NATO deterrence fails – Baltics prove NATO isn’t key to stop hybrid war
Halas 2019 (Matus Halas works as a Senior Researcher at IIR and member of the Centre for European Politics. He studied international relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague (Ph.D.) and political science at the Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in Bratislava (Mgr.). In the past, he worked as a lecturer at the Baltic Defense College in Estonia (2016-2018), editor of the scientific section of the SME journal (2015) and assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations in Bratislava (2011-2015), “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics”, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855 )//MargaretE
The increased Russian foreign policy assertiveness and the related security concerns associated with the Eastern Flank of NATO caused a revival of interest in European deterrence after more than two decades of neglect. Yet the absence of a military invasion into the Baltics does not necessarily imply a successful deterrent threat. Quite the contrary: a detailed analysis using Boolean logic suggests that deterrence does not really work in the Baltics, neither at the conventional, nor at the sub-conventional level. A lack of capabilities undermines the credibility of NATO’s conventional deterrence posture despite its clear effort to communicate the threat to the other side. The only reason why the lack of capabilities on the Eastern Flank has no negative consequences for the Alliance is because Russia has (currently) no need to advance its state interests by resorting to military force. At the same time, deterrence fails repeatedly at the subconventional level and it will probably continue to fail in the future. Incidents like the relocation of the Bronze Soldier Memorial in 2007, the kidnapping of a security officer in 2014 or the violations of airspace in 2018 can escalate to a full-blown crisis. Limiting the number of such incidents should be the main goal of the cumulative deterrence of hybrid threats.
An assertion that a deterrent threat prevented a military attack is probably the closest thing one can have in strategic studies to the article of faith. One might easily claim, and many in fact do, that an absence of evidence documenting the existence of God is not necessarily evidence of its absence. Some of us thus keep believing in God despite the lack of evidence. And it is similar for deterrence: it is notoriously difficult to prove its success, because the absence of an aggressive action might be caused by other factors than the deterrent threat itself. In other words, the absence of an attack is not necessarily evidence of a successful deterrence. Most of the scholars recognise that (see Buzan 1987, pp. 163–164, Morgan 2003, pp. 117–129, Paul 2009, p. 3, Rid 2012, pp. 142–143, Freedman 2013, p. 159) and still, we rarely question this article of faith. But one does not have to wait for the invasion to occur in order to investigate the existence of deterrence, and this text aims to do exactly that. It tries to examine the security environment at NATO’s Eastern Flank at both the conventional and the sub-conventional level in order to find out if deterrence works in the Baltics.
The European security is experiencing profound changes resulting from the increased Russian foreign policy assertiveness that Vladimir Putin voiced for the first time in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. It also does not take much effort to recognise a remarkable shift in the attention that NATO paid to deterrence in consequence of the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Deterrence was entirely absent from the 2008 Bucharest Summit official declaration (NATO 2008), and merely two paragraphs were devoted to it in the most recent Strategic Concept (NATO 2010). The final communiqu from the Wales Summit of the Alliance (NATO 2014) still mentioned deterrence less than a dozen times, but the count trebled already at the Warsaw Summit (NATO 2016). Bearing this in mind, the history of the Alliance can thus be divided into three distinct periods. During the first one, the Alliance devoted most of its attention to collective defence and deterrence, while staying open to detente especially after the Harmel Report. Later, after the end of the Cold War, it found a new purpose in out of area operations and crisis management. The last period, which began with Crimea, is characterised instead by a mix of priorities from the previous two periods and a careful rebalancing from crisis management towards a more traditional collective defence and deterrence again. The Baltic region is the best example of this gradual shift back to the basics and thus it became the focus of a case study presented here as well.
Yet this renewed emphasis on deterrence seems incomplete beyond the often repeated rhetorical exercises. It takes sufficient capabilities, solid credibility, and strong communication of threat to make deterrence work, but a closer look at the Baltic region reveals that there is not much of a substance behind NATO’s declaratory statements. The deterrent message of serious consequences in line with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in the case of an aggressive action against any NATO member state is expressed clearly enough (Rasmussen 2014, Mattis 2017, Pompeo 2018). However, after disregarding mutual deterrence at the nuclear level, the continuous Allied communication of deterrent threats lacks sufficient conventional capabilities on the Eastern Flank to be credible. Luckily for NATO, the analysis presented here shows that this lack of credibility does not really matter at the moment. Instead of a blind belief in the success of conventional deterrence, which is supposedly illustrated by the absence of a crisis leading to a Russian invasion into the Baltics, the lack of the Allies’ conventional capabilities to back up their own deterrent messaging suggests a need to shift the attention elsewhere. Boolean logic makes it possible to disentangle the argument and to show that the absence of a serious military crisis in the Baltics is not due to the success of deterrence at the conventional level, but rather due to the current lack of Russian interest in repeating the Crimean scenario in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. This conclusion is the only available explanation of the situation on the Eastern Flank of NATO after analysing the communication, credibility and capabilities of the Alliance and its member states.
Deterrence does not work at the conventional level, but it still did not fail thanks to the missing interest of the other side. Yet at the sub-conventional level of hybrid warfare, where deterrence matters most today, it failed repeatedly. Russia currently does not seem to be deterred by NATO or its individual members at the sub-conventional level, where hybrid threats naturally belong. Moscow regularly conducts actions which would normally amount to deterrence failure and there are no signs on its part of any intention to change this practice. To put it simply, the insufficient conventional capabilities of NATO on the Eastern Flank (Luik and Jermalavičius 2017, Cornish 2017, p. 9) do not have negative consequences only thanks to the lack of Russian interest in challenging the status quo in the Baltics in the first place. Moreover, where it matters the most, deterrence does not work simply because the number of attacks below the conventional level prove it completely ineffective. However, the most important result of these findings with respect to practical policy and scholarly analysis is that the Alliance has a vital interest in making subconventional deterrence work. That is due to the fact that a possible escalation of a local hybrid crisis might unmask the lack of conventional capabilities in the Baltics and by that also put the overall deterrence posture of NATO into question. The following text offers a similar structure of the argument. After analysing the logic of deterrence at the beginning, it continues by focusing on the conventional level and on shifts in communication in the second part the article. The third part of the text is then devoted to deterrence at the sub-conventional level of hybrid warfare and to some examples of repeated failures of deterrence at this level. The conclusion then not only summarises the whole argument, but also gives specific recommendation on how to adapt the logic of deterrence to the European security environment after Crimea and to hybrid warfare.