2NC – L – Cyber – PC
Cyber-security investments sap diplomatic energy crucial to doubling down on territorial defense.
Peter van Ham, '08 – senior research fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague (About The; "NATO Review"; NATO Review; https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2008/03/18/nato-and-the-madonna-curve-why-a-new-strategic-concept-is-vital/index.html; 3-18-2008, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC
That is why NATO needs policy entrepreneurs who are willing to give the Alliance a new lease of life and a new focus.
Today, there is hardly a challenge facing the West that NATO has not been obliged to add to its already crowded agenda. On top of traditional tasks such as territorial defence and peacekeeping, the Alliance now deals with WMD proliferation, missile defence and cyber-security.
In its multifunctionality, NATO begins to resemble a Swiss pocket-knife with all its tools exposed. But as we all know, unfolded pocket-knives are unwieldy affairs, and whilst prepared to do everything, are actually good at nothing. This is why NATO needs to retool itself, starting with a revision of its outdated strategic concept.
The current strategic concept, which is the core mission statement of the Alliance, was adopted in April 1999, in the midst of NATO’s Kosovo-campaign. This key document therefore predates the strategic paradigm-shift of 9/11, as well as NATO’s Afghanistan mission, the first outside the Euro-Atlantic area.
In the past, allies have not prepared strategic concepts frequently (in 1952, 1967, 1991 and 1999), but history seems to go at fast-forward speed these days. This is why NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for a new strategic concept in February 2007, arguing that on-going operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo have offered the Alliance “lessons of 21st century security. We need to enshrine them in our guiding documents so that they are implemented in practice.”
The “ if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality underestimates the strategic challenges facing NATO today
However, many officials in NATO capitals are concerned that the risks of such a strategic review are too great. They fear that it might revive the transatlantic controversies of 2002-3, and open wounds that have just begun to heal. They also suggest that with the Comprehensive Political Guidance-document that was endorsed in November 2006 at the Riga Summit, a solution has been found to NATO’s predicament.
Still, merely kicking the can down the road would be a serious mistake. This “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality underestimates the strategic challenges facing NATO today.
In the current debate, German chancellor Angela Merkel is the only political leader who has clearly stated she would like to see a new strategic concept endorsed at NATO’s Summit in 2009. This will be difficult to achieve given the electoral calendar in the United States where a new administration will take office in January 2009, and will need several months to get a new team together.
Presenting a new strategic concept at NATO’s 60th anniversary would be a welcome birthday present. But more important than nice timing is that at NATO’s Summit in Bucharest, allies commit themselves to biting the bullet and doing what is necessary: accept the inconveniences of temporary disagreements and aim for a new NATO strategic concept that clarifies the Alliance’s political and military strategy - and communicates this clearly to the wider world.
Why? And why now?
The current debate about a new strategic concept is déjà vu to strategic analysts: all arguments, pro and con, which could be heard in the 1990s, are now rehearsed. Why open Pandora’s Box? Why waste diplomatic energy that could be spent on more important, operational matters? Why risk failure by washing NATO’s dirty linen in public?
Interestingly, both the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts were innovative and instrumental in getting NATO ready for new members and missions. So recent experience does not support a cautious approach, but rather suggests that a more daring spirit serves the Alliance well.
Arguably, NATO is facing a litmus test which determines whether the organization is really still an “Alliance”, based on shared interests and values, or merely a glorified security coalition. There are four pressing reasons why a strategic recalibration of NATO is required.
To be successful, NATO needs a package-deal of painful compromises, where each member state has to give and take.
First, allies need to find a workable consensus about the legitimacy of using military force in non-article 5 operations (i.e., for purposes other than self-defence), and, in the extreme, even without an explicit UN Security Council mandate. In a way, this has been the most controversial, unresolved issue of the 1999 strategic concept, which has gained even greater relevance with the US invasion of Iraq and the American doctrine of preventive wars.