Central Asia escalates
Stephen Blank 12, PhD, Senior Fellow @ Strategic Studies Institute - US Army War College, "Making Sense of Moscow’s Syrian Gambit," 6/27/12, https://sldinfo.com/2012/06/making-sense-of-moscows-syrian-gambit/
Beyond that Moscow was and still may be equally anxious that the “Arab Spring” or some analogue of it might erupt in Central Asia where it even publicly voiced its apprehensions about that in April 2011.[xi] Any such uprising might spread throughout Central Asia and trigger an explosion on a scale resembling or even surpassing Syria’s current travails. And there are analysts who have publicly warned that such a revolution could occur under the inspiration of Arab events.[xii]
Moreover, Russian perceptions of disaster were quickly confirmed as Libya fell into civil war and as it became clear that Islamist factions might actually take power in one or more of the affected Arab states.
Russian discussions of the Arab Spring regularly complain that these revolutions’ likely outcome is an Islamist takeover leading to a protracted civil war or at least civil strife as those forces seek to impose their vision of a just society on their countries if not neighbors as well.[xiii]
Since Moscow is currently fighting an Islamic insurgency in the North Caucasus and fears for one in Central Asia the prospect of other Islamist victories or civil wars engendered by attempted Islamist takeovers in regions where Moscow still perceives as its strategic perimeter might evoke profound nervousness if not anxiety in Moscow.
(For a look at a video showing Russian attack helicopters of the sort being sent to aide the Assad regime see
II Strategic and Geopolitical Goals
Beyond these compelling domestic reasons for resisting the Arab Spring, Russia has equally profound strategic objections to Western interventions in the Middle East.
These include but go beyond the belief that the West deceived Moscow regarding Libya and used the UN resolutions on Libya to create a precedent as in Kosovo for a war on behalf of democracy promotion, or, more cynically, for French access to Libyan oil and gas. If the democracy virus could easily spread to Moscow’s restive Muslim south or Central Asia, democracy promotion on the wings of NATO aircraft threatens Russia’s fundamental domestic system and great power interests.
Since 1991 Russia has professed that any regional strife in and around its (i.e. Soviet) perimeter not only exposes it to war or at least significant threat, it might also escalate beyond anyone’s control as in Iraq and trigger a protracted war that could escalate vertically even to the nuclear level if Russia is drawn in.[xiv] Alternatively it could escalate horizontally if it spreads throughout the Middle East, which Moscow still claims as its strategic perimeter.
Given Moscow’s lack of confidence in Western judgments and suspicions of its inveterate hostility to Russia, it is hardly surprising that Russian spokesmen from Putin and Medvedev down have repeatedly threatened that intervention in Arab revolutions could escalate all the way up to nuclear war.[xv]