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It’s NOT a one-shot deal – it’s an ongoing, ever-expanding commitment to thirty countries – planners perceive multiplicative, NOT just additive, opportunity costs

Gold 21 Zack Gold, Ralph Espach, Douglas Jackson, and Nicholas Bradford, researchers in the Strategy, Policy, and Plans division of the Center for Naval Analyses, where they have conducted numerous evaluations of security cooperation activities for the U.S. military in recent years, “A Better Way to Measure Returns on U.S. Security Cooperation Investments,” Defense One, 6-16-2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/better-way-measure-returns-us-security-cooperation-investments/174742/ /GoGreen!

Second, even if the returns were quantifiable, the real costs of security cooperation for the U.S. military are often unmeasurable. For example, past analysis indicates that the structure of the Navy’s cost accounting system makes it impossible to know the full, exact cost of any security cooperation deployment or activity. Additionally, there is opportunity cost in every decision about security cooperation. In Washington, the focus in recent years has been on realigning resources for great power competition. However, each geographic combatant command has dozens of partners. How, for example, can one accurately calculate the real and opportunity costs of conducting a bilateral exercise with Brazil as opposed to Colombia; or even with the UAE navy versus the UAE armed forces?

Third, return on investment focuses on the wrong unit of analysis. By trying to quantify the costs and returns of isolated security cooperation activities, evaluations fail to capture the full context of security cooperation with U.S. partners. The U.S. conducts security cooperation as integrated, iterative, or mutually supporting activities that involve multiple countries or multiple elements of a single country. For example, providing a patrol craft, training a crew, and exercising patrol operations are all discrete security cooperation activities, but which is responsible for building a partner’s maritime patrol capability—and can any of these activities achieve that desired outcome without the others? The outcomes of these activities are therefore not an additive result of individual security cooperation activities, but oftentimes a multiplicative one, further reducing the utility of return on investment as a useful tool.

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