Card run
Stimpson, '15 – (Maj R.T. Stimpson; ""; No Publication; https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/317/305/stimpson.pdf; xx-xx-xxxx, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC
Cyberweapons have been hyped as an attractive alternative to conventional weapons due
to their affordability. Amy Chang a research associate in the technology and national security
program at the Center for a New American Security states, “cyber warfare is a great alternative
to conventional weapons, it is cheaper for and far more accessible to these small nation-
3
states.”3Ross Rustici argues that “Cyberweapons are a cheap way to build a global strike
capability against networked states.”4 He argues that poor states, who were incapable of
challenging larger more technologically advanced states with conventional weapons can now
take can now them on in cyber.
They are both partially correct. A cyberwarfare capability can be purchased on the
internet for a couple hundred dollars; one can purchase malware and botnets or hire the services
of a self-trained hacker.5
Gabriel Weimann identifies that “all terrorists need is an online
connection and personal computer.”6 What could be purchased at this price can be crude but very
effective. The ILOVEYOU virus was able to shut down businesses for hours and caused around
6 billion dollars in damages.7 Why would one waste money on expensive conventional weapon
that need upgrades and become obsolete when they can drop $200 on Craigslist for a virus or the
services of a ‘weekend cyberwarrior’?
Not all cyberweapons are created equally. As effective (causing damage to unprotected
computers) as it was, ILOVEYOU was not a militarized cyberweapon; it could not be directed
against a specific target, could not be controlled and was not sophisticated enough to penetrate
sensitive military networks. It proved to be more of an annoyance by indiscriminately attacking
hundreds of countries and millions of random emails.8
Thomas Rid points out that exceptional
cyber weapons require a lot of technical expertise and funding, hence they would not be the
preferred weapons of poor countries or non-state actors.9
A true cyberwarfare capability is
3
Ibid.
4 Ross Rustici, "Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field," Strategic Studies Institute (2011).37.
5 M. Lee and L. Hornby, "Google Attack Puts Spotlight on China's "Red" Hackers." Reuters (2010).
6 Gabriel Weimann, "Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?" USA Institute of Peace (2004).
7
S. Kirschner, "I Love You...Not." Popular Science., 2000, .48-49.
8
Ibid.
9 Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (London: Hurst and Company, 2013a).45.
4
expensive. The technologically advanced Stuxnet was able to discern targets and could be
controlled by the user after launch. It is estimated that Stuxnet cost around US$3 million dollars
to create.10 Additionally it is believed that the virus was tested by experts for many months
before it was actually launched.11 As malware and viruses become more and more complex so do
the defenses that prevent them from infecting computers. Advanced defenses will only raise the
costs and the entry requirements into militarized cyberspace.
Accessibility
Launching a real cyberattack is harder to achieve than media and movies portray it. An
obvious disadvantage to the state that wishes to replace physical weapons with cyber weapons is
that all future opponents 1) need to be present in cyberspace and 2) they need to be vulnerable to
cyberattack.
The first element is self-evident. You can’t attack someone in cyberspace if they don’t
have a presence in cyberspace. There are many countries, mostly poor and not technically
advanced, whose government, military and citizens are minimally connected. An attempted
cyberattack against such an unconnected country would have little to no effect and might even
go unnoticed. An advantage of physical weapons is that they can be employed against anyone
within range. Declaring cyberwar on a group that is not networked or dependent on IT systems
will not be all that productive.
