2NC – UQ – Collective Defense Now
NATO is shifting priorities towards Baltic conventional defense now, but that requires massive resource re-allocation.
Foy, 6/27 – FT's European Diplomatic Correspondent, based in Brussels. He reports on the EU's foreign policy, relations between Brussels and other world powers, and the diplomatic intrigues between member states. Previously he was Moscow Bureau Chief, where he interviewed president Vladimir Putin and charted his regime's descent into repression (Henry Foy; "NATO to increase forces on high alert to 300,000 "; Financial Times; https://www.ft.com/content/39caeff3-38cf-44e2-9270-835ab28f13c8; xx-06-27-2022, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC
Nato is to increase its forces on high alert by more than sevenfold to 300,000 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as part of a sweeping overhaul to better protect its eastern flank.
In a historic shift from the post-cold war era, when military spending was cut and troops pulled back from eastern Europe, secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg said the western alliance would also increase deployments close to Russia, shifting the focus from deterring any invasion to a full defence of allied territory.
The pledge to increase the number of troops on high alert across allied countries from 40,000 came as G7 leaders vowed to impose new sanctions to curb Moscow’s import of technology for its arms industry, amid efforts by western countries to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Speaking before the announcement, Stoltenberg told the Financial Times that the new military blueprint would drastically upgrade its eastern defences, tearing up a model that could have meant relinquishing and then attempting to recapture the Baltic states in the event of a Russian invasion.
Estonia’s prime minister has claimed that the current doctrine accepted that the Baltic states would be “wiped off the map” in the event of a Russian assault before Nato attempted a counter-attack to liberate them after 180 days.
“We never share the details of operational plans,” Stoltenberg said. “But I can assure you that we have been able to protect countries bordering Russia for decades, adjusting our presence in light of the threat assessment. We have done that before and we will do it again.”
The alliance would “significantly reinforce” its defences in eastern Europe, he said, pledging that Russia would not be able to capture the Estonian capital Tallinn “just as they have not been able to seize the city of Kirkenes in northern Norway or West Berlin during the cold war”.
The new “strategic concept”, to be signed off at an annual summit of alliance leaders that begins on Tuesday in Madrid, would define its goals and approaches for the next decade, and agree on a vastly expanded plan to defend its easternmost allies in response to Russian president Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
That will include new structures in which western Nato allies, such as the US, UK and France, would pledge their ships, warplanes and a total of more than 300,000 troops to be ready to deploy to specific territories on the alliance’s eastern flank, with graded response times starting from the opening hours of any attack.
Yes – CUT lower para ab cyber too
Machi, '22 – reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage (Vivienne Machi; "NATO to boost readiness numbers, approve new Ukraine aid at Madrid summit"; Defense News; https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/27/nato-to-boost-readiness-numbers-approve-new-ukraine-aid-at-madrid-summit/; 6-27-2022, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC
STUTTGART, Germany — NATO plans to approve increased readiness objectives and provide more support to Ukraine, as well as formalize a key strategic document at its annual summit this week, alliance Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Monday.
At the summit held Tuesday and Wednesday in Madrid member nations will agree to increase the number of high-readiness forces to “well over” 300,000 troops, in what Stoltenberg called the biggest overhaul of the alliance’s collective defense and deterrence since the Cold War. The alliance plans to enhance many of its forward-deployed battlegroups currently stationed in its eastern member countries up to brigade levels, he noted in a press conference broadcast online from Brussels.
The readiness increase will be matched with more prepositioned equipment and supplies stockpiles, notably air defense capabilities, he added. NATO is also planning to upgrade its defense plans, and pre-assign troops to defend specific allies.
“These troops will exercise together with home defense forces, and they will become familiar with local terrain facilities and our new prepositioned stocks, so that they can respond smoothly and swiftly to any emergency,” Stoltenberg said.
The ongoing war in Ukraine will be at the top of the summit’s program, particularly as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to attend. NATO plans to approve a new comprehensive aid package for Kiev, to include “partial deliveries” of capabilities like secure communications, unmanned systems and fuel, per Stoltenberg.
