Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← SearchGeorgetown2022Disadvantage
Opening Word document…

1NC – DA [Russia]

NATO will double down on collective defense against Russia now.

Kochis & Spoehr, 6/23 – senior policy analyst in European affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom (Daniel Kochis and Thomas W. Spoehr; "NATO Summit Madrid: Reinforcing Deterrence at This Crucial Time Is in the U.S. National Interest"; The Heritage Foundation; https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/IB5276_0.pdf; 06-23-2022, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-NoC

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) summit in Madrid on June 29 and 30 comes at a consequential moment for the Alliance. Russia’s unprovoked second invasion of Ukraine, the ensuing war that has resulted in the deaths of at least 4,000 Ukrainian civilians,1 and the displacement of over 14 million people is very likely a fulcrum in history. The transatlantic community will not return to the pre-invasion relations with Russia and must plan accordingly. As the shock of Russia’s invasion on February 24 has evolved into the realization that the war is likely to grind on, the transatlantic community must steel itself for the long haul.

For NATO, the Madrid Summit is an opportunity to expand upon the initiatives announced at the Brussels Summit in April, fulfilling the immediate need for further deterrence measures in Eastern Europe with a clear-eyed resolve, while putting in place plans to ensure that NATO has the capabilities to continue tackling challenges over the long term. While the summit provides a historic opportunity, the danger is that the summit will merely repackage half measures—which Russia would see as a sign of weakness, inviting further aggression. The U.S. must ensure that the Madrid Summit fulfills its potential. For the United States, a stable, secure Europe is firmly in U.S. national interest, and a stable and secure Europe begins and ends with a vigorous NATO capable of deterring Russian aggression against its member states.

The past few months have underscored the reality that, while many European nations have stepped up, there is no substitute for U.S. leadership within NATO. As such, the U.S. should ensure that NATO implements measures that bolster deterrence immediately while laying the groundwork for retaining strength in the long term through robust defense investment. The U.S. should propel its allies toward a wholesale recommitment to collective defense and all that entails: robust, lasting commitments to defense spending, moving beyond tripwire forces in Eastern European member states toward a force posture of deterrence with broad participation across the Alliance; swift consideration of Finland and Sweden in NATO; and support for member states that are aiding Ukrainian forces.

In the U.S. National Interest: A Robust NATO

For economic, political, and security reasons, the U.S. maintains a central interest in the peace and security of the European continent. While Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine has proven profoundly destabilizing, the core mission of NATO, to deter aggression against member states, remains intact, and Russia has thus far shied away from any direct military action against a NATO member state. To avoid further miscalculations and lessen the chance that Vladimir Putin strikes a NATO member, the Alliance must bolster its deterrence posture, starting with fleshing out the promises of the Brussel Summit to put in place new forces to deter Russian aggression and, if necessary, defeat an invasion of a NATO country.

In response to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO created an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of four multinational battalions in each of the Baltic states and Poland. While the force size in each battalion, typically 1,000 to 1,500 troops, is small, the idea was to deploy a multintional force as a signal of resolve as well as a so-called tripwire to ensure that, should Russia invade, the battalion would not only slow down any advance but also provide critical political insurance that member states contributing troops would literally have skin (or, more accurately, lives) in the game to galvanize their sustained involvement in the conflict. This spring in Brussels, the Alliance announced the creation of four additional battalions, one each stationed in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. While the Alliance’s decision to create additional battalions is helpful, it is clear that a small tripwire force does not provide the deterrence effect that a larger force, complete with enablers, such as air defenses, could. Recently, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz backed the calls of Lithuanian officials (where Germany leads the EFP battalion) to create a brigade-size presence (usually 3,000 to 5,000 troops).2

The aff overcommits NATO to broad info-sharing responsibilities, which trades off with a focus on collective defense.