Cyberattack, the critical component of cyberwarfare is reliant on, vulnerability. “One
distinction between cyberwarfare and warfare in all other media must be made: cyber warfare
requires that the targets have made mistakes in their implementation and use of digital
10 A. Hesseldahl, "Computer Worm may be Targeting Iranian Nuclear Sites," Bloomberg (2010).
11 Ibid.
5
equipment”12 If the adversary has a tight cybersecurity perimeter that is not penetrable, then
there is no cyberattack that can occur. A country that is in cyberspace can at any time reduce or
remove their presence. Making cyberattack difficult is not impossible. One way to protect
oneself against cyberattack is electronic isolation. By “air-gapping” a network from the rest of
the world a state makes it very difficult for outsiders to penetrate a system.13 The majority of
classified US Defense and other Western defense networks are air-gapped making if very
difficult to conduct a cyberattack.14 “Air-gapping” can reduce one’s vulnerability, however
human error plays a role in even the most perceptively secure systems, as was the case with
Buckshot Yankee. Buckshot Yankee, “the most significant breach of U.S. military computers
was caused by a flash drive inserted into a U.S. military laptop on a post in the Middle East in
2008.”15 The virus compromised a large amount of defense related sensitive material. Whether a
network is connected to the internet or not, cyberwarfare in all cases requires a window of
opportunity that is not necessarily going to be open when and where you need it to be.
Even when the opportunity exits to penetrate a system, an advanced country reliant on
cyberspace is going to employ advanced cyber defenses. Vulnerabilities will be hard to exploit.
It is not difficult to immunize one’s networks from cyberattack. Advanced cyberdefenses are
layered with other security measures to include “computing instructions that can only be
manipulated by hands on access to the hardware, preventing malware or malicious software with
12 Martin Libicki, "Why Cyber War Will Not and should Not have its Grand Strategy," Strategic Studies Quarterly
(2014).31.
13 Bruce Schneier, "Want to Evade NSA Spying? Don'T Connect to the Internet," Wired (2013).
14 Ibid.
15 Ellen Nakashima, "Defense Officials Discloses Cyberattacks," The Washington Post2010.
6
rogue instructions being placed on the machines.”16 This makes cyberattack against an advanced
state target very challenging.
Vulnerability is requisite but so is preparation time. It is true a cyberattack could be
launched at the click of a keyboard and the cyber projectile can arrive at target destination
instantaneously. There is however a substantial amount of preparation that needs to occur prior
to an attack whether retaliatory or pre-emptively. The Stuxnet attack would have needed
extensive knowledge of the nuclear facilities in Iran but also people with nuclear reactor
expertise.17
The need for so many pre-conditions to exist makes cyber not a particularly responsive
means to retaliate. When attacked by a physical weapon it is relatively easy to respond with
another physical weapon. If you are in range, your adversary is probably in range. For a
cyberattack to be effective as a pre-emptive strike option, the target needs to be known well in
advance, time is needed to probe the opponent’s system for vulnerabilities before attack. This is
one of the reasons cyberattack was not used during the NATO attack on Libya in 2011. The
attack was not foreseen in time to employ cyber means.18 One is not necessarily vulnerable to
your cyberweapon by virtue of their cyberspace presence.
Network vulnerabilities when found, are fleeting, especially with technologically
advanced states. When they are exploited and attacked they will be sensed by the defender and
repaired quickly. “Even if a potent cyber-weapon could be launched successfully once, it would
16 Libicki, Why Cyber War Will Not and should Not have its Grand Strategy30.
17 R. Langner, Cracking Stuxnet: A 21st Century Cyberweapon, Cracking Stuxnet: A 21st Century Cyberweapon.
Ted.com, 2011 .
18 Ellen Nakashima, "US Cyberweapons had been Considered to Disrupt Gaddafi's Air Defenses," The Washington
Post2011.
7
be highly questionable if an attack, or even a salvo, could be repeated in order to achieve a
political goal.”19
There are many things that can be done to reduce cyber and network weakness. If an
attack was impending there are substantially even more measures that can be taken. Just because
one has a cyberweapon does not mean one can use it at a time and place of choosing. It needs to
be enabled by the opponent’s carelessness and ignorance. For this reason alone cyberweapons
will never be a replacement for conventional weapons.
Risk and Cyberwarfare
Patrick Lin in his Atlantic article sees cyberwarfare as a low risk alternative to
conventional warfare.
