It’s the only thing that solves---cyber norms fail if they’re confined to insular alliance communities like NATO.
Adina Ponta 21, advisor to the Committee on Information Technology and Communications in the Romanian Parliament, teaching lecturer at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania and a postdoctoral researcher at the Law School’s Center for Business Law & Information Technology, “Legal Instability in Cyberspace and OSCE’s Mitigation Role,” Juridical Tribune, vol. 11, no. 3, 12/28/2021, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.24818/TBJ/2021/11/3.01
4. The process of consolidating existing norms under the OSCE umbrella
4.1 The old and new role of the OSCE
The more we try to perceive conflict as a manifestation of failed management of disagreements, the higher are the chances of developing efficient conflict prevention measures.35 Norm-making processes offer valuable opportunities for stakeholders to recognize the effects of limited trust between major powers and the means to overcome them. Regional organizations such as the OSCE were created as a response to the need observed by States to build trust and strengthen cooperation and are often regarded as holding the key to the impasse at the global level.36
Regional organizations have a long history of working with CBMs in conventional security areas.37 The OSCE, the world’s largest security-oriented regional organization, has a direct mandate to work on reducing risks of conflict in Europe, and successfully played the role it assumed in 2011 to strengthen cybersecurity.38 In 2017, the OSCE had already developed sixteen practical and actionable measures in this area, which can be grouped into two main clusters: transparency and cooperation measures. These tools aim at enhancing cooperation, transparency, predictability, and stability, to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflict, that may stem from the use of ICTs.39 These goals are tackled through information-sharing, improvement of national protective capacities, cooperation on incident response, and refrainment from destabilizing State practices.40
Due to its long history of promoting constructive dialogue, the OSCE is best suited to continuously respond to regional concerns or needs, not only of like-minded participating States, but also to bring together non-likeminded States which are in different stages of cyber development.41 OSCE’s active efforts in shaping developments in the cyber domain, including setting the global tone for the development and operationalization of norms and CBMs, is broadly recognized by its partner organizations and in GGE reports.42
As the current OSCE’s focus is to implement already agreed CBMs, rather than pursuing additional cyber norms, this paper aims at arguing several tools of effective consolidation.43 First, this process should build on previously agreed principles and norms, and focus on issues which received broad support by individual States, or by parallel processes, such as the GGE. Although due diligence is not widely endorsed as a binding rule of international law, there is currently widespread support of this non-binding norm of responsible State behavior.44 Voluntary non-binding norms can progressively acquire customary international law status, as well as third party endorsement. Efficient norms may generate productive imitation, especially if these are agreed by soft powers, as the espionage case illustrates.45 Therefore, simplicity might be the key, by reaching political commitments among a group of like-minded actors, by operationalization of agreements and development of culturally grounded behavioral expectations.46 The potential for practical implementation of CBMs makes them unique instruments, not just in the OSCE area, but as a source of good practices for other organizations to replicate.47
Second, the OSCE efforts escape many of the hurdles of high-level political commitments, including vague language, and focus on directive steps.48 The stakeholders should identify and capitalize on the benefits of regional bodies, including their capacity to be more responsive to the changing environment, and the closed sessions with less public scrutiny, where States’ concerns can be more effectively addressed.49 Moreover, benefiting from an established Secretariat and attached procedures, States can adapt OSCE information-sharing platforms to even more robust frameworks. As a neutral organization, with a clear mandate, the OSCE can act as an objective forum, because it does not have defense or sanctioning prerogatives.
Third, the OSCE should capitalize on the participation of its stakeholders, which are States, primary actors of international law. While other norm-making laboratories, such as the Tallinn Manual 2.0, are influential resources, these multilateral efforts are criticized for only addressing the members of a particular system or alliance, and therefore, their lack of impact on States that are not involved in that process.50 The USA and the Russian Federation, two of the States that are far apart on fundamental questions of application of international law to cyberspace, have participated in the GGEs and are standing members of the OSCE.