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Stimpson, '15 – (Maj R.T. Stimpson; ""; No Publication; https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/stimpson.pdf; xx-xx-xxxx, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Cyberweapons have been hyped as an attractive alternative to conventional weapons due

to their affordability. Amy Chang a research associate in the technology and national security

program at the Center for a New American Security states, “cyber warfare is a great alternative

to conventional weapons, it is cheaper for and far more accessible to these small nation-

3

states.”3Ross Rustici argues that “Cyberweapons are a cheap way to build a global strike

capability against networked states.”4 He argues that poor states, who were incapable of

challenging larger more technologically advanced states with conventional weapons can now

take can now them on in cyber.

They are both partially correct. A cyberwarfare capability can be purchased on the

internet for a couple hundred dollars; one can purchase malware and botnets or hire the services

of a self-trained hacker.5

Gabriel Weimann identifies that “all terrorists need is an online

connection and personal computer.”6 What could be purchased at this price can be crude but very

effective. The ILOVEYOU virus was able to shut down businesses for hours and caused around

6 billion dollars in damages.7 Why would one waste money on expensive conventional weapon

that need upgrades and become obsolete when they can drop $200 on Craigslist for a virus or the

services of a ‘weekend cyberwarrior’?

Not all cyberweapons are created equally. As effective (causing damage to unprotected

computers) as it was, ILOVEYOU was not a militarized cyberweapon; it could not be directed

against a specific target, could not be controlled and was not sophisticated enough to penetrate

sensitive military networks. It proved to be more of an annoyance by indiscriminately attacking

hundreds of countries and millions of random emails.8

Thomas Rid points out that exceptional

cyber weapons require a lot of technical expertise and funding, hence they would not be the

preferred weapons of poor countries or non-state actors.9

A true cyberwarfare capability is

3

Ibid.

4 Ross Rustici, "Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field," Strategic Studies Institute (2011).37.

5 M. Lee and L. Hornby, "Google Attack Puts Spotlight on China's "Red" Hackers." Reuters (2010).

6 Gabriel Weimann, "Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?" USA Institute of Peace (2004).

7

S. Kirschner, "I Love You...Not." Popular Science., 2000, .48-49.

8

Ibid.

9 Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (London: Hurst and Company, 2013a).45.

4

expensive. The technologically advanced Stuxnet was able to discern targets and could be

controlled by the user after launch. It is estimated that Stuxnet cost around US$3 million dollars

to create.10 Additionally it is believed that the virus was tested by experts for many months

before it was actually launched.11 As malware and viruses become more and more complex so do

the defenses that prevent them from infecting computers. Advanced defenses will only raise the

costs and the entry requirements into militarized cyberspace.

Accessibility

Launching a real cyberattack is harder to achieve than media and movies portray it. An

obvious disadvantage to the state that wishes to replace physical weapons with cyber weapons is

that all future opponents 1) need to be present in cyberspace and 2) they need to be vulnerable to

cyberattack.

The first element is self-evident. You can’t attack someone in cyberspace if they don’t

have a presence in cyberspace. There are many countries, mostly poor and not technically

advanced, whose government, military and citizens are minimally connected. An attempted

cyberattack against such an unconnected country would have little to no effect and might even

go unnoticed. An advantage of physical weapons is that they can be employed against anyone

within range. Declaring cyberwar on a group that is not networked or dependent on IT systems

will not be all that productive.