Moller, '20 – Assistant Professor at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations (Sara Bjerg Moller; "It Will Take More Than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/; 9-25-2020, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC

If and when the Biden team embarks on its grand European tour, it seems virtually certain that, beyond the expressions of gratitude for America’s “return” that will surely follow them wherever they go, the delegation can expect to be met with a lengthy list of items requiring their immediate attention. Moreover, appeals for Washington’s assistance are likely to differ from capital to capital, with each NATO ally arguing that their particular issue or concern represents the most pressing challenge and therefore requires the most attention and resources. In Warsaw and the capitals of the Baltic states, the U.S. delegation will hear that, despite a new U.S. rotational troop deployment, a revanchist Russia necessitates additional NATO (but especially U.S.) military commitments along the Eastern flank of the alliance. In Rome, Athens, and Madrid, U.S. policymakers will learn that the Mediterranean countries represent the “soft underbelly” of NATO and that the alliance must do more to project stability along its southern arc of instability. In Ankara, the message will be one of anger directed at what the Erdogan government perceives as NATO’s collective failure to support Turkish actions in Syria and elsewhere. In Paris, the message for the U.S. delegation will be that the alliance must strengthen its counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, while in Berlin the focus will be on reforming NATO’s nuclear posture and salvaging expiring arms-control agreements. Meanwhile, securing the Arctic and halting the effects of climate change will be at the top of the agenda in Copenhagen and Oslo.

In short, wherever the Biden presidential delegation goes, it will be met with requests that Washington — and with it, the NATO alliance — prioritize everything, thereby fulfilling the old adage that, “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Given the precarious state of international relations today, the temptation to do more is understandably strong. It is easy to understand why, in the present climate of global instability, calls for the transatlantic alliance to reinforce and strengthen its existing commitments while simultaneously adding new mandates, missions, and programs are popular. Rather than adding more items to its already crowded agenda, however, the time has come for not just the United States but also NATO to consider doing less but doing it better.

When More Is Less, and Less Is More

For an alliance that has long prided itself on its commonality of purpose and interests, the truth is that NATO is in danger of losing both. On paper and in public, the members still agree the core purpose of the 71-year-old alliance is deterrence and defense of the North Atlantic region. When internal disagreements are aired publicly, other allies are quick to dispel reports of rifts by pointing out that differences of opinion are nothing new. But unlike during the Cold War, when a single adversary occupied all of the alliance’s attention, today’s security environment — as the allies routinely remind each other — is multifaceted and complex. In an effort to address members’ often disparate security requirements, NATO has taken on additional tasks over the past three decades almost as quickly as it has taken on additional members. The NATO-ization of every security challenge has meant that issues once considered the purview of individual nations or other international organizations — such as migration, terrorism, and foreign security force assistance — are now lumped onto NATO’s agenda under the guise of fulfilling its ambitious (and potentially limitless) post-Cold War mandate of “projecting stability.”

For far too long now, alliance leaders have tasked the NATO military infrastructure with a seemingly impossible undertaking: weighing down the military organization with new responsibilities like peacekeeping and counter-terrorism while simultaneously allowing members to shirk on contributing the resources required to fulfill old and new alliance missions. To date, much of the criticism surrounding NATO’s current strategic deadlock has focused on the resource issue and the strains caused by uneven burden-sharing within the alliance. Far less attention has been paid to the first part of the “ends-means-ways” formulation of strategy, namely NATO’s original purpose. While addressing “means” and “ways” are crucial elements in any strategic enterprise, it is past time the Allies got around to focusing on NATO’s strategic ends once more.

Confronting NATO’s present strategic dilemma will require looking beyond existing strategic documents like the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaimed the signatories’ commitment to the “preservation of peace and security” in the North Atlantic area. As the past three decades of NATO transformation have shown, there is not much that does not fit under the rubric of fostering “peace and security” and consequently cannot be tacked onto the alliance’s agenda. True strategy requires setting (and adhering to) actual goals and priorities, as well as developing plans to achieve them. Although the alliance’s past strategic documents have often sought to define NATO’s evolving strategic purpose with more precision than the founding treaty, the alliance has not adopted a new strategic concept since 2010 for fear that embarking on such an exercise would only further inflame the deep rifts within the alliance that such strategic endeavors are meant to help address.

Officially, NATO members still assert collective defense is the alliance’s primary task, despite the inclusion of two other core tasks — projecting stability and cooperative security/crisis management — in all three of its post-Cold War Strategic Concepts (1991, 1999, 2010). The addition of these latter two core tasks — coupled with members’ differing threat perceptions about what rises to the level of an existential security threat — has clouded the organization’s focus. After three decades of continual adaptation, the danger that the alliance’s original raison d’étre of collective defense gets further downgraded to the point where it risks becoming primus inter pares among NATO’s many other responsibilities is real. As with previous critical junctures in transatlantic relations, it will take American leadership to change NATO’s future course. Come January 2021, a Biden administration should move swiftly to announce its intention to commission a new NATO strategic concept by 2022. Should Trump win, all bets are off.

