NATO withdrawal halts cooperation – backlash towards France proves
Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal
Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE
French withdrawal was also costly and politically salient. French withdrawal undermined the deterrent threat at the core of NATO’s mission, damaging the credibility of the alliance. Withdrawal also brought direct material costs. It removed the legal basis for the presence of allied military officers in France, expelling the alliance’s headquarters from Paris and forcing the relocation of NATO to Brussels.78 French withdrawal from NATO was also well publicized. It garnered global media coverage and formed the context of de Gaulle’s visits to Moscow and Phenom Phen in the summer and fall of 1966 in which he asserted French independence in foreign affairs, challenged US supremacy, and sought to establish France as a broker in the Cold War. Non-NATO states were aware of de Gaulle’s withdrawal and capable of incorporating the event into assessments of the reliability of France’s treaty commitments, factors that favor withdrawal as unreliability.
How did entry into multilateral agreements with France change following withdrawal? Figure 7 presents ratification trends graphically, representing (as before) the average number of joins by treaty members with a solid line, the same average for treaty non-members with a dotted line, and the post-withdrawal period as the grey shaded area. Figure 7 reveals that NATO members tended to ratify more treaties with France than non-NATO states in the pre-withdrawal period, as would be expected. Nonetheless, both groups’ trends in ratification behavior are similar during the five years prior to 1966, when France withdrew from the NATO SOF agreement. There is then an abrupt drop during the next three years in the average number of treaties ratified by NATO members that include France as a state party relative to this average among non-NATO states. This relative decrease persists through de Gaulle’s death in 1970, before returning to pre-withdrawal levels of cooperation.
This differential shift in the average number of joins by NATO members and non-members combined with the parallel trends in the pre-withdrawal period provides suggestive evidence consistent with breach of trust theory. If anticipation of withdrawal or existing acrimony in diplomatic relations explained the shift in ratification behavior (as expected by the byproduct hypothesis) the shift would have occurred prior to withdrawal. If the change in ratifications was a result of states learning about the unreliability of France’s treaty commitments, as would be expected by withdrawal as unreliability, then there would be corresponding shifts in both groups’ ratification practices.
Figure 7 departs from the aggregate trends presented in Figure 2 in an important respect: NATO states’ entry into treaties with France returned to pre-withdrawal levels six years following withdrawal, whereas aggregate trends never rebound. Some scholars argue that the “surprisingly benign” consequences of French withdrawal suggest that de Gaulle did not intend to subvert the alliance.79 The historical record indicates, however, that withdrawal set in motion mechanisms capable of undermining the long-term cooperation between NATO members and France.
Because French withdrawal was anticipated, President Johnson attempted to pre-empt retribution by US officials. On March 2, 1966, after de Gaulle held a press conference suggesting that major decisions were forthcoming, but prior to an official announcement of withdrawal, the State Department issued a circular telegram to all NATO missions, Brussels, and USEC noting that: [W]e should lean over backward to be polite and friendly to France, to President de Gaulle personally, and to all French government officials. Backbiting, recriminations, attempts to downgrade the importance of France as a nation, or attempts at reprisals should be avoided no matter what the temptation... We should maintain our support for the Common Market, taking care that we do not seem to take the lead in any effort to isolate France. If France is to be isolated, it should clearly be by her own doing and not as the result of American efforts.80 The telegram attempted to preclude US officials from ostracizing France. Johnson thus anticipated and sought to guard against the processes set underway by a breach of trust and the damage that it could do to broader US foreign policy objectives.
Although France’s withdrawal was expected, NATO members nevertheless perceived it as a violation of pacta sunt servanda. In a March 31 memo analyzing France’s exit, US Ambassador to France Charles (‘Chip’) E. Bohlen concluded that de Gaulle announced the withdrawal in advance of his June trip to Moscow so that his decision to “betray the Alliance” would not also be seen as colluding with the enemy and that French negotiations over the structure of NATO initiated by de Gaulle’s 1958 letter had all been in bad faith, merely a “[r]use” meant to feign allegiance to the alliance and deflect blame for withdrawal.81 Prior to withdrawal Bohlen had urged civility and restraint toward de Gaulle; after withdrawal he advocated a harsh punitive approach to the French president.82 Withdrawal provoked anger from other senior policymakers as well.83 In a White House meeting to formulate a policy response to de Gaulle, Under Secretary of State George Ball argued that de Gaulle had “repudiated a solemn agreement.”84 After de Gaulle told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that American troops must leave France, Rusk replied, “Does that include the dead Americans in military cemeteries as well?”85 Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson later told President Johnson that he had asked de Gaulle the same question.86 Policymakers perceived withdrawal as a violation of France’s normative commitments