Cyberattack, the critical component of cyberwarfare is reliant on, vulnerability. “One

distinction between cyberwarfare and warfare in all other media must be made: cyber warfare

requires that the targets have made mistakes in their implementation and use of digital

10 A. Hesseldahl, "Computer Worm may be Targeting Iranian Nuclear Sites," Bloomberg (2010).

11 Ibid.

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equipment”12 If the adversary has a tight cybersecurity perimeter that is not penetrable, then

there is no cyberattack that can occur. A country that is in cyberspace can at any time reduce or

remove their presence. Making cyberattack difficult is not impossible. One way to protect

oneself against cyberattack is electronic isolation. By “air-gapping” a network from the rest of

the world a state makes it very difficult for outsiders to penetrate a system.13 The majority of

classified US Defense and other Western defense networks are air-gapped making if very

difficult to conduct a cyberattack.14 “Air-gapping” can reduce one’s vulnerability, however

human error plays a role in even the most perceptively secure systems, as was the case with

Buckshot Yankee. Buckshot Yankee, “the most significant breach of U.S. military computers

was caused by a flash drive inserted into a U.S. military laptop on a post in the Middle East in

2008.”15 The virus compromised a large amount of defense related sensitive material. Whether a

network is connected to the internet or not, cyberwarfare in all cases requires a window of

opportunity that is not necessarily going to be open when and where you need it to be.

Even when the opportunity exits to penetrate a system, an advanced country reliant on

cyberspace is going to employ advanced cyber defenses. Vulnerabilities will be hard to exploit.

It is not difficult to immunize one’s networks from cyberattack. Advanced cyberdefenses are

layered with other security measures to include “computing instructions that can only be

manipulated by hands on access to the hardware, preventing malware or malicious software with

12 Martin Libicki, "Why Cyber War Will Not and should Not have its Grand Strategy," Strategic Studies Quarterly

(2014).31.

13 Bruce Schneier, "Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don'T Connect to the Internet," Wired (2013).

14 Ibid.

15 Ellen Nakashima, "Defense Officials Discloses Cyberattacks," The Washington Post2010.

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rogue instructions being placed on the machines.”16 This makes cyberattack against an advanced

state target very challenging.

Vulnerability is requisite but so is preparation time. It is true a cyberattack could be

launched at the click of a keyboard and the cyber projectile can arrive at target destination

instantaneously. There is however a substantial amount of preparation that needs to occur prior

to an attack whether retaliatory or pre-emptively. The Stuxnet attack would have needed

extensive knowledge of the nuclear facilities in Iran but also people with nuclear reactor

expertise.17

The need for so many pre-conditions to exist makes cyber not a particularly responsive

means to retaliate. When attacked by a physical weapon it is relatively easy to respond with

another physical weapon. If you are in range, your adversary is probably in range. For a

cyberattack to be effective as a pre-emptive strike option, the target needs to be known well in

advance, time is needed to probe the opponent’s system for vulnerabilities before attack. This is

one of the reasons cyberattack was not used during the NATO attack on Libya in 2011. The

attack was not foreseen in time to employ cyber means.18 One is not necessarily vulnerable to

your cyberweapon by virtue of their cyberspace presence.

Network vulnerabilities when found, are fleeting, especially with technologically

advanced states. When they are exploited and attacked they will be sensed by the defender and

repaired quickly. “Even if a potent cyber-weapon could be launched successfully once, it would

16 Libicki, Why Cyber War Will Not and should Not have its Grand Strategy30.

17 R. Langner, Cracking Stuxnet: A 21st Century Cyberweapon, Cracking Stuxnet: A 21st Century Cyberweapon.

Ted.com, 2011 .

18 Ellen Nakashima, "US Cyberweapons had been Considered to Disrupt Gaddafi's Air Defenses," The Washington

Post2011.

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be highly questionable if an attack, or even a salvo, could be repeated in order to achieve a

political goal.”19

There are many things that can be done to reduce cyber and network weakness. If an

attack was impending there are substantially even more measures that can be taken. Just because

one has a cyberweapon does not mean one can use it at a time and place of choosing. It needs to

be enabled by the opponent’s carelessness and ignorance. For this reason alone cyberweapons

will never be a replacement for conventional weapons.

Risk and Cyberwarfare

Patrick Lin in his Atlantic article sees cyberwarfare as a low risk alternative to

conventional warfare.