Defenders of NATO’s post-Cold War emphasis on projecting stability and collective security argue that NATO has a proven track record of crisis management and capacity-building beyond its borders in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The alliance’s cooperative security track record, however, is hardly stellar. This past June, the NATO-led international peacekeeping force in Kosovo entered its 22nd year of operation. Almost 17 years after the alliance’s Integrated Military Command first assumed responsibilities in Afghanistan, the NATO flag continues to fly in Kabul, where some 15,000 allied troops remain as part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission. Nor can the alliance’s intervention in Libya in 2011 be considered a resounding success, judging by the state of affairs there today. That NATO remains engaged in some of these places decades afterward is not an impeachment of the men and women who served in these operations and performed the tasks demanded of them. It is, howevwer, evidence of NATO’s failure to give sufficient consideration to its core strategic purpose.

While one can debate the wisdom of NATO having accumulated such an expansionist security agenda in an era marked by American unipolarity, an all-encompassing approach to security is harder to justify in a time of waning American power. Just as the diminishing threat of great-power competition in the 1990s and early 2000s freed NATO to take on additional security tasks beyond its traditional mission of collective defense, its return should prompt a reexamination to determine whether NATO is still the appropriate entity for handling such tasks.

Another center of excellence, special representative, or office will not fix what ails NATO. As the authors of a recent Heritage Foundation report on “NATO in the 21st Century” put it, it is time for NATO to get “back to the basics.” There are limits to what an international institution — even one as successful as NATO — can accomplish: “When policymakers expect or want NATO to do what it was never designed to do, that is when the Alliance risks failure.”

The launch of NATO Secretary Gen. Jens Stoltenberg’s #NATO2030 reflection process earlier this year to address political reforms within the alliance presented just such an opportunity to tackle these and other big-picture questions. It is still unclear to what extent the pandemic has delayed the work of the group of experts begun last March. The Biden team will have to move quickly if it hopes to help shape the working group’s deliberations, as Stoltenberg is slated to brief members on the path forward for the alliance at the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit.

Back to the Future: Narrowing (Not Broadening) NATO’s Remit

Looking ahead, alliance leaders should consider ways to streamline current NATO missions and tasks so that responsibilities that fall below the threshold of existential challenges can be unloaded onto other multilateral institutions or global partnerships. In addition to bringing an end to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, alliance leaders should consider getting NATO out of the security assistance and stabilization business altogether. Calls for NATO to look for opportunities to do more in the MENA region should also be rebuffed. Few would dispute that this region poses real security challenges to European states or that these challenges are particularly acute for the southernmost members of the alliance, some of whom might even view migration and refugee flows as rising to the level of existential threats. But while the 21st century challenges to the “stability and well-being” of member states may be numerous and growing, there is only one NATO. A single organization cannot tackle every national security challenge its members face. To remain useful, the alliance must choose which threats to prioritize.

Doing so requires recognizing that not every security issue rises to the level of an existential threat to the alliance. Terrorist attacks were a common occurrence in many West European nations in the 1970s and 1980s, yet NATO did not fundamentally transform its agenda back then because members recognized that the threat posed by the Soviet Union was greater. While neither Russia nor China as yet represents a threat on par with the Soviet Union, NATO should prepare for the possibility that the latter (either alone or in combination with Moscow) could pose an existential challenge to the Atlantic community in the coming decades.

Nor is it evident that NATO was ever the appropriate venue for tackling threats like terrorism in the first place. Effective counter-terrorism requires intelligence-sharing; local policing and counter-radicalization programs; and financial instruments that agencies like Europol, Interpol, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and others are better equipped to lead than an overstretched military alliance. The same is true when it comes to other activities the transatlantic alliance has added to its roster since 1991, like stabilization missions and security sector reform. In fact, organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the European Union provide more appropriate venues for tackling many of the collective security duties the alliance has assumed since the 1990s. As a regional defensive military alliance, NATO’s comparative advantage lies in providing territorial defense against other states or groups of states. This is a comparative advantage that should be preserved, not diluted by the addition of other security tasks. True comparative advantage arises from specialization. Continuing to add more and more security responsibilities to NATO’s already-full plate risks transforming the military alliance into a glorified clearinghouse or administrative apparatus whose sole task is the facilitation of information-sharing rather than the provision of collective defense.

