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2NC – I/L – AT: OCOs Turn

Baltic info-sharing is sufficient to deter Russian covert activities now BUT vulnerabilities remain in their military readiness.

Radin, '15 – political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include European security, NATO, and Russia's foreign and security policy; state building and security sector reform; and peace operations (Andrew Radin; "Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics"; RAND corporation; https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf; 2015, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC

Like Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the eastern portions of Estonia and Latvia are proximate to Russia and do have a significant Russian-speaking population that might make them similarly vulnerable to Russian covert action. In general, however, the Baltic countries appear to be a less fertile ground for covert subversion than Ukraine. While Russia was able to seize and maintain control over Crimea, where its conventional forces maintained dominance, the success of covert actions in eastern Ukraine was ultimately less successful, as discussed above. The Baltic countries are better positioned than Ukraine to defend against and deter Russian covert action. They have greater control over their own territory, through the development of their internal security forces, as outlined below. Furthermore, they are members of NATO, and so benefit from assistance from other NATO countries, including under Article 5. Unlike Ukraine, where NATO support to Ukraine was limited to nonlethal equipment after Russia used conventional forces to support the separatists, NATO member countries are committed to respond to an attack on any of the Baltic states as if it were an attack on themselves.

Indeed, both Estonian and Latvian Ministry of Defence officials indicated confidence in their ability to deal with covert Russian activity because of their greater state capacity and NATO’s conventional deterrent.56 Their policy to address covert Russian aggression is relatively straightforward—they plan to shoot the “little green men.”57 The Estonian Chief of Defence explains, “If Russian agents or special forces enter Estonian territory, ‘you should shoot the first one to appear. . . . If somebody without any military insignia commits terrorist attacks in your country you should shoot him . . . you should not allow them to enter.”58 By rapidly deploying civilian and military forces to quickly defeat Russian covert elements, the Baltic countries hope to defeat Russian special forces, and leave Russia with the choice of either backing down or risking conventional escalation that would bring NATO into the war. By relying on NATO to provide a conventional deterrent, the Baltic states thereby hope to deter Russian covert action.59

This strategy is uncertain, however. In practice, the Baltic countries may hesitate before attacking Russian forces operating in their territory because of fears of Russia’s willingness to escalate. Russia may also be able to seize territory and establish a new status quo before the Baltic states are able to respond. Indeed, the Baltic countries recognize the importance of rapidly alerting NATO of Russian aggression under Article 4 or 5.60 The Baltic countries may also not receive full NATO support if the presence of Russian forces is ambiguous and there is reason to believe that opposition is primarily carried out by Baltic Russian speakers.

Hence, despite the confidence of the Baltic officials, it remains important to evaluate the readiness, capabilities, and coordination of the security forces in the Baltic countries. Estonia appears have a relatively well-prepared security structure, albeit small and dependent on rapid mobilization of reservists. Estonia has an active duty ground force of 5,500 soldiers, of whom 2,700 are conscripts, organized into two brigades. With the exception of one professional highreadiness mechanized battalion, these two brigades are at low readiness and mainly serve to train conscripts for eight to 11 months before they are moved into the reserves.61 There are also four teams of American-trained special operations forces, who have repeatedly deployed to Afghanistan. The Kaitseliit, a 15,000-strong National Guard, contains some well-trained and -equipped fighting units that would coordinate with the special operations forces in the event of an invasion. Based on their own estimates of Russian special forces capabilities, Estonian officials claim that a two-battalion force—their own plus a U.S. or NATO battalion—would be able to hold off Russian special forces, at least until a broader mobilization occurred.62

Estonian government officials are confident in their ability to monitor Russian activity within their territory, highlighting the capability of the Internal Security Service, although it is uncertain how effectively this information can be shared with other NATO members. A July 2015 visit to Narva revealed a modern multilayered border post that would require a not insignificant effort to circumvent.63 While Western officials were skeptical of the extent of coordination between the Ministry of Defence and internal security forces, Estonian government officials claimed that coordination was quite good and straightforward in large part due to the small size of the Estonian security establishment. Estonia has undertaken regular war games and exercises to understand how to respond to different forms of Russian aggression, including practicing handoffs of responsibilities from the internal security forces to the Ministry of Defence forces and determining when to seek assistance from NATO. The Hedgehog exercise in May 2015, for example, involved 13,000 Estonian personnel and revealed gaps in mobilization times that the government is currently seeking to address.64