This also means new channels for warfare. Indeed, a target in cyberspace is more

appealing than conventional physical targets, since the aggressor would not need

to incur the expense and risk of transporting equipment and deploying troops

across borders into enemy territory, not to mention the political risk of casualties.

Cyberweapons could be used to attack anonymously at a distance while still

causing much mayhem.20

Cyberwarfare is not a riskless affair to the user. A characteristic of cyberspace is that it is very

difficult to determine the follow-on effect of actions taken in cyberspace and even more difficult

to try to control these effects. Physical weapons are tangible; they can be inventoried, expended

and destroyed if required. When cyberweapons are used in cyberspace the user may not always

be able to contain the weapon’s effects or control its use and eventual destination. This can have

three very negative consequences:

19 Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, "Cyber-Weapons," Rusi Journal 157, no. 1 (2012).

20 Patrick Lin, "Is it Possible to Wage just a Cyberwar?" The Atlantic (2012).

8

Firstly, a state’s cyberweapon will not necessarily discern enemy from friendly in

cyberspace. A launched cyberweapon could seep into the attacker’s networks and infect the

systems of the employer resulting in negative consequences. Conventional weapons effects are

observable and finite. It is not easy to tell what kind of damage a cyberweapon has done or

where a virus ultimately ends up. When a state loses control of the effects of its weapons, the

attacking state could do more damage to itself that to the intended target. Consequences of cyber

blowback would not be contained to defense systems and would include the technologies that are

integral to the state’s citizens. Major efficiencies and economic production could be

compromised. The secondary effects caused by engaging in cyberwarfare could undermine a

state’s citizen’s trust in cyberspace well into the future.

Secondly, a country that uses and creates advanced cyberweapons will need to be very

reliant on IT systems. This serves to increase a state’s vulnerability to the very cyberweapons it

is producing. It also increases the attractiveness of that state to other states wishing to employ

cyberattack.21

Thirdly, the most lucrative targets and typically most vulnerable in cyberspace are nonmilitary. Attempting to defeat the adversary by attacking the economy and industry of a country

through cyber will have global consequences given the interconnectedness of the world. Power

generators and communications networks are intertwined with other cities and countries. IT

infrastructure and private networks are connected globally.22 Due to the interconnectedness of

the financial systems, a successful attack against for example Wall Street will more than likely

21 James Adams, "Virtual Defense," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (2001).98.

22 Andrew Krepinevich, "Cyberwarfare: A "Nuclear Option"?" Centre for Strategic and Bugetary Assessments

(2012).65.

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have negative consequences to an attacker’s allies and the country itself. Interdependencies are

not always obvious in cyberspace.23

PART II

Cyberdeterrence

Threat and deterrence are unique psychological aspects within the concept of war. The

aim of deterrence is to persuade an adversary not to initiate action for fear the retaliation would

not be outweigh potential benefits.

A state deploys a deterrent strategy to protect an interest. To keep adversaries

from attacking the interest, a state makes a deterrent declaration, ‘Do not do this,

or else that will happen.’ This is any adversary action that would threaten the

[state’s] interest. That includes either denial measures, penalty measures, or

both.24

There is a significant body of knowledge that shows wars have been averted due to the

perception of strength or perception of powerful weapons that were in reality not as powerful as

they appeared.25 If arguing for cyberwar as a legitimate form of war, it would be rational to

assume that the associated negative costs and risks of engaging in cyberwar could act as a

deterrent. Will Goodman who has served as an advisor to US Defense dept. argues cyberwarfare

can be used as an effective deterrent. He states that “Cyberdeterrence proves easier in practice

than it seems to be in theory because cyberattacks are ultimately inseparable from the physical

domain, where deterrence has a long-demonstrated record of success”.