Yes, NATO is better equipped to handle the myriad security problems its members face than any other multilateral security organization in existence today. But the proposition that because NATO has the resources and coordinating mechanisms it should automatically take on the latest mission du jour is what has led to a strategically deadlocked alliance.

Much like the 1990s, the coming decade will be one of transition for NATO. Back then, proponents of alliance reform argued that the only way forward was to enlarge the alliance and take on new responsibilities. Without such reforms, they claimed, NATO would disappear. The choice facing NATO members today is different: not a world without NATO, but a world in which NATO fails to fulfill its intended purpose. Preparing NATO for China’s rise does not mean sending alliance-flagged vessels to the South China Sea. But the reality is, as Stoltenberg put it last December, China is already “coming closer to us.”

Ultimately, NATO possesses few capabilities of its own. Individual allies — and not the alliance itself — retain ownership and control over the military material and personnel assigned to NATO operations and missions. The alliance’s real strength, however, lies in its integrated military command structure. Preserving and protecting the integrated command structure’s organizational bandwidth should be the primary focus in the coming years. Unloading the alliance’s collective security responsibilities onto other international actors would allow alliance military officials to focus on the challenges emanating from China (and, to a far lesser degree, Russia) free of the need to also tackle a host of lower-threshold security concerns, all of which require office space, funding, and personnel billets. Bifurcating collective security tasks from collective defense would also force European leaders once and for all to decide exactly what price they are willing to pay for their own national defense.

The Way Forward

Instead of seeking to tackle every new security challenge of the 21st century, NATO leaders should work to preserve NATO’s core assets and capabilities for the task that it is uniquely suited for: deterring state-based adversaries and defending the territorial integrity of its members. The time when NATO could be both a collective defense and a collective security organization has passed. Amid the reemergence of great-power rivalries, it no longer makes sense to assign NATO’s limited resources to naval operations in support of the refugee crisis as the organization did back in 2016. Or for the alliance to continue to try its hand at stabilizing war-torn nations.

NATO has survived this long by adapting. But unlike in the past, where NATO adaptation has always meant taking on more responsibilities, the reforms needed today are those that involve shedding commitments rather than taking on additional ones. In seeking to reestablish NATO once again as an alliance focused solely on collective defense, and not a collective security organization, the Biden team will need to resist the urge to pick up the phone and call NATO Headquarters whenever a new security challenge emerges, like previous U.S. presidents have done since the end of the Cold War.

Jettisoning the collective security responsibilities the NATO alliance has assumed over the past three decades won’t be easy. Nor does freeing NATO from responsibility for tackling issues like counter-terrorism and instability in the near abroad mean that such threats are not deserving of international cooperative efforts by states. It simply means that going forward, countries committed to these kinds of activities will have to look to organizations and venues other than NATO to address them.

Rather than expend precious resources and continue to use NATO as an instrument to grapple with all manner of cooperative security issues, a Biden administration should instead reorient the alliance’s strategic focus toward the more pressing task of adjusting to China’s rise. Not doing so risks turning NATO into nothing more than a glorified discussion club. To avoid this fate, the Biden team will have to move quickly. At stake is not just alliance unity but NATO’s future utility.

That’s key to deter a looming Russian invasion of the Baltics.

Deni, '22 – Dr. John R. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. (Dr. John R. Deni; "Yes, Russia Might Invade a NATO Country. Here’s How the Alliance Should Prepare."; POLITICO; https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/04/nato-spread-itself-too-thin-00013933; 3-4-2022, Accessed 6-26-2022)//ILake-NoC

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a careful balancing act on the part of NATO allies, who are eager to see Russia fail but also unwilling to jump into the war directly. This reflects the same challenge that has confronted the West vis-à-vis Ukraine for two decades: how to foster a sovereign Ukraine independent of Russia without necessarily inviting Kyiv into NATO or the EU.

