NATO cooperation fails to deter hybrid war – empirics
Halas 2019 (Matus Halas works as a Senior Researcher at IIR and member of the Centre for European Politics. He studied international relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague (Ph.D.) and political science at the Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in Bratislava (Mgr.). In the past, he worked as a lecturer at the Baltic Defense College in Estonia (2016-2018), editor of the scientific section of the SME journal (2015) and assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations in Bratislava (2011-2015), “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics”, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855 )//MargaretE
Yet one doesn’t have to look for a long time in order to find a proof of deterrence failure at the sub-conventional level already happening on a regular basis and in line with the third row of Table 1, which depicts the logic of deterrence by using Boolean algebra. The Estonian island Vaindloo in the Gulf of Finland witnessed at least half a dozen violations of its airspace by Russian state-owned aircraft in 2018. Since Estonia has virtually no air force or ground-based air defence systems and relies entirely on the NATO Baltic Air Policing as regards the protection of its airspace, in this case one can hardly expect a use of kinetic force similar to the shooting down of the Russian Su-24 in November 2015 after a very similar incursion into the Turkish airspace. These violations easily stay below the Article 5 threshold in the given context with no risk of conventional escalation under present conditions. But they represent a constant reminder of the limited ability of the three Baltic states to protect their sovereignty. How Estonian military personnel will react to these airspace violations after Estonia procures a medium-range air defence system and how the allies will react if Estonia for whatever reason decides to shoot down the aircraft, remains to be seen.
Another example of the lacking sub-conventional deterrence and intentional pushing and probing below Article 5 is the already mentioned visit of the U.S. President Obama in Tallinn in September 2014 and the events that occurred immediately after his visit. In a rather symbolic move, just two days after Barack Obama declared that “the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London”, Russian FSB agents kidnapped the Estonian Internal Security Service officer Eston Kohver and took him across the border into the Russian Federation, where he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The abduction helped to cement the reputation of the FSB as “the most aggressive Russian special service targeting Estonia” (EISS 2016, p. 14), although Kohver was then swiftly exchanged in a Cold War-like swap for a Russian spy on a bridge over the border river Piusa shortly before a meeting between Putin and Obama. The border between Estonia and Russia remains an unresolved issue in general. Just about a decade ago and thanks to the territorial changes after WWII, a small part of Estonia could have been reached only by taking a short section of a road through the Russian territory. Although an alternative detour has been built in recent years, the final resolution of the problem by an exchange of territory as proposed in the Estonian-Russian State Border Treaty signed in 2014 is not going to materialise due to the Russian refusal to ratify the treaty.
Maybe the best example of how a full-blown crisis resulting from deterrence failure at the sub-conventional level might look was the riots and cyber attacks following the relocation of a Soviet-era bronze soldier from a square in central Tallinn to a military cemetery in 2007. While the emotionally charged issue of relocating a WWII monument led to two days of rioting, several burned cars and looted shops, dozens of wounded individuals and hundreds of arrests, the subsequent three weeks of distributed denial-of-service cyber attacks from abroad brought Estonia – a digital champion of the world that just introduced electronic voting in parliamentary elections – virtually to its knees. It was not just websites and mail servers of government agencies and political parties that were shut down by an incoming traffic that exceeded the normal level by degrees of magnitude. Online services of major newspapers were disrupted too, as were the electronic operations of the biggest Estonian banks (Joubert 2012). National authorities managed to cope with this onslaught only by digitally cutting Estonia off from the rest of the world and thanks to the lucky coincidence that a few key individuals of global internet security were present in Tallinn at the same time. All of that happened long before NATO started to pay attention to hybrid threats in relation to Article 5 scenarios. The reported disruption of mobile phone networks in some NATO member states during the recent Zapad exercise (Cook 2017) then only shows that the Russian military practices exploitation of electronic and digital vulnerabilities on a continuous basis.
Crises and incidents like that have a significant escalation potential, which is not only the reason for the certain degree of ambiguity on the NATO side that was mentioned earlier, but also the source of a major concern. Hybrid threats must be dealt with primarily by individual member states and therefore NATO should not be, strictly speaking, blamed for deterrence failure at the sub-conventional level. Yet due to the possibility of Article 5 activation and a hybrid crisis escalation to the conventional level, NATO might be very much involved in a resolution of the crisis. A challenge to the status quo and a related threat to use military force in order to promote state interests – for example, in the form of protection of ethnic minorities – might then unmask the weak points of a strategy, which the Allied deterrence posture in the region rests upon. “As a tripwire force largely taken out of NATO’s Cold War playbook, the eFP is not automatically suited to the subconventional and conventional challenges” in the Baltics (Zapfe 2017, p. 157) and reinforcements with follow-on forces might not be in place with a sufficient strength soon enough. The Alliance thus has a clear interest in making sure that deterrence of hybrid threats will work as much as possible in the future. The whole situation also illustrates how conventional and sub-conventional levels of deterrence relate to each other in the post-Crimea security environment in Europe, similarly to how the division of Germanymade superpowers realise the linkages between nuclear and conventional deterrence during the Cold War.