26

Cyberwarfare however does not represent an effective means to apply the functions of

deterrence. Deterrence requires two key elements: a credible threat and ability to communicate

23 S. Borg, "Economically Complex Cyber Attacks," IEEE Security and Privacy 3, no. 6 (2005).

24 Will Goodman, "Cyber Deterrence," Strategic Studies Quarterly (2010)., 105-106.

25 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).35-56

26 Goodman, Cyber Deterrence102.

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the threat. Cyber unfortunately does neither effectively. Cyber coercion cannot compel like

physical means can. A physical force in a tangible environment is still preferred.

Known cyberwarfare capability on its own is not compelling. “All publicly known

cyberweapons have far less ‘firepower’ than is commonly assumed”.27 To deter, you need to

make the adversary believe that an attack will cause some level of pain and suffering. Though

the Stuxnet example might be an example of how physical damage can be delivered via cyber

(albeit indirectly), for now it is the exception rather than the rule in cyberwarfare. The cyber

attacker in reality is very limited in what can be achieved. Interrupting a state’s industry or

military communications network are irritating notions and could weaken the state temporarily,

they are however temporary and any resulting destruction could be fixed fairly quickly as

previous examples have indicated. Retired US Marine General James Cartwright has been urging

the US military to be more overt with their cyber capability.

We've got to step up the game; we've got to talk about our offensive capabilities

and train to them; to make them credible so that people know there's a penalty to

this," said Cartwright. "You can't have something that's a secret be a deterrent.

Because if you don't know it's there, it doesn't scare you.28

Cartwright is correct, if you want to deter, having the capability is important but you also need to

communicate to your enemy your ability. What Cartwright fails to realize, is how hard this is to

do in cyberspace. When it comes to deterrence, actions speak louder than words. In

cyberwarfare deterrence is difficult.

Pointing to one’s ability to use cyberweapons effectively in the past would not

necessarily be all that compelling. If a computer virus was launched in the past and discovered, it

can be safe to say an attack employing an identical or similar virus and using similar

27 Rid and McBurney, Cyber-Weapons

28 Shane McGlaun, "DARPA Wants More Money for Cyber Weapons," Daily Tech Magazine, 2011, .

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vulnerabilities would be nearly impossible to deliver again. Additionally the cyberweapon design

utilized will have been dissected and access points patched. As soon as Stuxnet was discovered it

was globally “outted” and neutralized.

Once you know that it's there it's not that difficult to reverse engineer.

Neutralization of Stuxnet, once its operation is understood, would not be that

difficult as it was precisely engineered to disrupt a specific item of machinery,

once Stuxnet’ s signature is identified it can be eliminated from a system .29

Launching a lesser show of force attack like overtly probing an enemy’s servers or causing

minor network disruptions to illustrate a capability would work well in an observable world, but

not so much in the virtual world. By conducting a show of force you telegraph your intent to use

cyberwarfare. Lupovici sees this as a significant drawback stating, “exposing the offensive

capabilities as the consequence of repeated attacks may serve as the basis of knowledge or

inspiration for the challenger, it is also likely to allow enemies to prepare for a future threat.”30

Attribution is another challenge in cyberdeterrence. The advantage of easily being

anonymous in cyberspace has its benefits and drawbacks. When trying to coerce in cyberspace it

is a drawback. Cyberspace is not an exclusive club where all members are known, like the

‘nuclear club’ of the Cold War. The majority of the world is operating in cyberspace.31 This

poses a problem in deterrence as the sender of a cyberdeterrence message may not be known.

When the sender is not known the message can be misinterpreted, misread, misidentified or

perhaps not even detected. There is a difference between a cyberattack that originates from a

domestic hacker and one that is external and state sanctioned. The attack against Estonia in 2007

used hundreds of thousands of computers from 178 countries against 90% of the key information

29 Peter Sommer, "Experts Say, Iran has Neutralized Stuxnet," YNet News- Middle East, 2012, .

30 A. Lupovici, "Cyber Warfare and Deterrence: Trends and Challenges in Research," Military and Stategic Affairs

3, no. 3 (2011).55.

