A European system is key to stabilize Russia
Menon 22 – Rajan Menon is the director of grand strategy at Defense Priorities. (“A NEW AND BETTER SECURITY ORDER FOR EUROPE,” Defense Priorities. February 15th, 2022. https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/a-new-and-better-security-order-for-europe) CTF
NATO EXPANSION AND PERPETUAL CRISES IF EUROPE’S SECURITY ORDER EXCLUDES RUSSIA
Not every dispute between Russia and Ukraine or Russia and Georgia can be chalked up to NATO expansion.1 Yet the denial of any connection flies in the face of the evidence. Every post-Cold War Soviet and Russian leader (Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin) has condemned NATO expansion. Moreover, Russia’s preoccupation with, and antipathy toward, that project reflects a historical pattern: great powers seek spheres of influence and resist adversaries’ attempts to establish a military presence within them.2 That may not be commendable or desirable, but it does mean Russia’s behavior cannot reasonably be viewed as aberrant or indeed wholly different from that of other great powers, including the United States.
Seen thus, the 2014–2015 and 2021–2022 crises centering on Ukraine were not purely bilateral ones between Ukraine and Russia. They resulted, in part, from Washington’s failure to seize the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War—the “unipolar moment,” when the United States wielded unprecedented, peerless power—to forge a pan-European security order that extended from the Atlantic to the Urals (as the USSR’s last leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, put it) and included Russia. The decision to expand NATO excluded Russia from the new European order, whereas a Europe-wide system would have laid the foundation for far-reaching arms control and confidence-building measures, strengthening the security of a Europe, newly conceived.3 Such measures as were taken to include Russia were never so far reaching.4 Instead, the thinking about the continent’s future was timid and, worse, stuck in the past.
American leaders may speak in general terms about the desirability of a European order that integrates Russia, but such an arrangement would diminish, and over time perhaps even destroy, U.S. primacy in Europe. Russia is too large, powerful, and independent to accept a European order in which the United States’ preferences on critical matters tend to prevail. The desire to preserve the United States’ preeminent position within NATO may explain Washington’s choice not to include Russia in the alliance once it began to expand after the Cold War.
Post-Cold War NATO expansion not only obligated the United States to defend countries marginal to U.S. national security, but also contributed to crises with Russia involving Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–2015, 2021–2022).
Russia’s alienation from a European order marked by U.S. primacy and NATO enlargement also contributed to the demise of arguably the most significant arms control agreement in modern European history: the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The INF Treaty eliminated all U.S. and Soviet ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 550 and 5,000 kilometers from Europe (and, in Russia’s case, Asia as well).5 Opportunities to build upon previous conventional (non-nuclear) arms control treaties, such as the 1990 Conventional Arms Forces in Europe Treaty, were also lost. Russia and the United States charged one another with violating these agreements, but their differences should have been resolved through negotiations, so that those accords could continue to contribute to European security.
A new European security order should include regular diplomatic and military-to-military exchanges with Russia. Discussions within these forums could help prepare the groundwork for confidence-building measures that reduce the risk of the frequent, close, and dangerous encounters between the two countries’ warships and military aircraft in and around the Baltic Sea and Black Sea—something that has occurred on several occasions—creating accidents that could spiral into a conflict between the world’s two nuclear superpowers.6
NATO continually underscores the magnitude of Russian power and the threat it poses to Europe, but maintaining forces required to deter Russia should not preclude steps toward a new European security system in which it acquires a stake. Yet NATO remains divided on whether to engage Russia. Even those members of the alliance who favor engagement are not of one mind on what the agenda for engagement should be, the extent to which engagement should be pursued, and the ends it should seek.
Within NATO, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are the least enthusiastic about formulating a new approach toward Russia that would have a distinctive European stamp.7 They are also the most fervent opponents of strategic autonomy aimed at military self-sufficiency on the continent, or even a reduced U.S. military presence.
The United States and Russia control approximately 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, which makes avoiding direct conflict between them paramount.
The United States nevertheless has good reasons to change course in Europe, among them China’s rise, the relative decline in American economic power, and festering social and economic problems at home.8 And as the 2021–2022 crisis with Russia demonstrated, the American security guarantee to an enlarged NATO has created more demanding defense commitments to its eastern flank now that a stronger Russia has emerged. The consensus in Washington is that China presents the principal challenge to American primacy, and Americans are increasingly concerned about problems on the home front.9 Under these circumstances, better to formulate a new approach to Europe with care and deliberation than to change course abruptly because of events in the Asia-Pacific.