This also means new channels for warfare. Indeed, a target in cyberspace is more
appealing than conventional physical targets, since the aggressor would not need
to incur the expense and risk of transporting equipment and deploying troops
across borders into enemy territory, not to mention the political risk of casualties.
Cyberweapons could be used to attack anonymously at a distance while still
causing much mayhem.20
Cyberwarfare is not a riskless affair to the user. A characteristic of cyberspace is that it is very
difficult to determine the follow-on effect of actions taken in cyberspace and even more difficult
to try to control these effects. Physical weapons are tangible; they can be inventoried, expended
and destroyed if required. When cyberweapons are used in cyberspace the user may not always
be able to contain the weapon’s effects or control its use and eventual destination. This can have
three very negative consequences:
19 Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, "Cyber-Weapons," Rusi Journal 157, no. 1 (2012).
20 Patrick Lin, "Is it Possible to Wage just a Cyberwar?" The Atlantic (2012).
8
Firstly, a state’s cyberweapon will not necessarily discern enemy from friendly in
cyberspace. A launched cyberweapon could seep into the attacker’s networks and infect the
systems of the employer resulting in negative consequences. Conventional weapons effects are
observable and finite. It is not easy to tell what kind of damage a cyberweapon has done or
where a virus ultimately ends up. When a state loses control of the effects of its weapons, the
attacking state could do more damage to itself that to the intended target. Consequences of cyber
blowback would not be contained to defense systems and would include the technologies that are
integral to the state’s citizens. Major efficiencies and economic production could be
compromised. The secondary effects caused by engaging in cyberwarfare could undermine a
state’s citizen’s trust in cyberspace well into the future.
Secondly, a country that uses and creates advanced cyberweapons will need to be very
reliant on IT systems. This serves to increase a state’s vulnerability to the very cyberweapons it
is producing. It also increases the attractiveness of that state to other states wishing to employ
cyberattack.21
Thirdly, the most lucrative targets and typically most vulnerable in cyberspace are nonmilitary. Attempting to defeat the adversary by attacking the economy and industry of a country
through cyber will have global consequences given the interconnectedness of the world. Power
generators and communications networks are intertwined with other cities and countries. IT
infrastructure and private networks are connected globally.22 Due to the interconnectedness of
the financial systems, a successful attack against for example Wall Street will more than likely
21 James Adams, "Virtual Defense," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (2001).98.
22 Andrew Krepinevich, "Cyberwarfare: A "Nuclear Option"?" Centre for Strategic and Bugetary Assessments
(2012).65.
9
have negative consequences to an attacker’s allies and the country itself. Interdependencies are
not always obvious in cyberspace.23
PART II
Cyberdeterrence
Threat and deterrence are unique psychological aspects within the concept of war. The
aim of deterrence is to persuade an adversary not to initiate action for fear the retaliation would
not be outweigh potential benefits.
A state deploys a deterrent strategy to protect an interest. To keep adversaries
from attacking the interest, a state makes a deterrent declaration, ‘Do not do this,
or else that will happen.’ This is any adversary action that would threaten the
[state’s] interest. That includes either denial measures, penalty measures, or
both.24
There is a significant body of knowledge that shows wars have been averted due to the
perception of strength or perception of powerful weapons that were in reality not as powerful as
they appeared.25 If arguing for cyberwar as a legitimate form of war, it would be rational to
assume that the associated negative costs and risks of engaging in cyberwar could act as a
deterrent. Will Goodman who has served as an advisor to US Defense dept. argues cyberwarfare
can be used as an effective deterrent. He states that “Cyberdeterrence proves easier in practice
than it seems to be in theory because cyberattacks are ultimately inseparable from the physical
domain, where deterrence has a long-demonstrated record of success”.
