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There is no part of the government not on board, it just takes a while

O’Mahony 18 Angela O’Mahony, associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND, former assistant professor of international political economy and economic statecraft at the University of British Columbia, PhD political science, UCSD; Ilana Blum, researcher at RAND; Gabriela Armenta, researcher at RAND; Nicholas Burger, senior economist at RAND and director of RAND’s Washington office; Joshua Mendelsohn, researcher at RAND; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Steven W. Popper, researcher at RAND; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Thomas S. Szayna, senior political scientist and former director of RAND's Defense and Political Sciences Department at RAND, MA international relations, Claremont Graduate School; “Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation,” RR2165, RAND Corporation, 2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1056354.pdf /GoGreen!

As Part I of this study discussed, Army security cooperation activities have aligned fairly well with what previous analyses have found contribute to effectiveness in both security cooperation and international development assistance. However, across the U.S. government, requirements for more rigorous and systematic AM&E are growing. The Army, with the rest of DoD, must improve its ability to analyze and report the extent to which its security cooperation activities are meeting their objectives. As Part I makes clear, there is still much to be learned. As the United States increases the scope of security cooperation, in terms of both activity and partner types, planners will need to understand not only what has been effective in the past but also how to identify lessons from the broader range of partners the United States is engaging. Part II of this study focuses on helping the Army develop an AM&E implementation framework that will better link security cooperation activities to their outcomes.

AM&E Developments—and Requirements—Are Accelerating

Within the past ten years, several developments have laid the foundations for a more strategic and analytically rigorous approach to security cooperation. As shown in Figure 4.1, these developments have arisen at several levels of government: Congress, the White House, OSD, DSCA, and combatant commands (CCMDs), and within the Army itself.

First, an important impetus for DoD’s recent efforts to improve the security cooperation AM&E process has come from Congress, some of whose members are eager for the department to improve its ability to track security cooperation resource expenditures and demonstrate the effectiveness of security cooperation programs in achieving DoD objectives at the national, theater, or country level. In Section 1202 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress mandated that DoD work with the Department of State (DoS) to establish a strategic framework for security cooperation “to guide prioritization of resources and activities.” Furthermore, it specified that one of the elements of this strategic framework would be “a methodology for assessing the effectiveness of Department of Defense security cooperation programs in making progress toward achieving the primary objectives, priorities, and desired end-states . . . including an identification of key benchmarks for such progress.”1 The FY 2017 NDAA reiterates the previous NDAA’s call for a security [Figure 4.1 OMITTED] cooperation AM&E framework, but goes further by requiring an “independent assessment of defense security cooperation programs.”2

Second, the National Security Council laid the groundwork in 2013 for a more integrated approach to security sector assistance. Directed primarily at DoS and DoD, Presidential Policy Directive 23 (Security Sector Assistance Policy) called for “a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with [U.S.] national security priorities.” Among other things, this meant ensuring greater consistency between programs and objectives, fostering transparency and coordination across U.S. government agencies, building sustainable partner security capacity through comprehensive sector strategies, being more selective in the use of security assistance resources to achieve the greatest impact, and informing policy with rigorous analysis, assessment, and evaluations. According to the directive, this latter effort would involve introducing “common standards and expectations for assessing security cooperation requirements” as well as “investing in monitoring and evaluation of security sector assistance programs.” Although the emphasis was on greater standardization of AM&E policies and procedures throughout the security assistance sector, the directive did indicate that newly established “standards and data collection will take into account the varying security and information environments where U.S. programs operate.”3

Third, in 2016 OSD released Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise, which provides guidance for a “whole of DoD” approach to security cooperation AM&E. It asserts that “accountability and learning are the primary purposes” of AM&E, and highlights AM&E’s importance in demonstrating security cooperation’s “returns on investment” so policymakers might “identify and improve or eliminate ineffective initiatives” as well as garner evidentiary support for policy and legislative proposals.4

The DoDI specifies two main military service requirements in supporting CCMD AM&E: (1) an initial (country-level) assessment of the security cooperation environment and (2) an initial design document (IDD) for “significant” security cooperation initiatives. “The initial assessment provides an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements immediately before the implementation of security cooperation initiatives and other activities.” It informs initiative design and establishes a “baseline against which to track progress.” The IDD contains milestones and measures that allow for performance monitoring and “independent and rigorous evaluations” of initiative “relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability.”5 The IDD must also include a TOC.

Within the terms of the DoDI, the GCCs have the primary security cooperation AM&E role. Their responsibilities include (1) leading initial assessment efforts, (2) orchestrating the assessment process, (3) formulating IDDs for all significant initiatives, (4) monitoring all significant initiatives, and (5) submitting to DSCA all initial country assessments and IDDs for new security cooperation initiatives.6 Based on the analysis in this report, services play an important role in every step of the AM&E process, particularly for the activities they implement directly. ASCCs play a particularly important role linking Army security cooperation to GCCs’ initial assessment and IDD.

In addition to issuing the DoDI, OSD has encouraged the development of AM&E processes, for example, by highlighting the importance of AM&E in various other guidance documents and hosting DoD-wide and interagency workshops to share best practices. These efforts were accelerated and better integrated after OSD’s establishment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation in 2015. This office undertook several initiatives over the past two years, supported by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, which focused on institutionalizing best practices in security cooperation planning, transparency, and AM&E.7

Fourth, innovative concepts for using technology to improve data collection have allowed hundreds of U.S. security cooperation practitioners around the globe to report on their activities in more methodical and comprehensive ways and for policymakers and program managers to provide more rigorous oversight. The creation of security cooperation management information systems by the GCCs and other DoD organizations provided unprecedented platforms for planning, resourcing, assessing, monitoring, and evaluating future security cooperation AM&E efforts. These largely independent initiatives have begun to coalesce in the form of a comprehensive tool for tracking DoD security cooperation activities and resources: G-TSCMIS, whose development is being managed by DSCA (with support from the Joint Staff) and is required to be used by all DoD security cooperation activity managers. G-TSCMIS is still a work in progress, and CCMDs face challenges getting all relevant activities included in the system.8 Still, even when G-TSCMIS is fully developed and widely used, it will not fulfill all the information management needs required for effective security cooperation planning and AM&E, which is why the CCMDs and other security cooperation organizations continue to use their own systems.

In addition to overseeing the development of G-TSCMIS, DSCA has also recently launched an initiative to formalize security cooperation workforce competencies and associated experiential and training requirements, which could eventually contribute to a larger pool of qualified AM&E professionals within the security cooperation field.

Fifth, the Joint Staff has also played an important role in attempting to improve and standardize security cooperation and security force assistance (SFA) doctrine, including with respect to AM&E. Acknowledging the challenge of determining the extent to which security cooperation activities have contributed to U.S. objectives, the draft Joint Publication 3-20 provides guidelines for three kinds of security cooperation assessments: operations assessments (which focus on “are we doing the right things”), task assessments (which focus on “are we doing things right”), and functional assessments (which focus on “are we efficient and effective”).9

Sixth, OSD established theater campaign plans (TCPs) for CCMDs and campaign support plans for the military services as a way of applying military planning techniques beyond traditional war plans to incorporate more steady-state activities like security cooperation. These plans allowed for a Secretary of Defense–led analysis and discussion of security cooperation ends, ways, and means that did not exist before. More recently, the CCMDs have begun to develop country plans that promise a clear auditing trail between theater objectives and the means (activities and resources) employed to achieve them that involve U.S. allies and partner nations, given appropriate country objectives and metrics as well as improved country-level data collection.

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