The readiness and preparation of the Latvian military is more questionable. Despite Latvia’s greater population (2 million compared with 1.3 million in Estonia), Latvian forces are smaller than Estonia’s, in large part because Latvia spends only 0.94 percent of GDP on defense, in comparison with Estonia’s 1.93 percent in 2014.65 Latvia does not have conscription, and the overall size of the active ground force is 3,900. This force is organized into a single brigade with two active duty battalions, and also includes highly trained special forces. Latvia also has a volunteer National Guard of approximately 8,000.66 The focus of the military has been on out-of area NATO deployments, and some Western trained observers in Riga have expressed doubts about the force’s readiness to counter either serious covert violent action or a conventional attack.67 As with Estonia, Latvian officials were also confident of their intelligence gathering related to Russian covert actions. They observed that they had dealt with the Russian covert threat for many years. Although Latvian defense officials noted good interagency information sharing, contingency planning, and coordination,68 Western-trained observers noted serious interagency coordination problems, including the absence of regular exercises to practice crisis coordination between the Ministry of Defence and internal security forces. Latvian and foreign observers have also questioned the effectiveness of the Latvian border guard relative to those of Estonia and the Nordic countries.69

Strengthening conventional defense is key to keep up with Russia – that matters most for territorial, cross-border conflicts.

Boston et al., '18 – senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. His research focuses on land warfare, with particular emphasis on Russian military (Scott Boston, Michael Johnson, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Yvonne K. Crane; "Assessing the Imbalance of Military Power in Europe"; RAND; https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2402.html; 02-05-2018, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC

This report outlines how NATO and Russian force levels and capabilities have evolved in the post–Cold War era and what recent trends imply for the balance of capabilities in the NATO member states that border Russia in the Baltic Sea region. It is intended to inform debate over appropriate posture and force structure for NATO forces to respond to the recent growth in Russian military capability and capacity and to increased Russian assertiveness in the use of force. Given NATO's current posture and capability, including European battalions and a rotational U.S. armored brigade combat team, Russia can still achieve a rapid fait accompli in the Baltic states followed by brinksmanship to attempt to freeze the conflict. Nothing about this analysis should suggest that Russian conventional aggression against NATO is likely to take place; however, prudence suggests that steps should be taken to mitigate potential areas of vulnerability in the interest of ensuring a stable security relationship between all NATO members and Russia. NATO has sufficient resources, personnel, and equipment to enhance conventional deterrence focused on Russia; a more robust posture designed to considerably raise the cost of military adventurism against one or more NATO member states is worthy of consideration.

Key Findings

Current Imbalance of Military Power on the Russian Border a Result of Different Motivations

In the years following the end of the Cold War, NATO's ground forces have substantially declined in size and shifted focus away from high-intensity conventional combat.

By contrast, while Russia also saw a major decline through the 1990s and 2000s, more-recent efforts have led to effective changes in Russian warfighting capabilities and a gradual spread of more-modern systems to much of the Russian armed forces.

Recent improvements to readiness and to the ability to move forces quickly within Russia, combined with the density of anti-access/area denial capabilities arrayed to defend the Russian heartland, provide Moscow with a much greater ability to project force against countries on its borders.

The Russian Threat to NATO in the Baltics

While NATO militaries have retooled to focus on stability operations and lighter forces that can be more easily deployed out of area to such places as Afghanistan, Russia has retained a combined-arms force that emphasizes mobility and firepower and trains to conduct larger-scale combined-arms operations. This gives Russian forces an important advantage in conflicts between mechanized forces close to their border.

There has been a notable increase in the quality of Russian forces over the last decade: a growing number of volunteer soldiers, fielding of modernized weapons, improvements to readiness, and experience gained from large-scale exercises and combat operations in Ukraine and Syria.

The highest density of Russia's most-capable ground and air forces is in its Western Military District, which borders the NATO allies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have very small conventional forces.

Russia's demonstrated ability to mass ready forces from elsewhere within its borders, leveraging its internal rail and road networks, means it is likely to enjoy a significant time-distance advantage in generating combat forces during the opening period of a crisis.

