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2NC – L – Cyber

Peripheral commitments like cybersecurity spread NATO too thin – obfuscates a focus on the operational capabilities that sustain collective defense.

Peter van Ham, '08 – senior research fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague (About The; "NATO Review"; NATO Review; https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2008/03/18/nato-and-the-madonna-curve-why-a-new-strategic-concept-is-vital/index.html; 3-18-2008, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC

If NATO aspires to deal with terrorism and WMD proliferation, the timing and legitimacy of military force will be a key issue on which the allies have to see eye to eye. But as a look at some core strategic documents shows, this is not the case today. The EU Security Strategy of 2003 opens with the sanguine observation that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free”, whereas the US Security Strategy of 2006 starts with the ominous statement that “America is at war.” This testifies to the potential of infecting the Alliance with a level of strategic schizophrenia [irrationality] that is unhealthy and untenable.,

The current ostrich-reflex, with the head in the sand in the hope that the problem will go away, will no longer do. A commitment must be made to turn NATO into a true, functioning political organisation, prepared to debate key strategic challenges facing the Alliance. That this is not happening today explains the diverging threat perceptions which make collective NATO-action problematic. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s key political governing body, now focuses its deliberations largely on the Alliance’s on-going operations, with too little time spent on potential crises lurking over the horizon. A new strategic concept should bring an end to this imbalance, for example by changing procedures for agenda-setting within the NAC.

Second, choices must be made regarding NATO’s future as a defence organisation. Obviously, collective defence remains the backbone of the Alliance. But what does this mean in an era where energy cut-offs and (cyber-)terrorism are the preferred lines of attack? NATO’s collective defence clause under Article 5 was duly invoked after 9/11, which means in theory that NATO as a whole remains in a quasi-state of war. The fact that we simply forget this indicates that the Alliance needs to rethink the nature of collective defence, its responses, and the importance of retooling its operational kit to address new security challenges more effectively. NATO’s military operations suggest a new strategy of “forward defence”, where allied interests and values are protected “at the Hindukush.” But with energy security topping the agenda and relations with Russia at freezing point, the true, and possibly novel, meaning of Article 5 requires serious collective thought.

All this implies that NATO has to set priorities. The expectations–capabilities gap of the Alliance is becoming dangerously large. As an organisation, NATO cannot bring many policy tools to the table and depends on member states’ willingness to work together and pool their collective resources and capabilities. But the continuing acrimony over funding and force generation for NATO-led operations exposes the crumbling consensus within the Alliance, especially in the case of ISAF. NATO should begin to cut its coat according to its cloth. The new strategic concept should clearly explain what Article 5 means in the 21st century, and, based on that new assessment, set limits to the scope and nature of NATO-led missions.

Third, NATO should bring its relationship with new, often global partners and key players like the EU and UN on a new level. In Afghanistan, ISAF includes crucial allies such as Australia, whose 1000 soldiers are engaged in the country’s risky southern province of Uruzgan. Since numerous NATO member states remain reluctant to risk life and limb in these dangerous missions, the Alliance risks becoming a “coalition of the willing”, which would undermine internal solidarity, and hence NATO’s raison d'être. If NATO chooses to go truly global, it must draw global partners closer to the organization, and clarify their rights and obligations under new and transparent rules of the game.

There is no perfect time for a strategic extreme makeover of the Alliance. So today is as good a time as any.

This also applies to NATO’s ties with the EU and UN. The Alliance takes prides in the “comprehensive approach” it takes towards operations. In reality, however, this can only be realized by bringing the resources of key international organisations (IOs) such as the EU, UN, and World Bank into play. This is why these IOs were invited for the first time to discuss the reconstruction of Afghanistan during NATO’s informal meeting of defence ministers in Noordwijk, in October 2007. Since 21 EU states are also members of NATO, more coordination and joint action between both organisations is obviously required.

The Berlin Plus-arrangement foresaw the EU using NATO resources. Now it is time for a so-called Berlin Plus in reverse, as the Alliance may want to draw upon EU tools like the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), as well as the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities. Since the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) now has 90,000 troops deployed under its authority (based on a US$ 5 billion annual budget), NATO-UN ties obviously need to be strengthened and formalized. Numerous modalities are informally discussed, but choices have to be made urgently.

Fourth, confronting NATO’s strategic choices and dilemmas head-on will have a cleansing effect within the Alliance.

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