31 J. Nye, "Cyber Power," Belfer Centre for Science and Int'L Affairs Harvard Kennedy School (2010).4.

12

systems in the country.32 The origin of the attack could not be determined; without knowing who

was attacking it is difficult to determine what the purpose of the attack even is. Estonia is an

example of how difficult it might be to attribute what the message is and where it is coming

from.

Cyberspace is not a good venue to achieve deterrence. Physical weapons and their effects

are observable and their effects are understood making deterrence compelling. Deterrence

through cyber is not effective as one cannot effectively communicate the threat in which one

should fear.

Cyberpower

Could cyberpower replace conventional military means in other domains? Cyberpower,

as a new form of warfare has been compared to the emerging airpower theory of the 20th century.

Andrew Krepinevich states, “in the context of the historical analogies discussed, the state of

cyber weapon development appears to most closely approximate that of airpower during the

1930s.”33 He further states that a “cyberattack on an advanced state’s critical infrastructure

achieves results more similar to those of the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II”34It is

argued that cyberweapons can strike at strategic targets like industry supporting the war effort

and the state infrastructure so crucial in holding the will of the people together. Conceptually,

there are obvious similarities between airpower and cyberpower, however the domains of

cyberspace and air are vastly different. The most glaring difference is in the potential to create

destruction. During WWII, Allied aerial bombing campaigns could effectively strike deep into

Nazi Germany, degrading support to the war effort.

32 Charles Clover, "Kremlin Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz," Financial Times- Europe (2009).

33 Krepinevich, Cyberwarfare: A "Nuclear Option"?79.

34 Ibid.65.

13

The German experience suggest that even a first class military power- rugged and

resilient as Germany was- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation

of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the

invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness.

Her armament production was failing irretrievably, orderliness in effort was

disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along.35

Bombing campaigns targeted civilian targets like transportation, electricity and manufacturing

infrastructure that enabled war production. Assessment reports post Second World War

determined irreparable physical damage needed to occur to inflict strategic victory over the

means of production.36

Cyberattacks cannot achieve destruction of infrastructure like

conventional weapons can. Networks can be disrupted temporarily but the hardware and

machines that enable cyberspace will still be intact. “Because cyberwar does not involve

bombing cities or devastating armored columns, the damage inflicted will have a short-term

impact on targets”.37

Another effect of aerial bombardment is the immediate delivery of shock and destruction.

It is seen and felt. Cyberweapons are incapable of delivering this sensation. Empirical evidence

shows that a cyberweapon has never caused immediate direct damage and destruction on the

same level as bombs. Stuxnet took many months to damage Iranian nuclear facilities.38

Aerial bombardment can be overwhelming on first strike, but usually requires multiple

waves and re-attack to achieve strategic goals. This was noted in the US Strategic Bombing

Survey, “no indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single attack.

Persistent re-attack was necessary.”39

Attacks were rarely successful on the first attempt and if

35 . The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, Summary Report (Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air

University Press,[1945]).37-38.

36 Ibid.

37 Eric Gartzke, "The Myth of Cyberwar," International Security 38, no. 2 (..57.

38 Langner, Cracking Stuxnet: A 21st Century Cyberweapon

39 . The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, Summary Report39.

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they were, the German industry was very capable of replacing and rebuilding infrastructure.40

Persistent attacks is not a luxury in cyberwarfare.

Cyberattacks “are most effective as an opening salvo in war”.

41 Once an attacker has

infiltrated a network the defender will quickly move to patch the vulnerability and perhaps even

close the network from the outside. For a re-attack to occur, another vulnerability in the system

would need to be found. The more attacks that are launched against a system the harder it

becomes to find future vulnerabilities.

Though cyberattacks can achieve disruption of critical industry in depth for minimal

expenditure, they are not a replacement for airpower as they are incapable of delivering the

carnage of bombs and cannot be employed persistently. The more pragmatic use of

cyberweapons is in a combined force environment which may be alongside strategic bombing

campaigns but always synchronized with conventional warfare assets

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