Withdrawal wrecks cooperation – breaches trust and wrecks negotiation credibility
Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal
Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE
My central argument begins from the premise that unilateral exit entails the violation of the type of moralistic trust known as particularized trust.13 Trust is the willingness to put one’s wellbeing in another’s hands. Moralistic trust is trust based on the belief that others share your normative commitments. Trust of the moral variety exists on a continuum from generalized to particularized trust. Generalized trust is a belief that others are inherently trustworthy, because everyone is part of the same moral community. It reflects an optimistic disposition toward human nature. Moving down the continuum from generalized trust toward particularized trust involves narrowing the inclusivity of one’s community. Particularized trusters are those who trust members of their community and regard others with skepticism. They divide the world into in-groups and out-groups defined in terms of their normative commitments. The etymology of particularized trust is that “A trusts B,” whereas the etymology of generalized trust is simply that “A trusts.”14 Generalized trust is dispositional. Particularized trust is relational.
Recent research has linked generalized trust to the emergence and design of multilateral institutions.15 This research demonstrates how variation in trust can explain state entry into international agreements. Decision-makers high in generalized trust are more likely to negotiate, conclude, and ratify multilateral agreements than those with less generalized trust. This suggests that trust – and the proclivity of states to enter into agreements with one another – is a function of who is sitting at the negotiating table. But this account is hard-pressed to explain what happens when trust is broken. As a dispositional characteristic, individuals’ level of generalized trust should not change because another party walked away from its treaty commitments. As a result, explanations based on generalized trust are limited in their ability to explain how international cooperation evolves following unilateral exit.
The concept of particularized trust addresses this limitation. Because particularized trust entails categorizing actors based on whether they belong to one’s moral community, it offers a framework for understanding what happens when someone exits this community. Particularized trust is central to constructivist accounts for the emergence of cooperation. When Wendt writes that trust is the solution to “the fundamental problem of collective identity formation” he is suggesting that particularized trust provides the basis of norms and intersubjectivity.16 Trust is relational for constructivists, particular to groups and pairs of states. Hemmer and Katzenstein, for instance, use variation in particularized trust to explain US preferences for the creation of multilateral security institutions in Europe and the creation of bilateral institutions in Asia.17 By this logic, when particularized trust decreases, states identify with each other less and, consequentially, enter into fewer multilateral agreements.
Unilateral exit violates particularized trust. Although states often include provisions for flexibility, escape, and exit in the design of international agreements, meaning that unilateral exit is lawful, rule-bound behavior,18 there is a distinction between the letter of the law and the spirit of the deal.19 Even if states agree on the language of a treaty, they may have differing expectations concerning how a treaty will work in practice, especially its duration and the circumstances that would justify exit. The one-sided nature of unilateral exit suggests that divergent beliefs exist.
Although unilateral exit is lawful behavior, it violates particularized trust because it transgresses group-based norms. When states ratify multilateral treaties with one another, they self-categorize into a group of states defined by a shared commitment to the treaty. The norm that agreements must be kept provides that it is inappropriate to walk away from this commitment, even if the costs of compliance exceed expectations.20 These norm-based in-group expectations stand in contrast to the unbridled behavior of non-treaty members. When a state exits a treaty unilaterally, it violates the expectations of appropriate behavior shared by treaty members, but does not transgress a shared understanding with non-members. Such “collective experiences” are capable of changing the moral basis of trust.21 Even though treaty members and non-members observe the same behavior, only one group has experienced a breach of trust.
The consequences of violating particularized trust stem from its normative basis and unique etymology. Breaking particularized trust involves the violation of group-based norms; therefore, in-group members should respond with indignation and out-group members should not. These sentiments should be expressed by foreign policy decision-makers, especially those negotiating with the withdrawing state and relevant domestic stakeholders. Following a logic of appropriateness, treaty members should respond to norm transgression with social sanctions; out-group members, in contrast, should take no such action.22 One of the ways treaty members enforce social norms is by “opting out” of future cooperation with the withdrawing state. As a punishment, opting out is similar to outcasting, which “involves denying the disobedient the benefits of social cooperation and membership.”23 But rather than expelling a state from the community of benefits, opting out occurs when states systematically avoid cooperating with a state because of its past norm transgressions. To opt out is to ostracize. The etymology of particularized trust – that “A trusts B” – suggests that the scope of ostracization should be wide. As a result, unilateral exit should correspond with a decrease in the extent to which treaty members are willing to enter into agreements with the withdrawing state across issue areas.