26
Cyberwarfare however does not represent an effective means to apply the functions of
deterrence. Deterrence requires two key elements: a credible threat and ability to communicate
23 S. Borg, "Economically Complex Cyber Attacks," IEEE Security and Privacy 3, no. 6 (2005).
24 Will Goodman, "Cyber Deterrence," Strategic Studies Quarterly (2010)., 105-106.
25 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).35-56
26 Goodman, Cyber Deterrence102.
10
the threat. Cyber unfortunately does neither effectively. Cyber coercion cannot compel like
physical means can. A physical force in a tangible environment is still preferred.
Known cyberwarfare capability on its own is not compelling. “All publicly known
cyberweapons have far less ‘firepower’ than is commonly assumed”.27 To deter, you need to
make the adversary believe that an attack will cause some level of pain and suffering. Though
the Stuxnet example might be an example of how physical damage can be delivered via cyber
(albeit indirectly), for now it is the exception rather than the rule in cyberwarfare. The cyber
attacker in reality is very limited in what can be achieved. Interrupting a state’s industry or
military communications network are irritating notions and could weaken the state temporarily,
they are however temporary and any resulting destruction could be fixed fairly quickly as
previous examples have indicated. Retired US Marine General James Cartwright has been urging
the US military to be more overt with their cyber capability.
We've got to step up the game; we've got to talk about our offensive capabilities
and train to them; to make them credible so that people know there's a penalty to
this," said Cartwright. "You can't have something that's a secret be a deterrent.
Because if you don't know it's there, it doesn't scare you.28
Cartwright is correct, if you want to deter, having the capability is important but you also need to
communicate to your enemy your ability. What Cartwright fails to realize, is how hard this is to
do in cyberspace. When it comes to deterrence, actions speak louder than words. In
cyberwarfare deterrence is difficult.
Pointing to one’s ability to use cyberweapons effectively in the past would not
necessarily be all that compelling. If a computer virus was launched in the past and discovered, it
can be safe to say an attack employing an identical or similar virus and using similar
27 Rid and McBurney, Cyber-Weapons
28 Shane McGlaun, "DARPA Wants More Money for Cyber Weapons," Daily Tech Magazine, 2011, .
11
vulnerabilities would be nearly impossible to deliver again. Additionally the cyberweapon design
utilized will have been dissected and access points patched. As soon as Stuxnet was discovered it
was globally “outted” and neutralized.
Once you know that it's there it's not that difficult to reverse engineer.
Neutralization of Stuxnet, once its operation is understood, would not be that
difficult as it was precisely engineered to disrupt a specific item of machinery,
once Stuxnet’ s signature is identified it can be eliminated from a system .29
Launching a lesser show of force attack like overtly probing an enemy’s servers or causing
minor network disruptions to illustrate a capability would work well in an observable world, but
not so much in the virtual world. By conducting a show of force you telegraph your intent to use
cyberwarfare. Lupovici sees this as a significant drawback stating, “exposing the offensive
capabilities as the consequence of repeated attacks may serve as the basis of knowledge or
inspiration for the challenger, it is also likely to allow enemies to prepare for a future threat.”30
Attribution is another challenge in cyberdeterrence. The advantage of easily being
anonymous in cyberspace has its benefits and drawbacks. When trying to coerce in cyberspace it
is a drawback. Cyberspace is not an exclusive club where all members are known, like the
‘nuclear club’ of the Cold War. The majority of the world is operating in cyberspace.31 This
poses a problem in deterrence as the sender of a cyberdeterrence message may not be known.
When the sender is not known the message can be misinterpreted, misread, misidentified or
perhaps not even detected. There is a difference between a cyberattack that originates from a
domestic hacker and one that is external and state sanctioned. The attack against Estonia in 2007
used hundreds of thousands of computers from 178 countries against 90% of the key information
29 Peter Sommer, "Experts Say, Iran has Neutralized Stuxnet," YNet News- Middle East, 2012, .
30 A. Lupovici, "Cyber Warfare and Deterrence: Trends and Challenges in Research," Military and Stategic Affairs
3, no. 3 (2011).55.
