OSCE is the only viable post-Ukraine framework that has a chance to promote global norms---but it needs a proof of concept.
Andrew Lohsen 22, fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Can the OSCE Help Resolve the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?,” CSIS, 1/12/2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-osce-help-resolve-russia-ukraine-crisis
The flurry of diplomatic meetings dedicated to Moscow’s demands for a new security paradigm in Europe will culminate with discussions at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on January 13. The scheduled talks in Vienna have garnered little attention in comparison to bilateral U.S.-Russian discussions on January 10 and the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on January 12. In truth, few concrete outcomes are likely to result from the final round of discussions, which will take place during a regular session of the OSCE’s Permanent Council. The scope of Russia’s demands and the fundamental questions they pose are far too complex to be considered in a single meeting. Nonetheless, if Russia is willing to engage in diplomatic negotiations about the future of European security—as opposed to insisting on the West’s immediate acceptance of its demands in their entirety—and refrains from using them as a pretext for war, then the potential role of the OSCE in securing a new peace in Europe is worth close consideration.
As a forum for dialogue covering a broad range of regional security issues with an open membership policy, the OSCE arguably is the most appropriate of the aforementioned venues to consider Russia’s maximalist proposals. Yet the organization faces considerable constraints on its ability to serve as a useful platform for dialogue. In this regard, a look at the potential advantages and disadvantages of the OSCE in facilitating a resolution to the crisis is helpful in devising recommendations on how to improve its chances of success in breaking the impasse.
Why the OSCE Is the Right Framework
In many ways, the OSCE is the ideal framework in which to consider Russia’s security demands as well as the reciprocal views of other countries. First and foremost, the OSCE’s membership structure ensures that all countries with a stake in European security are included in the discussion. The OSCE was created as a forum for dialogue between the East and West during the Cold War. By design, it has an inclusive membership policy and comprises 57 participating states spanning from Vancouver to Vladivostok. There are no prerequisites for membership other than geography. The organization operates according to a consensus-based decisionmaking model, ensuring that less powerful states in Europe have just as much of an opportunity to engage in and shape discussions on security issues as their more powerful neighbors. In the context of Russia’s buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s border and its insistence on carving out a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region, discussions at the OSCE allow the Biden administration to follow through on its pledge not to conclude security agreements with Russia over the heads of the countries that would be most affected by them. Of the many discussions scheduled for mid-January, this is the only one in which Ukraine has a chance to respond directly to Russia’s demands and to do so on an equal footing.
Second, Russia’s proposals take aim at core concepts of regional security that emerged from the OSCE. The OSCE traces its origins to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, in which contemporary European states unanimously pledged to uphold 10 principles guiding relations between them. These principles, which became known as the Decalogue, include sovereign equality and respect for rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These are precisely the issues that Russia has brought up for debate with its recent proposals for NATO and the United States. If Russia wishes to engage in earnest talks on revising the foundations of European security, then the OSCE—as the forum in which Russia initially agreed to adhere to these principles—is the right venue for this discussion. Russia affirmed its commitment to upholding basic standards of behavior outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which adapted the concept of comprehensive security to the post-Communist era, when it signed the 1999 Charter for European Security. It pledged to implement these documents fully and in good faith at the 2010 Astana Summit, which was the most recent high-level summit organized under the auspices of the OSCE. Clearly, there is a need to work though the discrepancies between what Russia agreed to and its recent actions.
Finally, the OSCE has experience supporting negotiations on confidence-building measures that could allay Russia’s stated concerns. Underpinning Russia’s demands for a cordon sanitaire in the post-Soviet space and a restriction on NATO enlargement and its activities in non-member states is a narrative that portrays Russia as a besieged fortress that is surrounded on all sides by enemies. This belief among the top echelons of the Kremlin has metastasized after five waves of NATO enlargement. It is still unclear whether Russia will accept anything short of its demand for a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, but a shift in focus toward mitigating specific capabilities and behaviors that provoke concern in Moscow would put the OSCE in a position to affect a positive outcome. Having hosted talks that led to the adoption of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and Open Skies Treaties at the end of the Cold War, and as the organization in charge of the Vienna Document, the OSCE has sufficient experience and technical capacity to lead dialogues on reducing tensions through transparency, improved communication, and reciprocal limitations. More recently, limited progress has been made in the OSCE’s Structured Dialogue on the topic of risk reduction, and this format could be used as a springboard for additional confidence-building measures to rebuild the basic trust that is a prerequisite to talks at the strategic level.