OSCE can compel members to share information about cybersecurity challenges---despite a divergence in values in the membership.
Adina Ponta 21, advisor to the Committee on Information Technology and Communications in the Romanian Parliament, teaching lecturer at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania and a postdoctoral researcher at the Law School’s Center for Business Law & Information Technology, “Legal Instability in Cyberspace and OSCE’s Mitigation Role,” Juridical Tribune, vol. 11, no. 3, 12/28/2021, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.24818/TBJ/2021/11/3.01
Fifth, as the coordinating fora for CBMs, the OSCE, has accumulated political capital of addressing States’ reluctance regarding information-sharing and inherent challenges that create multi-stakeholder cooperation problems. During the previous rounds, the OSCE gained an overview on which objectives can reasonably be achieved multilaterally, and which ones are more suited for bilateral cooperation mechanisms.53 Deriving lessons learned from past processes enables better approaches to national interests, concerns, and operational practices.54
It would be utopic to believe that major powers will agree on interpretations of every legal institution. Even the experts of the Tallinn Manual Process could not agree on basic principles, although as mentioned, they mainly originated from like- minded states and cultures. The first part of this paper highlighted that the process of norm-creation may matter as much as the destination, as participants agree to disagree and understand each other’s differences and underlying rationales.
Another important endeavor is the analysis of past and present challenges of effective implementation of voluntary norms. The OSCE should strive at assisting States to recognize the prospective domestic and foreign policy value of recognizing CBMs.55 The reasons why some of the measures were perceived as being less important, implementation challenges, and responses within the civil society and industry shall be thoroughly examined.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is sometimes cited as a possible model for future cybersecurity cooperation. 56 This approach has been described as a “coalition of the willing” against a global threat by means of flexible coordination of national and international instruments.57 The proposed institutional architecture encourages collective action for a common cause, without requiring legally binding commitments. This agreement is also recognized for reaching a political commitment by only a few States, which accepted that they have different capacities and resources to identify and respond to threats. This initiative represents a successful example of voluntary cooperation, first among like-minded States, around enforcement of specific, agreed norms of behavior.
The OSCE participating States should capitalize on lessons learned to operationalize norms in a practical manner, such as was the case of the 1990 OSCE Vienna Document on Negotiations on CSBMs, which contained voluntary military measures aiming at enhancing transparency, trust building, and arms control. After their translation into the cyber realm, these tools departed from the traditional military components of CSBMs and adopted more cyber diplomacy approaches, bringing both likeminded and non-likeminded States to the table.58