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The aff clouds NATO’s focus – info-sharing makes the organization a glorified clearinghouse that trades off with NATO security initiatives.

Moller, '20 – Assistant Professor at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations (Sara Bjerg Moller; "It Will Take More Than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/; 9-25-2020, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC

If and when the Biden team embarks on its grand European tour, it seems virtually certain that, beyond the expressions of gratitude for America’s “return” that will surely follow them wherever they go, the delegation can expect to be met with a lengthy list of items requiring their immediate attention. Moreover, appeals for Washington’s assistance are likely to differ from capital to capital, with each NATO ally arguing that their particular issue or concern represents the most pressing challenge and therefore requires the most attention and resources. In Warsaw and the capitals of the Baltic states, the U.S. delegation will hear that, despite a new U.S. rotational troop deployment, a revanchist Russia necessitates additional NATO (but especially U.S.) military commitments along the Eastern flank of the alliance. In Rome, Athens, and Madrid, U.S. policymakers will learn that the Mediterranean countries represent the “soft underbelly” of NATO and that the alliance must do more to project stability along its southern arc of instability. In Ankara, the message will be one of anger directed at what the Erdogan government perceives as NATO’s collective failure to support Turkish actions in Syria and elsewhere. In Paris, the message for the U.S. delegation will be that the alliance must strengthen its counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, while in Berlin the focus will be on reforming NATO’s nuclear posture and salvaging expiring arms-control agreements. Meanwhile, securing the Arctic and halting the effects of climate change will be at the top of the agenda in Copenhagen and Oslo.

In short, wherever the Biden presidential delegation goes, it will be met with requests that Washington — and with it, the NATO alliance — prioritize everything, thereby fulfilling the old adage that, “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Given the precarious state of international relations today, the temptation to do more is understandably strong. It is easy to understand why, in the present climate of global instability, calls for the transatlantic alliance to reinforce and strengthen its existing commitments while simultaneously adding new mandates, missions, and programs are popular. Rather than adding more items to its already crowded agenda, however, the time has come for not just the United States but also NATO to consider doing less but doing it better.

When More Is Less, and Less Is More

For an alliance that has long prided itself on its commonality of purpose and interests, the truth is that NATO is in danger of losing both. On paper and in public, the members still agree the core purpose of the 71-year-old alliance is deterrence and defense of the North Atlantic region. When internal disagreements are aired publicly, other allies are quick to dispel reports of rifts by pointing out that differences of opinion are nothing new. But unlike during the Cold War, when a single adversary occupied all of the alliance’s attention, today’s security environment — as the allies routinely remind each other — is multifaceted and complex. In an effort to address members’ often disparate security requirements, NATO has taken on additional tasks over the past three decades almost as quickly as it has taken on additional members. The NATO-ization of every security challenge has meant that issues once considered the purview of individual nations or other international organizations — such as migration, terrorism, and foreign security force assistance — are now lumped onto NATO’s agenda under the guise of fulfilling its ambitious (and potentially limitless) post-Cold War mandate of “projecting stability.”

For far too long now, alliance leaders have tasked the NATO military infrastructure with a seemingly impossible undertaking: weighing down the military organization with new responsibilities like peacekeeping and counter-terrorism while simultaneously allowing members to shirk on contributing the resources required to fulfill old and new alliance missions. To date, much of the criticism surrounding NATO’s current strategic deadlock has focused on the resource issue and the strains caused by uneven burden-sharing within the alliance. Far less attention has been paid to the first part of the “ends-means-ways” formulation of strategy, namely NATO’s original purpose. While addressing “means” and “ways” are crucial elements in any strategic enterprise, it is past time the Allies got around to focusing on NATO’s strategic ends once more.

Confronting NATO’s present strategic dilemma will require looking beyond existing strategic documents like the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaimed the signatories’ commitment to the “preservation of peace and security” in the North Atlantic area. As the past three decades of NATO transformation have shown, there is not much that does not fit under the rubric of fostering “peace and security” and consequently cannot be tacked onto the alliance’s agenda. True strategy requires setting (and adhering to) actual goals and priorities, as well as developing plans to achieve them. Although the alliance’s past strategic documents have often sought to define NATO’s evolving strategic purpose with more precision than the founding treaty, the alliance has not adopted a new strategic concept since 2010 for fear that embarking on such an exercise would only further inflame the deep rifts within the alliance that such strategic endeavors are meant to help address.

