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Perm fails -- treaty withdrawal halts cooperation

Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE

What explains persistent cooperation in the face of withdrawal by some states, but not others? More broadly, how does treaty withdrawal affect the prospects of international cooperation? I argue that the consequences of withdrawal on international cooperation are best explained by viewing exit as a breach of norm-based trust. When states exit treaties they violate the norm that agreements must be kept (pacta sunt servanda), undermining the foundation of trust upon which cooperation is based. States perceive exit as a violation of international norms and, consequentially, react with indignation. This sense of being wronged drives states to punish the norm-violating state by isolating it internationally and avoiding cooperation with it in the future. As a result, state parties to the treaty of withdrawal – those whose trust has been violated – begin to opt out of ratifying agreements to which the withdrawing state is a member.

The implications of this argument differ from other common explanations. One possibility is that withdrawal causes states to develop reputations for unreliability, making it more difficult for them to attract cooperative partners in the future.5 A second explanation is that the consequence of withdrawal on cooperation are a function of the material cost that it exacts on other states: states respond more harshly to withdrawals in issue areas characterized by direct costs as compared to those where the costs of withdrawal are more diffuse or modest.6 A final possibility is that withdrawal has no independent effect on cooperation; instead, both withdrawal and observed changes in cooperation are the byproduct of increased isolationism, populist nationalism, or some other change in the withdrawing state’s preference for international engagement.7 My theory, in contrast, predicts that treaty members will react more strongly to withdrawal than treaty non-members, that this reaction does not depend on the costs of withdrawal, and that the change in cooperation is driven by other treaty members’ actions rather than the withdrawing state itself.

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