Baltic states are invulnerable to irregular warfare; Russia will exploit their conventional inferiority which risks nuclear escalation.

Radin, '15 – political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include European security, NATO, and Russia's foreign and security policy; state building and security sector reform; and peace operations (Andrew Radin; "Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics"; RAND corporation; https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf; 2015, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC

I find that the most significant threat from Russia to the Baltics lies in Russia’s conventional forces, not its capacity for irregular warfare or political subversion. I divide potential Russian aggression in the Baltics into three distinct categories of scenarios: nonviolent subversion, covert violent actions, and conventional warfare supported by political subversion. I find that the Baltic countries are not especially vulnerable to nonviolent or covert violent actions by Russia. Given the loyalty of many Russian speakers in the Baltics to their home countries, and their greater economic well-being within the EU, Russia will have difficulty provoking large-scale protests or separatist movements. Covert violent Russian actions are also unlikely to succeed, given preparations in these countries to deploy security forces sufficient to either defeat Russian covert forces or compel Russia to escalate to conventional war. A large-scale conventional Russian incursion into the Baltics would almost inevitably be hybrid in the sense that it would include some effort at political subversion. Nevertheless, the danger of such an attack lies in NATO’s local conventional inferiority, not in Russian propaganda or proxy warfare, and as such NATO needs to establish a more credible conventional deterrent.

The limited vulnerability to irregular warfare does not mean that a U.S. or NATO policy can focus exclusively on conventional warfare in deterring or defeating Russian aggression. Effective defense of the Baltics depends on reducing vulnerabilities to all forms of Russian aggression. The greater the perceived vulnerabilities of the Baltic countries to a particular form of aggression, the more likely that Russia is to undertake it. Even if the objective risk of success is limited, Russia could miscalculate or determine that the possible benefit is great enough that risk is justified. Alternatively, war or conflict could emerge by accident. Russia and NATO forces could unintentionally come into conflict, as they did when Turkish forces shot down a Russian plane in November 2015. Or, Russia could become involved if groups allied with the Russian state, but not controlled by them, engage in aggressive action.5 The failure of Russian-backed armed groups could lead Russia to escalate to avoid defeat, a cycle which could lead to large-scale conflict and even nuclear use. Hence, even if Russia prefers to avoid conflict, a crisis could nevertheless emerge. Strengthening the overall resilience of the Baltic States can reduce the risk of low-level aggression and unintentional escalation.

I conclude this report by suggesting several implications for U.S. and NATO policies to limit the potential for Russian hybrid aggression. First, with regard to nonviolent subversion, pressure from Western allies to improve language and citizenship rights for Russians in the Baltics is probably impractical. Instead, the United States and NATO should pursue the development of a more sophisticated and subtle strategic communication campaign, starting with supporting local Russian-language broadcasters within the Baltic countries.

Second, with regard to covert violent action, continued support for the Baltic countries’ security forces is clearly beneficial. The U.S. Air Force can help improve the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Baltic states by strengthening their technical capabilities for border control and air and maritime domain awareness. NATO and its member states can also do more to share intelligence of Russian policies and actions and help conduct whole-of-government exercises to better prepare for covert or denied Russian aggression. Additional research would also be beneficial to develop and evaluate responses to a wide range of Russian covert tactics.

Third, in developing a credible conventional deterrent in the Baltics, the United States and NATO should attempt to reduce the risk of low-intensity conflict. While there is no way to definitively prevent Russia or Russian speakers in the region from misperceiving NATO’s intent, the United States and NATO may be able to deploy forces in a way that would reduce the risk of Russian aggression or subversion. Such actions may include avoiding basing forces in areas dominated by Russian speakers, increasing transparency, limiting activities that appear intended to achieve regime change in Russia, and developing a comprehensive public relations campaign aimed at the Baltic Russian speakers.

Baltic hybrid war goes nuclear unless NATO shores up their local conventional forces.

Radin, '15 – political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include European security, NATO, and Russia's foreign and security policy; state building and security sector reform; and peace operations (Andrew Radin; "Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics"; RAND corporation; https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf; 2015, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC

A final category of hybrid warfare involves a conventional attack by Russian ground, air, naval, and airborne forces, justified and legitimized by covert or denied activities focused on the Russian speakers. Such an attack could seek to capture territory, replace the government of the Baltic countries, or shift the military balance in an ongoing internal conflict, as in eastern Ukraine. Even if the value to Russia of occupying the Baltic countries is low, Russia could seek to demonstrate that NATO’s security guarantees are not credible and the United States is unable to defend its allies.

