Leaving NATO ends security cooperation – material goods and wrecked credibility halts negotiations
Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal
Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE
Even if unilateral exit is lawful, it can impact the distribution of material benefits across states by producing an asymmetric change in states’ legal obligations. Prior research has shown that the nature of strategic interactions varies by issue areas, shaping the emergence and design of international agreements.41 Koremenos draws a theoretically motivated distinction concerning the nature of cooperation in the issue areas of security, economics, human rights, and the environment.42 I build on this research by considering how the distributional consequences of unilateral exit varies across these issue areas.
Security cooperation is often modeled as an iterated prisoners’ dilemma marked by a concern for relative gains. States make themselves vulnerable to opportunism when they abide by security agreements, because other states may gain an advantage by exploiting their cooperation.43 Similar issues pertain in the areas of trade and economic cooperation, where states adjust their trade policies in order to gain the benefits of comparative advantage, but in doing so make themselves vulnerable to protectionist policies if their trading partners renege on their commitments. While some economic agreements create excludable goods that can be denied to withdrawing states, exit nonetheless has direct economic consequences for other treaty members. In the areas of security and economic cooperation, there are thus direct costs to treaty members if another state exits unilaterally from an agreement.
The distributional consequences of unilateral exit are different in the areas of human rights and the environment. In the area of environmental cooperation, the costs of withdrawal are more diffuse and long-term, such as those resulting from other treaty members bearing the costs of pollution or overfishing. Unilateral exits from human rights agreements, in contrast, tend to produce fewer negative externalities for other states, because these agreements are primarily designed to resolve domestic-level commitment problems.
If unilateral exit exacts a cost on other treaty members, then theories that explain how states respond to defection can suggest plausible hypotheses for the consequences of withdrawal on subsequent cooperation. One way states punish the withdrawing state is by withholding future cooperation. This claim is consistent with the mechanism of reciprocity which emphasizes the sequential and symmetric exchange of items by actors.45 Reciprocity suggests that when a state withdraws from a treaty, their former partners will withhold cooperation in kind. Unlike opting out, which predicts that states will abstain from ratifying agreements with the withdrawing state across issue areas, reciprocity suggests that states will meet like with like by withholding cooperation in the issue area of withdrawal.