Officially, NATO members still assert collective defense is the alliance’s primary task, despite the inclusion of two other core tasks — projecting stability and cooperative security/crisis management — in all three of its post-Cold War Strategic Concepts (1991, 1999, 2010). The addition of these latter two core tasks — coupled with members’ differing threat perceptions about what rises to the level of an existential security threat — has clouded the organization’s focus. After three decades of continual adaptation, the danger that the alliance’s original raison d’étre of collective defense gets further downgraded to the point where it risks becoming primus inter pares among NATO’s many other responsibilities is real. As with previous critical junctures in transatlantic relations, it will take American leadership to change NATO’s future course. Come January 2021, a Biden administration should move swiftly to announce its intention to commission a new NATO strategic concept by 2022. Should Trump win, all bets are off.

Defenders of NATO’s post-Cold War emphasis on projecting stability and collective security argue that NATO has a proven track record of crisis management and capacity-building beyond its borders in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The alliance’s cooperative security track record, however, is hardly stellar. This past June, the NATO-led international peacekeeping force in Kosovo entered its 22nd year of operation. Almost 17 years after the alliance’s Integrated Military Command first assumed responsibilities in Afghanistan, the NATO flag continues to fly in Kabul, where some 15,000 allied troops remain as part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission. Nor can the alliance’s intervention in Libya in 2011 be considered a resounding success, judging by the state of affairs there today. That NATO remains engaged in some of these places decades afterward is not an impeachment of the men and women who served in these operations and performed the tasks demanded of them. It is, howevwer, evidence of NATO’s failure to give sufficient consideration to its core strategic purpose.

While one can debate the wisdom of NATO having accumulated such an expansionist security agenda in an era marked by American unipolarity, an all-encompassing approach to security is harder to justify in a time of waning American power. Just as the diminishing threat of great-power competition in the 1990s and early 2000s freed NATO to take on additional security tasks beyond its traditional mission of collective defense, its return should prompt a reexamination to determine whether NATO is still the appropriate entity for handling such tasks.

Another center of excellence, special representative, or office will not fix what ails NATO. As the authors of a recent Heritage Foundation report on “NATO in the 21st Century” put it, it is time for NATO to get “back to the basics.” There are limits to what an international institution — even one as successful as NATO — can accomplish: “When policymakers expect or want NATO to do what it was never designed to do, that is when the Alliance risks failure.”

The launch of NATO Secretary Gen. Jens Stoltenberg’s #NATO2030 reflection process earlier this year to address political reforms within the alliance presented just such an opportunity to tackle these and other big-picture questions. It is still unclear to what extent the pandemic has delayed the work of the group of experts begun last March. The Biden team will have to move quickly if it hopes to help shape the working group’s deliberations, as Stoltenberg is slated to brief members on the path forward for the alliance at the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit.

Back to the Future: Narrowing (Not Broadening) NATO’s Remit

Looking ahead, alliance leaders should consider ways to streamline current NATO missions and tasks so that responsibilities that fall below the threshold of existential challenges can be unloaded onto other multilateral institutions or global partnerships. In addition to bringing an end to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, alliance leaders should consider getting NATO out of the security assistance and stabilization business altogether. Calls for NATO to look for opportunities to do more in the MENA region should also be rebuffed. Few would dispute that this region poses real security challenges to European states or that these challenges are particularly acute for the southernmost members of the alliance, some of whom might even view migration and refugee flows as rising to the level of existential threats. But while the 21st century challenges to the “stability and well-being” of member states may be numerous and growing, there is only one NATO. A single organization cannot tackle every national security challenge its members face. To remain useful, the alliance must choose which threats to prioritize.

Doing so requires recognizing that not every security issue rises to the level of an existential threat to the alliance. Terrorist attacks were a common occurrence in many West European nations in the 1970s and 1980s, yet NATO did not fundamentally transform its agenda back then because members recognized that the threat posed by the Soviet Union was greater. While neither Russia nor China as yet represents a threat on par with the Soviet Union, NATO should prepare for the possibility that the latter (either alone or in combination with Moscow) could pose an existential challenge to the Atlantic community in the coming decades.

Nor is it evident that NATO was ever the appropriate venue for tackling threats like terrorism in the first place. Effective counter-terrorism requires intelligence-sharing; local policing and counter-radicalization programs; and financial instruments that agencies like Europol, Interpol, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and others are better equipped to lead than an overstretched military alliance. The same is true when it comes to other activities the transatlantic alliance has added to its roster since 1991, like stabilization missions and security sector reform. In fact, organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the European Union provide more appropriate venues for tackling many of the collective security duties the alliance has assumed since the 1990s. As a regional defensive military alliance, NATO’s comparative advantage lies in providing territorial defense against other states or groups of states. This is a comparative advantage that should be preserved, not diluted by the addition of other security tasks. True comparative advantage arises from specialization. Continuing to add more and more security responsibilities to NATO’s already-full plate risks transforming the military alliance into a glorified clearinghouse or administrative apparatus whose sole task is the facilitation of information-sharing rather than the provision of collective defense.

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