31 J. Nye, "Cyber Power," Belfer Centre for Science and Int'L Affairs Harvard Kennedy School (2010).4.
12
systems in the country.32 The origin of the attack could not be determined; without knowing who
was attacking it is difficult to determine what the purpose of the attack even is. Estonia is an
example of how difficult it might be to attribute what the message is and where it is coming
from.
Cyberspace is not a good venue to achieve deterrence. Physical weapons and their effects
are observable and their effects are understood making deterrence compelling. Deterrence
through cyber is not effective as one cannot effectively communicate the threat in which one
should fear.
Cyberpower
Could cyberpower replace conventional military means in other domains? Cyberpower,
as a new form of warfare has been compared to the emerging airpower theory of the 20th century.
Andrew Krepinevich states, “in the context of the historical analogies discussed, the state of
cyber weapon development appears to most closely approximate that of airpower during the
1930s.”33 He further states that a “cyberattack on an advanced state’s critical infrastructure
achieves results more similar to those of the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II”34It is
argued that cyberweapons can strike at strategic targets like industry supporting the war effort
and the state infrastructure so crucial in holding the will of the people together. Conceptually,
there are obvious similarities between airpower and cyberpower, however the domains of
cyberspace and air are vastly different. The most glaring difference is in the potential to create
destruction. During WWII, Allied aerial bombing campaigns could effectively strike deep into
Nazi Germany, degrading support to the war effort.
32 Charles Clover, "Kremlin Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz," Financial Times- Europe (2009).
33 Krepinevich, Cyberwarfare: A "Nuclear Option"?79.
34 Ibid.65.
13
The German experience suggest that even a first class military power- rugged and
resilient as Germany was- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation
of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the
invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness.
Her armament production was failing irretrievably, orderliness in effort was
disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along.35
Bombing campaigns targeted civilian targets like transportation, electricity and manufacturing
infrastructure that enabled war production. Assessment reports post Second World War
determined irreparable physical damage needed to occur to inflict strategic victory over the
means of production.36
Cyberattacks cannot achieve destruction of infrastructure like
conventional weapons can. Networks can be disrupted temporarily but the hardware and
machines that enable cyberspace will still be intact. “Because cyberwar does not involve
bombing cities or devastating armored columns, the damage inflicted will have a short-term
impact on targets”.37
Another effect of aerial bombardment is the immediate delivery of shock and destruction.
It is seen and felt. Cyberweapons are incapable of delivering this sensation. Empirical evidence
shows that a cyberweapon has never caused immediate direct damage and destruction on the
same level as bombs. Stuxnet took many months to damage Iranian nuclear facilities.38
Aerial bombardment can be overwhelming on first strike, but usually requires multiple
waves and re-attack to achieve strategic goals. This was noted in the US Strategic Bombing
Survey, “no indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single attack.
Persistent re-attack was necessary.”39
Attacks were rarely successful on the first attempt and if
35 . The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, Summary Report (Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air
University Press,[1945]).37-38.
36 Ibid.
37 Eric Gartzke, "The Myth of Cyberwar," International Security 38, no. 2 (..57.
38 Langner, Cracking Stuxnet: A 21st Century Cyberweapon
39 . The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, Summary Report39.
14
they were, the German industry was very capable of replacing and rebuilding infrastructure.40
Persistent attacks is not a luxury in cyberwarfare.
Cyberattacks “are most effective as an opening salvo in war”.
41 Once an attacker has
infiltrated a network the defender will quickly move to patch the vulnerability and perhaps even
close the network from the outside. For a re-attack to occur, another vulnerability in the system
would need to be found. The more attacks that are launched against a system the harder it
becomes to find future vulnerabilities.
Though cyberattacks can achieve disruption of critical industry in depth for minimal
expenditure, they are not a replacement for airpower as they are incapable of delivering the
carnage of bombs and cannot be employed persistently. The more pragmatic use of
cyberweapons is in a combined force environment which may be alongside strategic bombing
campaigns but always synchronized with conventional warfare assets