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Structural limitations compound – scarce staffing and budgetary constraints, a spaghetti bowl of conflicting authorities, funding cycles, and reporting requirements, and high turnover ALL make tradeoffs in DoD planning unavoidable – they cannot walk and chew gum

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf /GoGreen!

First, the proliferation and complexity of authorities make it difficult to develop security cooperation initiatives with partners, especially ambitious efforts that integrate several types of activities requiring multiple authorities. Every authority details different requirements and constraints concerning which partners are eligible, under what circumstances, and with what reporting requirements. Military planners in the field often have little experience managing security cooperation and rotate every two to three years, while more experienced DoD civilians are few in number with perhaps a handful to support a combatant command. Many initiatives require several authorities using different sources of funding on different cycles with different processes and restrictions, and different congressional reporting requirements. Should funding for one of these authorities fall through, major events may be canceled or radically restructured. Despite its value in helping deploy partners to Afghanistan, the Coalition Readiness Support Program example discussed earlier provided only one of the five authorities necessary to support four infantry battalions from the country of Georgia. Similarly, it was one of only six authorities required to loan Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to another country. In addition to the inefficiencies created by this patchwork approach, the delays and changes that result from associated planning problems can generate confusion with partners and setbacks in strengthening relationships and building a partner’s capabilities. Even more-modest efforts can require multiple authorities, leading some planners to avoid smaller programs because they may only have time for one or two high-visibility efforts. Finally, greater complexity has required greater involvement by DoD lawyers to interpret what is and is not allowed, with different interpretations by different individuals or organizations or at different times. For example, can a particular maritime training event be considered a counterterrorism effort? Can a particular exercise pay for certain civilians to attend? Legal uncertainties like these have resulted in delays and cancellations, generating further frustration and confusion between U.S. and foreign military planners.

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