking the organizational skills to use available means to exploit opportunities remain only potential risks.
Employing this MMOO framework to the challenge of terrorism since 9/11, what do we find? Potential perpetrators motivated to conduct terrorist attacks on the United States have multiplied beyond anyone’s expectation in 2001. By invading and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, and striking targets in many other countries with drones, the United States has created new enemies. In Iraq and Afghanistan, our counterinsurgency campaigns on behalf of one faction against others have given thousands of other people motives to seek revenge against us. In what the Bush Administration labeled the “Global War On Terrorism,” U.S. forces have conducted attacks on the territory of at least seven Muslim-majority nations—killing individuals we labeled “terrorists,” but also civilians who are known as collateral damage. These actions have provided fodder that extremists have used skillfully to recruit and motivate payback. Indeed, the Osama bin Laden dream to ignite a “clash of civilizations” between Muslims and what he called the “Jewish-Christian crusaders” has more credibility today than anyone could have imagined at the beginning of the century.
While post–9/11 security measures have made it more difficult to hijack a commercial airliner, the means by which to kill double, triple, and even quadruple digit numbers of people have also expanded. As the Orlando and Las Vegas shootings suggested, in many states in the United States, it is not that hard to buy an assault rifle and ammunition that will allow a shooter to fire 1,000 rounds in two minutes. And recent truck attacks by ISIL-inspired fighters in Nice, Barcelona, and New York demonstrate that terrorists recognize that modern life offers them many means by which to carry out their attacks.9 The internet has also expanded the availability of chemicals, deadly opioids like fentanyl, and even pathogens. Web-accessible information about how to make elementary bombs or acquire and use pathogens like anthrax has also increased.
Opportunities to kill hundreds or even thousands of Americans also abound. As military planners would put it, the United States offers a “target-rich” environment. Terrorists intent on killing large numbers could find them everywhere: from malls and movie theaters to sports stadiums and churches.
Organizational capability appears to have been terrorists’ Achilles’ heel. The planner of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, demonstrated extraordinary imagination and operational skills. Intelligence professionals gave his design and execution of the plan an “A.” Fortunately, he has been one of the few. Advances in al-Qaeda’s bombmaking appear to be traceable also to a single individual—Ibrahim al-Asiri. He developed the bombs for the failed underwear bomb plot in 2009 and cargo hold plot in 2010, as well as the laptop bomb that led the Trump Administration to temporarily ban laptops on flights.10
Terrorists have for the most part been “technically challenged.” Should that factor change, the overall picture could also change dramatically overnight.
In sum, the question about why there has been no nuclear terrorist attack is one piece of the larger puzzle about why there has been no mega-terrorist attack of any kind. And the deeper question behind that is whether we in the analytic community have a good grasp on the fundamentals of this challenge. Truth be told, I register my doubts.
Nonetheless, I am not ready to conclude that my 2004 estimate of the odds of a nuclear terror attack was incorrect. And contrary to the claims of a number of critics, as a matter of statistics, the evidence of the past 13 years does not require me to do so. A brief aside on the logic of betting and odds will explain why. Imagine a coin that was slightly weighted so that it had a 51 percent chance of landing heads and 49 percent chance of tails. From a single toss of that coin that landed tails, what could one conclude? Statistically, the answer is—very little. Such a result would be expected to happen 49 out of every 100 times the coin was tossed. If we tossed the coin a second time, and again it landed tails, statisticians would again remind us that the chances of that occurring were 1 in 4. To conclude as a matter of statistics that my estimate was incorrect would take a lifetime of successive decades in which there was no successful nuclear attack.11 Thus, I stand behind my assessment in 2004 that the odds of an attack in the next decade were greater than even. (As we all know, dozens of planned terrorist attacks have failed or been foiled—from the Christmas Day underwear bomber to the Times Square bombers.)
The issue this article addresses is whether in the past decade we have just beaten the odds, or whether actions we have taken have changed the odds for the better. To address that question, it is necessary to review the array of factors and actions that have reduced the risk of nuclear terrorism on the one hand, and those that have increased the risk on the other.
Consider, for example, what would likely have happened after 9/11 had Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda been able to continue operating from their headquarters in Afghanistan. As the video bin Laden made after the attack demonstrated, he was thrilled by what Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s operation had achieved. He later called on all faithful Muslims to join the jihad and top 9/11. At the pinnacle of his pyramid of destruction was a mushroom cloud enveloping one of the great cities of the world. What prevented that first and foremost was a relentless counterterrorism campaign that killed or captured most of al-Qaeda’s leadership and left the others spending most of their time trying to survive rather than perfecting plots for future terrorist attacks. Destruction of their headquarters and training camps meant that thousands of individuals who would have been planning, training, and then conducting terrorist attacks never got their chance. On the other hand, the failure to stop North Korea from developing a nuclear arsenal, as well as the collapse of U.S.–Russian nuclear security cooperation, have created new significant risks.
Section II of this article reviews actions taken that have reduced the risk of nuclear terrorism. Section III reviews factors and actions that have increased these risks. A concluding section offers an updated assessment of the risks posed by nuclear terrorism from the perspective of year-end 2017. While applauding thousands of actions that have been taken by hundreds of thousands of individuals in the past 13 years to reduce these risks, reviewing all the pluses and all the minuses, my gut tells me that the chances of a successful nuclear terrorist attack in the decade that began in 2015—in effect, the second flip of the coin—are better than even. Specifically, I believe the odds of a successful nuclear terrorist attack somewhere in the world before the end of 2024 are 51 percent or higher. While giving thanks that terrorists have failed to achieve their deadliest ambitions, in my view that is not grounds for complacency, but rather a reason for redoubling our efforts.
I am aware that on an issue about which I am passionate, I may have slipped from analysis to advocacy. The central point is not whether the odds of a nuclear terrorist attack are 51 percent or 15 percent. Threat equals likelihood times consequences, and in this case, the consequences would be devastating. Since the costs of actions to reduce these risks are modest, prudent policymakers should focus on the feasible agenda of actions.
Factors and Actions That Have Reduced the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
In the past decade, the United States and its international partners have taken literally thousands of specific actions that closed what had been open doors to terrorists acquiring a nuclear bomb, or nuclear materials from which they could have fashioned an improvised nuclear weapon. In terms of the MMOO framework, U.S. counterterrorism and counterproliferation actions have significantly diminished both the means and the opportunities.
On the counterterrorism front, the terrorist groups that sought to attack the United States with nuclear weapons have been decimated. Osama bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and most of the operational talent behind 9/11 have been captured or killed. While Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Zawahiri, succeeded him as head of al-Qaeda, and while several of the key operatives including Abdel Aziz al Masri, who led the organization’s nuclear program, remain missing, the deadly pursuit of the entire roster of the organization by collaborative intelligence, Special Operations Forces, and drones has severely diminished al-Qaeda’s ability to mount a nuclear terrorist attack.
Al-Qaeda’s successor as the greatest terror threat to the United States, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), has also suffered heavy losses in recent months. In 2014, ISIL acquired a broad swath of territory across Iraq and Syria—a safehaven in which it could train militants, plot attacks, and compile resources. While we know less about ISIL’s efforts to acquire nuclear materials, the fact that the Belgian police discovered that ISIL agents involved in the 2015 terrorist attacks had surveillance footage of a Belgian nuclear research facility is suggestive.12 Furthermore, its ideological centerpiece—an epic final battle with the West—would seem to require nuclear Armageddon. By wiping out its safehavens in Syria and Iraq, the United States and its partners have diminished ISIL’s ability to organize a major effort to acquire nuclear weapons.