The bottom line is that militarily, NATO will only offer limited assistance to Ukraine. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, allies are obligated to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. But the flip side is that they are under no obligation to help countries that aren’t members of the club.

While NATO’s short-term role in Ukraine may be limited, its bigger role now is to keep Russia out of the rest of Europe. For years, many have taken for granted that Putin will stop at NATO’s borders, deterred by the promise of an Article 5 response. But this is no longer a given in light of the Russian leader’s belligerence and unpredictability.

Although NATO’s Article 5 has not been triggered, Article 4 has — the provision of the treaty allowing member states to request consultations if they believe their “territorial integrity, political independence or security” is threatened. Requesting consultations may sound weak-kneed, but this in fact carries enormous political and diplomatic weight, with the potential to trigger serious military moves. Last week, no fewer than eight allies — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia — called for Article 4 consultations because they believe Putin’s actions threaten them, too.

The serious concerns of these eight allies are yet another indication that NATO may have spread itself too thin. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has become something of an ‘all of the above’ alliance, simultaneously engaged in collective defense in Europe, crisis management in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, and building cooperative security relationships across the globe from Morocco to Japan. Now, NATO needs to recommit to its original mission. In the short term, it should expand its frontline battlegroups in the Baltic States and Poland. In the longer term, the alliance needs to prepare to admit new members, equip itself to fight Russian hybrid aggression and expand its permanent presence in Eastern Europe.

Although the early days of the invasion seemed marked by some major setbacks for Russia and surprising momentum for Ukraine, the weight of evidence still points toward a brutal Russian victory. Russia retains overwhelming military advantage, and its drive to encircle Kyiv continues unabated. The Russian military has yet to commit all of the available forces that sit just across Ukraine’s borders. And the most likely outcomes remain a Ukrainian state dominated and/or dismembered by Russia and neighboring Belarus, which hosts an enduring, offensive Russian presence close to NATO territory.

NATO’s primary response — made after Article 4 was invoked — has been activating the NATO Response Force and its leading element, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, parts of which can deploy in as little as 48 hours. Notably, the alliance has never deployed any part of the NRF for collective defense purposes, not even in 2014 when Russia first invaded Ukraine. Sending this force to the alliance’s most exposed members in Eastern Europe, even though NATO has no intention of taking part in the war, is a powerful, tangible indicator of NATO’s commitment to defend every inch of allied territory and to deter Russia from expanding the conflict. Deploying the NRF is more than symbolic; it’s a response to genuine fears that the West may have its work cut out when it comes to deterring Putin.

Beyond this collective response, several NATO countries individually have committed to sending more defensive forces to Eastern European members and to continuing or increasing the flow of military assistance to Ukraine. These measures include the deployment of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Europe for both defensive purposes and to assist in managing the influx of Ukrainian refugees, an additional $350 million in U.S. security assistance for Ukraine, Germany’s groundbreaking decision to send anti-tank weapons and man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and an array of other steps.

The question is whether all of this is enough to prevent Putin from looking beyond Ukraine to the Baltic States or elsewhere in Eastern Europe. He may intend to create more buffer space along Russia’s western border, regain some lost semblance of Russian greatness, bolster his declining approval ratings at home or solidify his legacy. The point is, Putin’s evident unpredictability — and his government’s blatant lies on the eve of the invasion — create doubt that Western defense and deterrence thus far are adequate.

To reduce the risk that Putin will expand the conflict beyond Ukraine and prepare for the new reality of post-conflict Europe, NATO should expand the scale, mission and capabilities of the units that would be on the front lines of any Russian attack on Eastern European NATO countries. The Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups, located in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, were established in 2017 as a somewhat belated response to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine. Since 20 out of NATO’s 30 members contribute troops to these battlegroups, they represent a “tripwire”: If Russia was to invade one of the four host nations, several alliance members would likely sustain casualties, which would spur a faster, more unified NATO response. In this way, the EFP battlegroups help deter Russia by signaling NATO’s increased willingness to take a risk — the basic game theory at the heart of deterrence.

But shortcomings persist. Each battlegroup consists of roughly 1,200 troops, which probably isn’t enough to deny Russian advances. The EFP units also lack persistent American contributions (except for the unit in Poland, which is U.S.-led), struggle to share information internally and with one another, and lack the ability to tackle hybrid Russian threats.

