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BRI solves southeast Asian stability

Wuthnow 17 – Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University. (“Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative:

Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications,” INSS “China Strategic Perspective” Chapter 12. October 2017. ) CTF

One common argument in Chinese analyses of the BRI is that regional integration will contribute to a more stable security environment, especially around China’s southern and western periphery. This argument both reflects and supports Xi’s broader vision for a new regional order—often described as a “community of common destiny” or “community of shared interests”—in which economic development and cooperative security reinforce each other.27 China’s 2017 white paper on Asia-Pacific security explains the logic:

Security and development are closely linked and mutually complementary. Equal consideration should be given to both a security framework and an economic framework—the main components of the entire regional structure—to ensure their parallel development. On the one hand, the improvement of the security framework will help ensure a peaceful and stable environment for economic development; on the other, faster regional economic integration will provide solid economic and social support for the development of the security framework.28

This is not an abstract goal but rather vital to the mitigation of a range of security challenges within and around China’s borders, including terrorism, separatism, and extremism (known as the “three evils”), territorial disputes with India in the Himalayas and with several Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea, and the alleged fomenting of “color revolutions” by the United States.29 Along these lines, Chinese scholars argue that the BRI can help improve stability in several ways:

Mitigating the sources of violence in fragile states. Retired Major General Wang Haiyun, a senior advisor at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), claims that economic growth created by the BRI will “eradicate poverty,” which is a “root cause” of terrorism and extremism, and play a role in “diffusing clashes of civilization that should actually never happen, and calming the restless social sentiments of Islamic regions.”30 This could reduce perceived threats such as those posed by Uighur separatists and militants of the so-called Islamic State (IS) infiltrating into China.31

Ameliorating territorial disputes. Wang Junsheng, a scholar at the CASS National Institute of International Strategy, argues that the BRI will help resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea by moving leaders away from a “zero sum” mindset. As evidence, he claims that Vietnam’s participation in BRI projects has lowered tensions between Beijing and Hanoi in the South China Sea, and led to stronger overall Sino-Vietnamese relations.32 Hu Bo, a research fellow at Beijing University, similarly argues that one goal of the BRI is to alleviate maritime disputes, though this does not imply that China will “sacrifice” its “legal rights” to enforce territorial claims.33

Increasing mutual trust.34 Li Gang, a scholar at the Central Party School’s Institute of International Strategy, argues that the BRI will exhibit China’s virtues of “openness, trustworthiness, inclusivity, and development,” and thus convince other states of its peaceful intentions.35 Renmin University professor Wang Yiwei likewise contends that trust gained through “civil and local interactions” in creating the BCIM economic corridor will help Beijing and New Delhi overcome historical suspicions.36

Building more effective security partnerships. Central Party School scholar Sun Xianpu argues that China can expand CT intelligence sharing, training, and technical exchanges under the BRI framework, citing closer CT cooperation with Pakistan as an example. Sun also anticipates greater cooperation in the areas of counternarcotics in Southeast Asia, and counterpiracy in South Asia.37 Senior Colonel Meng Xiangqing, a professor at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) NDU, similarly argues that the BRI will lead to closer CT cooperation among Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, which is needed to address violent extremism and to stabilize Afghanistan following a reduction of U.S. forces.38

A weakness of the Chinese literature is that it tends to assert rather than substantiate a causal relationship between development and security. This tendency underscores official rhetoric promoting the “community of common destiny,” but ignores contentious debates in international relations and policy circles about the linkages between regional integration and conflict. Many studies, of course, support the argument that regional trade integration helps reduce conflict.39 Others, however, have found either no relationship or suggest that high levels of economic interdependence could even increase the chance of interstate militarized disputes in some cases.40 Moreover, Chinese analyses often fail to consider how regional integration may be increasing transnational security threats, such as facilitating international crime.41 By ignoring these perspectives, China’s security community might not have adequately considered the possible externalities of BRI projects.

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