Every member says yes---US initiating the cooperation ensures allies toe the line.
Sperling 19 – Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron, PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Dr. Mark Webber, Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham, PhD from the University of Birmingham, Master of Social Science from the University of Birmingham, BA from the University of Warwick.
James Sperling, January 20 2019, “Trump’s foreign policy and NATO: Exit and voice,” Review of International Studies, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CECD6A4DA95D3C177531E8C10A6E562B/S0260210519000123a.pdf/trumps_foreign_policy_and_nato_exit_and_voice.pdf
If exit is a credible option for the US, why has it not taken place? The answer lies in the institutional character of the Alliance. Institutional analysis of NATO is often seen as a counter to realism. The latter views alliances as mechanisms of balancing or bandwagoning in the international system with alliance formation, stability, and durability being a reflection of power configurations among states. Realism can account for the formation of NATO, its cohesion when confronted with a commonly recognised existential threat such as the Soviet Union, and its adaptation after the Cold War as the US harnessed the Alliance to new security tasks. Here, what matters is national and especially American preferences not NATO’s institutional qualities.33 Discounting institutions in this case is, however, misplaced. NATO’s permanent mechanisms of intra-alliance political consultation alongside a standing command structure (embracing defence planning, standardisation, interoperability, and a recurrent rather than one-off ability to deploy) are unique among both historical alliances and contemporary international organisations.34 Two consequences follow from the presence of these arrangements. First, NATO has assumed an elevated status in American strategic calculations. Here, the burden of defending allies is offset by NATO’s political role in aligning allied preferences with those of the US. NATO’s institutional mechanisms (the North Atlantic Council above all) make that alignment possible, ensure it is embedded, and deliver efficiencies and gains to all allies in the process. NATO thus takes on alliance-centric tasks (the security of Europe and the stabilisation of its periphery) that are of clear benefit to Europeans but which provide, simultaneously, an important security externality to the US. Second, institutionalisation has assumed a social character – the sophistication and permanency of intra-alliance mechanisms provide ample opportunities for voice and renders that articulation legitimate. One need not characterise NATO as a community organisation of democratic values35 in order to allow for this outcome. It can be seen also as the consequence of more formal properties that pertain to a sophisticated multilateral security arrangement: acceptance of the principle of consultation, agreement on common security threats and, in NATO’s case, a sense of shared endeavour built up over a decades’ long history.36 These properties are certainly open to exploitation. However, even the most powerful ally will be wont to play within the multilateral rules of the game. These, after all, are stacked in its favour and so offer a reliable means of exercising leadership and getting fellow allies to toe the line.37
All of this is not simply realism by another route. Institutions act as a vehicle within which the demands of the powerful are articulated and modified. The institution, in other words, exerts its own effect. The interaction of exit and voice in NATO bears out this assumption. A member as powerful as the US could well hold the view that NATO is underperforming its core defence function or is neglecting other tasks the US considers important. Equally, it might believe that the cost of contributing to NATO’s public security goods is too great particularly if other allies are seen to be shirking their responsibilities. America’s history of engagement with NATO has been characterised by the periodic recurrence of such tensions yet, as we shall see below, throughout it has exercised the option of voice. Voice has proven effective both in expressing dissatisfaction with NATO’s allies and advocating changes to allied business. NATO’s institutionalisation, in other words, has served to minimise the cost, and to maximise the benefits of exercising voice, just as it has served to minimise the benefits and to maximise the cost of exit.38