It’s reasonably clear that Russia understands it will incur costs if it invades a NATO country — what international relations scholars call “deterrence by punishment.” What’s less clear is whether Russia sees the NATO military presence as foreboding enough to rule out the idea of invasion altogether — or “deterrence by denial.”

To change Putin’s calculation about a potential invasion of the Baltics or Poland, NATO can take a number of steps. First, it should expand each EFP unit to an enhanced brigade of 5,000 troops. This would dramatically increase the deterrent effect given that a typical Western brigade is a far more capable, self-sufficient combat formation in a way that a battlegroup simply is not.

Second, the United States should contribute at least a battalion to each of the expanded EFP units. There’s no substitute for American boots on the ground in Europe, which are a physical manifestation of the United States’ commitment to Article 5.

Third, the alliance should quickly provide each EFP unit (and the four nations that host them) common advanced, secure voice and data communications equipment and network tools, perhaps supplied by the United States. It’s here — in communications — where the number of allies involved in EFP is an Achilles heel instead of a strength. Twenty contributing allies can mean 20 different types of radios and computers, leading to serious internal communication challenges — a problem not faced by the Russians, who operate largely without allies. A common, off-the-shelf solution will not only enable the individual contributors to each EFP battlegroup to communicate, but also permit more effective communication between EFP units so they can operate together across borders.

Fourth, NATO should expand the mission of the EFP units. Currently, the units are almost entirely focused on conventional military missions. They are not equipped to conduct operations in the information space, with electronic warfare and signals jamming, or in cyberspace. Yet when I visited the units last year, I learned that they struggle against Russian information, electronic and cyber attacks almost every day. The alliance ought to authorize the EFP units to engage in these domains (only in accordance with host-nation policies, of course).

Beyond immediately strengthening EFP, NATO needs to think more strategically about how to adjust in the aftermath of Russia’s dramatic upending of European security. Given the challenges posed by Russia (and to a lesser degree, China) and the requirements of collective defense, NATO probably can’t do it all. It will either need to pare down its appetite and focus almost entirely on collective defense as in the Cold War, or receive increased resources from the allies to maintain the global set of tasks it’s taken on since the 1990s, including in crisis management and security cooperation in Africa, Asia and elsewhere.

Baltics invasion causes nuclear war. Only strengthening traditional defense caps escalation.

Brands, '19 – Hal Brands is an American scholar of U.S. foreign policy. He is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. (Hal Brands; "How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics"; American Enterprise Institute - AEI; https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-russia-could-force-a-nuclear-war-in-the-baltics/; 11-7-2019, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.

There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers. During the Cold War, NATO was outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces, and it would have had great difficulty stopping a Soviet attack with conventional weapons. From the moment it was formed, NATO relied on the threat of nuclear escalation — whether rapid and spasmodic, or gradual and controlled — to maintain deterrence. American thinkers developed elaborate models and theories of deterrence. US and NATO forces regularly carried out exercises simulating the resort to nuclear weapons to make this strategy credible.

After the Cold War ended, the US and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Tensions with Russia receded and nuclear strategy came to seem like a relic of a bygone era. Yet today, with Russia rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear statecraft is returning.

The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have the capability to prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in two to three days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO could respond by mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would require striking targets — such as air defense systems — located within Russia itself, as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines.

Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. They are particularly alarmed at the possibility of NATO using its unmatched military capabilities to conduct conventional strikes within Russian borders. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the Russians are serious about it.

A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead, through deliberate choice or miscalculation, to a general nuclear war involving intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and apocalyptic destruction?

So what to do? One option would be for the West to pull back — to conclude that any game that involves risking nuclear war over the Baltic states is not worth the candle. The logic here is superficially compelling. After all, the US could survive and thrive in a world where Russia dominated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, just as it survived and thrived during the Cold War, when those countries were part of the Soviet Union. The problem is that failing to defend the Baltic states would devalue the Article 5 guarantee on which NATO rests: the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. And given that one could raise similar questions about so many US commitments — would declining to meet a Chinese attack on the Philippines really endanger America’s existence? — this failure could undermine the broader alliance system that has delivered peace and stability for so many decades.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.