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2NC – I/L – Deter Russia

Collective defense k2 russia

Kochis et al., '22 – Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom (Daniel Kochis; "The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time"; Heritage Foundation; https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-russian-threat-bolstering-nato-deterrence-critical-time; 3-14-2022, Accessed 6-26-2022)//ILake-NoC

The security and prosperity of the transatlantic community, including the United States, rests on the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s ongoing war of naked aggression against Ukraine, a NATO non-member state, should put to rest any lingering questions about the modern utility of the Alliance and about which threat should be the focus of NATO’s upcoming strategic concept.

The answer is clear: The U.S. must lead the Alliance to a wholesale refocusing on the organization’s raison d’être of collective defense. While the Alliance faces challenges emanating from an unstable Mediterranean basin and terrorism originating from the Middle East, the fact remains that Russia continues to be the only existential threat to member states. NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to the increased threat from Russia.

Deterrence measures should include an Alliance-wide recommitment to defense spending; a persistent and continuing U.S. presence in Eastern European member states; updated Alliance operational planning in light of Russia’s position in Belarus and Ukraine; and an increase in U.S. air, ground, and naval forces in the European theater as a sign of continued commitment to the NATO treaty’s Article 5.

These deterrence measures must be carried out with the recognition that, from a long-term perspective, China is the largest peer challenger from whom the U.S. must expect hostile action. Any improvements to the U.S. force posture must not be to the detriment of the nation’s ability to counter China.

The Importance of NATO Deterrence Has Only Increased

From the Arctic to the Levant, Russia remains an aggressive and capable threat to NATO and the interests of its members. For member states in Eastern Europe, Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat. Russia’s entrenched position in Belarus, along with its ongoing actions to cleave Ukraine, a nation that borders four NATO members, in two, scramble the geostrategic map of Europe and necessitate changes to NATO operational planning, exemplifying the need for the Alliance to take swift and resolute steps to bolster deterrence measures along its eastern flank.

Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine will hopefully be the push that some allies need to finally live up to their commitments to the NATO defense spending benchmark. As an intergovernmental security alliance, NATO is only as strong as its member states. Weak defense spending on the continent has led to a significant loss of capabilities and embarrassing gaps in readiness for NATO allies. As a result, American Presidents of both political parties have long called for increases in defense spending by NATO allies.

Although most are familiar with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—an attack on one is an attack on all—Article 3 is the most important when it comes to the overall health of the Alliance. Article 3 states that member states, at a minimum, will “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Only a handful of NATO members can legitimately say that they are living up to their Article 3 commitment.

In 2006, in an effort to encourage defense investment, NATO set a target for its 30 member states to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. At the 2014 Wales Summit, member states recommitted to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense and committed to spending 20 percent of their defense budgets on “major equipment” purchases by 2024.

NATO allies have made real and sustained increases in defense spending in recent years, but it is far from enough. In 2021, 10 members of the Alliance spent 2 percent of GDP on defense, and 24 members met the 20 percent benchmark.1

Procuring capabilities does not happen overnight, and allies in NATO must commit today to investing the necessary political and economic capital to fulfill their Article 3 treaty commitments.

U.S. Deployments in Europe Can Magnify NATO Deterrence

U.S. basing structures in Europe harken back to a time when Denmark, West Germany, and Greece represented the front lines of freedom. The security situation in Europe has changed, not least of which due to Russia’s force posture in Belarus and occupied portions of Ukraine. The U.S. must account for this shift by establishing a persistent and continuing military presence in allied nations further east. A robust presence displays the long-term U.S. resolve to live up to its NATO treaty commitments. The U.S. should lead by example, while also encouraging other NATO allies to base forces in Eastern European member states.

Over the course of the past few weeks, the U.S. has deployed additional rotational forces in Europe. On Thursday, 7,000 troops from the Army’s First Brigade, Third Infantry Division, deployed to bases in Germany.2

Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Orders 7,000 More Troops to Europe,” The New York Times, February 24, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/us/politics/us-troops-deploy-europe.html (accessed February 25, 2022).

In total, the U.S. has deployed an additional 14,000 troops to Europe in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The U.S. has also redeployed aircraft further east on a temporary basis, including 20 Apache helicopters (AH-64s) based in Germany deploying to Baltic allies, 12 AH-64s based in Greece deploying to Poland,3

and six F-35 fighter jets from Utah deploying temporarily to bases in Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania.4

Furthermore, two B-52s from the 5th Bomb Wing deployed on a “long-planned Bomber Task Force Europe mission over the Arctic and Baltic Sea regions.”5

Ibid.

Earlier in February, the U.S. deployed 3,000 forces to Poland and Romania to bolster deterrence and aid in preparations for refugees crossing the border from Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Defense noted that “[t]hese moves are temporary in nature, and are part of the more than 90,000 U.S. troops already in Europe on rotational and permanent orders.”

Some NATO allies have also increased their presence further east. Germany, which serves as the framework nation in Lithuania for NATO’s enhanced forward presence battalion stationed there, added 350 troops.6

NATO allies have battlegroups stationed in Estonia (U.K.-led), Latvia (Canadian-led), and Poland (U.S.-led); France has offered to lead a similar battalion in Romania, and stated that it is “accelerating” the deployment of forces to the nation.7

On Friday, NATO activated its Very High Readiness Joint Taskforce (VJTF), with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stating: “We are now deploying the NATO response force for the first time in the context of collective defense.”8

NATO will partially deploy a portion of the VJTF to Eastern Europe; the deployment will include air, land, and naval assets.9

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