Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← SearchGeorgetown2022Counterplan
Opening Word document…

Turn: The EU is too reliant on Russian energy to effectively deter – without NATO, no deterrence

Vicente 5/4/22 -- Adérito Vicente is PhD researcher in Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Published May 4, 2022. “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine” https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/ //DG

Before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, four key threat perception conclusions emerged: 1) a state geographically close to an adverse nuclear power increases threat perception (e.g. Finland and Sweden); 2) a state geographically far from an adverse nuclear power decreases threat perception (e.g. Portugal and Spain); 3) a shared history of conflict increases threat perception (e.g. the Baltic States and Poland); 4) a non-shared history of conflict decreases threat perception (e.g. Italy). In sum, the different degrees of threat perception of each European state towards Russia undermined the idea of European solidarity and cohesion and, ultimately, the effectiveness of the EU as a political player with regard to Ukraine.

Europe’s energy dependence is another conditioning factor of political divergence within the EU. For example, the impact of Russia’s policy over EU politics towards Ukraine, especially through its bargaining power in the energy sector (namely through Russian business proxies Nord stream and Gazprom), led the Union to become more inactive and less effective. Other Russian activities – such as increased activities of Russian funded media, intensified contact between Brussels and other European countries with Moscow, the spread of disinformation, and the sponsoring of Eurosceptic political forces – impacted the ability of the EU to act effectively in opposition to Russian aggression.

Furthermore, while the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement served as an important display of the EU’s economic and political force (soft power) towards Kyiv, Russia continued to be one of the EU’s main economic and trade partners. In fact, European countries with different economic interests continued to negotiate large trade and energy deals with Russia at least until February 2022.

This contrasting dual approach led to, even if indirectly, the continuous funding of Moscow’s aggression machine in Ukraine. For example, despite the 2014 EU arms embargo, according to a recent report, ten EU member states (France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Finland, Slovakia and Spain) exported weapons to Russia until at least 2020. These countries relied on the use of a legal loophole in EU regulations that allowed the continuation of arms exports “contracts concluded before 1 August 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts”. These legal loopholes, combined with other conditioning factors of political divergence, contributed to the half-hearted implementation of the EU sanctions policy.

Ultimately, Europe could not prevent a Russian military invasion of Ukraine because of the EU’s security idiosyncrasies, nuclear policy choices, divergent political interests, energy dependency and ineffective sanctions policy on Russia. Despite its failure to prevent the war, Europe has taken relevant steps over the past two months to respond to the invasion: They have rapprochement with their Atlantic allies (the UK and the US) and, among other initiatives, have established a Strategic Compass on Security and Defence, which could represent a unique opportunity for the EU tobecome a “more assertive and decisive security provider”.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.