NATO’s identification of Russia as its most significant threat will be reflected in the ongoing deliberations over whether Finland and Sweden will become the alliance’s newest members. While Stoltenberg and other stakeholders have called for the two partner nations to join NATO as quickly as possible, member Turkey has promised to veto their accession, claiming Sweden has harbored members of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization.
On Monday, Stoltenberg reasserted the need to “take into account concerns expressed by allies” and said that the leaders of Finland, Sweden, and Turkey would meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels later that day, as well as on the sidelines of the Madrid summit this week.
“I will not make any promises, but I can just assure you that we are working actively to ensure progress, because the applications of Finland and Sweden to join NATO – they are historic,” Stoltenberg said. “It will strengthen the security of Finland and Sweden, it will strengthen NATO, and it will be something that will contribute to stability across the Euro-Atlantic area, Europe and North America.”
NATO member nations are also expected to formally approve the new “Strategic Concept” document which lays out the alliance’s defense and security vision. Members tasked NATO to update the Strategic Concept document at the 2021 summit. Per the alliance, the document has been updated about once every 10 years to reflect the current security environment.
This latest concept will reflect a “fundamental shift in NATO’s deterrence and defense” and will focus on NATO’s “evolving approach” to current and new threats and challenges, to include terrorism, cyber attacks, and hybrid warfare, Stoltenberg said Monday.
NATO’s new strategic concept prioritizes collective defense over cooperative security to counter Russian aggression.
Simón & Arteaga, '22 – Director of the Research Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) and a Research Professor in International Security at the Brussels School of Goverance (Luis Simón & Félix Arteaga; "NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept"; Real Instituto Elcano; https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/; 01-17-2022, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC
Deterrence and defence
NATO endorsed its posture of deterrence and defence after the ratification of the Lisbon Strategic Concept as a means of having a combination of capabilities appropriate to a range of possible scenarios.[7] In the absence of a specific adversary, the capabilities to be established could only be generic, but the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and its burgeoning hostility forced the Alliance’s military posture to be redefined. NATO had to deploy forces on its Eastern border to reassure the allies and strengthen its capacity for deterrence.
The Russian aggression forced the natural procedure to be inverted and, since 2014, NATO has had to adapt its deterrence and defence posture to the new situation without waiting for the formal review of the Lisbon Strategic Concept. It began by strengthening its reassurance and adaptation measures on its eastern flank (its Readiness Action Plan) in 2014,[8] followed by a review of its military strategy (MC 400/4) in 2019, the adaptation of its defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region (Defence and Deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic Area, DDA) in 2020 and NATO’s fundamental concept of combat (NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, NWCC) in 2021.[9] In recent years NATO’s military authorities have thus been establishing the doctrine, goals and capabilities needed to confront the Russian threat before the political concept that will require them is approved.
The new military developments are not known in detail given their confidential nature, but amid a specific threat such as Russia’s they will have been tailor-made to address it, and therefore will be less reactive than those envisaged in the current Strategic Concept, which are restricted to awaiting an armed attack before responding. The new military strategy will need to address the new forms of confrontation in all domains (land, sea, air, outer space and cyberspace) and in their conventional and non-conventional forms (hybrid war), a more proactive and anticipatory shift in focus that now requires a political justification. As matters stand, the necessity now arises of reconciling the political component of the Madrid Strategic Concept with the military strategy already adopted, which could present problems if one or several allies disagree with the new terms of military planning.
Spain has contributed and will continue to contribute to collective deterrence on NATO’s eastern borders, meaning that it will not be difficult to adapt itself to the new deterrence and defence guidelines from a military point of view. It may be more difficult to acknowledge the Russian Federation as a threat and to act accordingly from the political perspective, because Spanish strategic culture is reluctant to put a name to threats to national security and because adopting the necessary measures would incur major political and economic costs.
Russia, China and strategic competition
The North Atlantic Council described Russia’s aggressive conduct as a ‘threat’ at its June 2021 meeting in Brussels,[10] together with terrorism and other asymmetrical threats such as hybrid threats, disinformation and cyberattacks. Numerous acts jeopardising Euro-Atlantic security were listed and laid at Russia’s door, and consequently Russia is going to provide the adversary that the Alliance lacked in the Lisbon Strategic Concept. With China, the Council’s communiqué was more cautious: the country was described as a ‘systemic challenge’ to the international order and it was called upon to behave more responsibly within this order. However, while the NATO 2030 report drawn up by a group of experts did not deem China a ‘military threat’ like Russia, it placed it on an equal footing in terms of threat to the security of the Alliance.