Russian conventional forces could adopt a range of courses of action. They might seek to drive ground forces across the Baltic countries to their capitals, and attempt to seize the countries before a significant Western response. Russian forces might limit their offensive to a small “bite” of the Baltic countries, capturing a Russian-dominated city near the border, such as Narva, or an area of strategic importance, such as a land bridge between Belarus and Kaliningrad. Russia may bargain that NATO is unwilling to risk war to recapture an area of strategic importance to Russia, or a Russian-dominated territory where there is some ambiguity about whether there is support for Russian action by the local population. Russia would likely use its anti-access and area-denial capabilities to inhibit NATO deployments in the region and give it more time to consolidate its gains. However Russia uses its conventional forces, it will likely threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter a response from NATO. Russia has discussed the possibility of deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Crimea and nuclear-capable ballistic Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, and emphasized that it would use such weapons to defend its territory. Russia would likely do the same if it attacked the Baltics.70

RAND has recently undertaken a series of tabletop exercises to better understand the prospects for a Russian conventional attack in the Baltics. Based on open source estimates, Russia could muster approximately 27 maneuver battalion tactical groups to attack the Baltic countries in a short-warning attack, supported by significant long-range fires. Assuming a week of warning, NATO could deploy 12 maneuver battalions. NATO forces, however, would be light, outgunned, and outmaneuvered by Russian heavier units, and fixed in place or destroyed while Russian forces maneuvered toward the capitals. Furthermore, while NATO could deploy significant air forces, without heavy NATO ground forces present, Russia would have significant freedom to deploy its forces to limit its vulnerability to air power. Across multiple iterations of the scenario, Russian forces were on the outskirts of Riga and Tallinn between 36 and 60 hours after the start of the war. It would likely take at least several weeks until armored reinforcements from the United States could arrive in numbers that would be capable of ejecting Russian forces.

By that point, NATO may be reluctant to risk nuclear war and bear the heavy casualties necessary to retake the Russian-occupied areas in the Baltics.71 The success of Russia’s actions in the “small bite” scenario may vary depending on the degree of surprise, but the chances for Russia’s conventional success in the short term appear high, given the substantial numerical superiority of Russian conventional forces in the region.

While Russia could theoretically only use conventional forces and eschew political subversion or covert action, these unconventional tactics have the potential to reduce the likelihood of a NATO response. Russia could provoke a conflict between Russian speakers and the Baltic governments, which may create the perception that local Russian speakers support Russian military action. Because the North Atlantic Council makes decisions based on consensus, any disagreement about Russian intent could delay or vitiate a NATO-backed response to Russian provocations. Russian leaders made an extensive effort to rationalize and justify their actions in Crimea, and it seems likely that Russian aggression in the future would be accompanied by similar activities to justify their actions.72 Russian covert action could also be used to delay or undermine the Baltic countries’ ability to deploy their security forces to respond to Russian forces.

Even in the absence of consensus within the North Atlantic Council, individual member states could come to the defense of the Baltics under Article 5, which states that each member state can take “such action at it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”73 So long as the United States is willing to respond, and the transit countries of Germany and Poland permit the U.S. deployment, opposition from other member states cannot prevent a large-scale military response to a potential Russian invasion.

In summary, the greatest danger posed by Russia in the Baltics appears to be its local conventional superiority. Without the threat or actual use of a conventional attack to inhibit a decisive response to Russian subversion, the efficacy of nonviolent or covert efforts would be limited against competent states such as the Baltics. Offsetting Russia’s geographic advantages with a strengthened NATO defense posture may therefore be the essential precondition for maintaining political stability in this region. The nature of such a deterrent is the focus on other research and beyond the scope of this report.74 It suffices to note that such a deterrent will likely involve a significant deployment of NATO forces to the region. The Baltic countries, for example, have requested that the United States permanently deploy a U.S. Army battalion in each country. Determining the types and numbers of forces and where they will be deployed will have important ramifications for the relations between the Russian speakers and their governments.

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