The allies, including Spain, will need to endorse the characterisations in the Madrid Strategic Concept and the respective measures to reverse these types of behaviour. The measures to be taken against the Russian threat already seem to be defined in the new allied strategy, but it remains to be seen what measures are adopted against China. The allies are faced with the dilemma of how to address the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US and to take preventative measures to deter and defend their security interests against Chinese power in the European region, the scope of its global capabilities and, above all, the application of its disruptive technologies to erode NATO’s military superiority.[11] In this context, the NATO 2030 report warns about China’s strategy of civil-military fusion, whereby Beijing seeks to acquire the intellectual copyright and advances of European and Western research centres and companies with the goal of boosting its own military development.
All the foregoing presents the Madrid Strategic Concept with the need to use a public language of diplomacy that explains the reasons and consequences of returning to a strategy of deterrence and containment. This constitutes a significant communication effort because the allies and their citizens have become accustomed over the course of various decades to prioritise crisis management to the detriment of collective defence and deterrence. It was a habit they hurriedly had to abandon in 2014 after the Russian annexation of Crimea and required halting the freefall in military spending and committing to investing 2% of GDP by 2024 (NATO Defence Investment Pledge). Spain is not one of the allies most affected by geographical proximity to Russia or the Asia-Pacific, but it must share its allies’ concern about the growing physical presence of these countries in its space of strategic interest in the Mediterranean and Africa and about the virtual reach of their hybrid capabilities to destabilise national security. The tendency of Spanish strategic culture is inclined to prioritise détente over deterrence, but it will have to revise this inclination if the Madrid Strategic Concept incorporates binding containment measures against the Russian and Chinese threats.
The Alliance’s functions
NATO has three fundamental functions: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, with none of these taking precedence. The Madrid Strategic Concept will have to address the situation on NATO’s eastern flank and experiences such as Afghanistan so as to prioritise collective defence against the Russian threat, to the detriment of its functions of crisis management and cooperative security. As well as priorities, the allies will have to weigh whether to add new functions to the traditional list, and candidates such as resilience, cybersecurity, pandemics and technological disruption, among others, are all under consideration.
Prior to the Lisbon Strategic Concept, the usefulness of crisis management operations –referred to variously as international, humanitarian or, in Spanish terminology, peace-keeping missions– was being called into question. It was agreed in Lisbon to halt combat missions in Afghanistan in 2014 and promote the construction of local capabilities as a way of avoiding new interventions within the function of cooperative security. The outcome of operations in Libya and Afghanistan had the effect of discrediting the crisis management function, at least whenever it involves mass troop deployments on the ground, and the Madrid Strategic Concept should reduce its priority compared to deterrence, which is necessary against the Russian threat, and cooperative security, which is necessary in order to strengthen local partnerships.
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Morcos, '22 – Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program (Pierre Morcos; "NATO and the South after Ukraine"; Center for Strategic & International Studies; https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-south-after-ukraine; 5-9-2022, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC
“We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO Allies, have met today to address Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades.” In this solemn statement released after an extraordinary summit in Brussels on March 24, 2022, NATO leaders sent a clear signal: Russia poses an unprecedented threat that the alliance needs to address as a matter of priority. Beyond its decisions to assist Ukraine and reassure frontline allies, NATO is also preparing for the long-term implications of the return of war to the European continent. Incidentally, this reorientation coincides with the preparation of a new strategic concept that will be adopted in Madrid.
The strategic concept is arguably NATO’s most important political document as it scans the international security context, identifies the main threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, and outlines an approach to addressing such challenges. The previous strategic concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, signaled a meaningful rebalancing among NATO’s so-called core tasks, namely collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Inter-state competition took a back seat because the alliance still hoped it could strike a cooperative relationship with Russia despite the invasion of Georgia in 2008. The return of great-power competition in Europe—arguably best illustrated by Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014—forced allies to put collective defense once again at the center of NATO strategy. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is further compounding this shift. A renewed commitment to territorial defense will undoubtedly be at the forefront of the Madrid strategic concept.