2NC – L – OCOs – CYOC
OCOs would be integrated by the CYOC.
Maigre, '22 – Non-resident Senior Fellow with CEPA's Transatlantic Leadership Program and CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, as well as the Senior Cyber Security Expert at Estonia’s e-Governance Academy, a non-profit that helps governments go digital. (Merle Maigre; "NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security"; GMFUS; https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security; 4-6-2022, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC
CyOC is the first cyber-dedicated entity within the Command Structure. The “eyes and ears” of the respective commanders in cyberspace, CyOC aims at enhancing situational awareness in cyberspace and helping integrate cyber into NATO’s planning and operations at all levels. While CyOC operates within the existing NATO frameworks, its main aim is to equip the Supreme Allied Commander Europe with any necessary tools to operate in cyberspace. As CyOC moves toward initial then final operating capacity, it will be critical that it is staffed with sufficient—and sufficiently expert—personnel.2222NATO, NATO's Role in Cyberspace, February 19, 2019.
During NATO’s July 2018 summit, the allies affirmed, for the first time, their determination “to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats,” shifting away from securing cyberspace with defensive measures only. The “full range” of cyber capabilities means that both defensive and offensive capabilities can be deployed by NATO, in line with its defensive mandate and in accordance with international law. As NATO will not develop or acquire any offensive capabilities, it will rely, like in other operational domains, on the voluntary contributions of allies.
CYOC operations drain expertise from other NATO cyber operations.
Ablon et al., '19 – information scientist at the RAND Corporation and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. (Lillian Ablon, Anika Binnendijk, Quentin E. Hodgson, Bilyana Lilly, Sasha Romanosky, David Senty, Julia A. Thompson; "Operationalizing Cyberspace as a Military Domain"; RAND; ; 2019, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC
Workforce
NATO will need staff officers, civilian personnel, and other augmentees who not only are steeped in the technical aspects of cyberspace but also understand how cyberspace operations can contribute to the overall success of NATO operations and how other domains can reinforce the cyber domain. NATO is starting to adapt its educational curriculum to address the full array of cyberspace issues. The NATO Communications and Information Agency has built a new school in Portugal to support its mission and teach staff about the operation of NATO IT systems.53 Other academic institutions, such as the NATO Defence College, the NATO School Oberammergau, or the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, should also implement courses focusing on cyberspace as a domain of operations.
The competition for skilled cybersecurity personnel is well documented. The cybersecurity certification organization, (ISC)2 , noted in a recent report that the workforce shortage of these professionals is growing globally, reaching almost three million positions in 2018.54 Nearly half of the surveyed organizations for that report expected to increase cybersecurity staffing in the next year, underscoring that demand will grow, not diminish. NATO undoubtedly will be among those organizations competing in the labor marketplace for skilled cybersecurity professionals, but as we have seen, it will require more than technical staff. It will need to educate its leadership, both military and civilian, in the technical, operational, legal, and policy topics of cyberspace.
Officers and civilian personnel assigned to NATO on rotations will come with varied backgrounds and experience for the positions they will fill. Some positions, such as in the cyber offices at Allied Command Operations (ACO), ACT, and the new CyOC will clearly need personnel who have a deeper experience than the broader organization, something that will likely rely on personnel from a subset of the member nations for the near future, given the wide variance in national experience in cyberspace. But other parts of NATO will also need to draw on cyber expertise to ensure cyberspace integration into operations, including at the various operational headquarters. A first step to ensuring that qualified personnel are assigned (part of which has already been completed by the NATO Command Structure Adaptation that reviewed, among others, ACT and ACO cyber positions) is to evaluate and enumerate the specific job functions and associated qualifications for cyber-related positions across the alliance. These can include planners, operators, cyber defenders, acquisition personnel, and even less-obvious areas such as public diplomacy.
NATO relies on its member nations to send qualified personnel on rotation, but NATO also has longer-serving staff among its civilian personnel. Whether employees have served for three years or 30, NATO will want to ensure that its cyber workforce has a baseline of skills and knowledge and develop progressive educational modules to grow and sustain its human capital. As already noted, the baseline will vary depending on the work roles and job series a person occupies. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has developed a DoD Cyber Workforce Framework that encompasses four main categories of personnel: cyberspace IT, cybersecurity, cyberspace effects, and intelligence.55 NATO could also look to bring in expertise on short-term assignments similar to the U.S. Defense Digital Service.56 It could also develop industry fellows programs to give its permanent staff experience in the private sector, similar to the U.S. Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows program.57 These programs could inject new thinking and bring valuable private-sector experience to bear. NATO’s educational institutions will play a critical role in developing and sustaining the cyberspace workforce for the alliance, starting with instituting courses that cover relevant topics, from strategy and policy to more technical areas. Some suggested topics to include in a first orientation course that establishes the baseline (some of which are already being taught) would include
• NATO organizational structure and national-level organizations that interface with the alliance. This would include covering the roles and responsibilities of the NCIRC, ACO Cyber Division, ACT Cyber Capabilities Branch, and the CyOC, as well as national-level cybercommands and EU institutions strategic and operational planning, including how cyber operations fit into the COPD and the NATO Crisis Management Process.
• technical topics for those less familiar with the layers of the cyber domain, from the physical infrastructure to the virtual or “cyber persona” domain.
• cyberspace capabilities in the alliance and at the national level, including defensive capabilities.
• the legal and policy frameworks for cyber operations, including the law of armed conflict and its application to the cyber domain, operational authorities, and NATO declarations and policies. Finally, NATO will need to address how it recruits and retains personnel to identify opportunities for attracting talent and taking advantage of expertise. Initiatives could include offering limited-term appointments from the private sector, scholarship-for-service, and developing stronger ties with academic institutions across the alliance.
Conclusion
For NATO to achieve the ambitious goals it has set for itself in Ministerial statements, it will take sustained effort and dedication. Each member has a role to play, at the very least in shoring up its own cyber defenses, as well as contributing to the extent it can and is fit for purpose to the overall defense of the alliance. In this section, we highlighted key areas to focus on in terms of defining cyberspace functions, exercises and training, and workforce development, but as is often the case, there are numerous other areas requiring focus. Numerous members large and small have clear capabilities in cyberspace. Harnessing those capabilities in an integrated manner will not happen overnight, but NATO
has the capacity and mechanisms to accomplish its goals.
Preparing for the Future:
Indications and Warning Against
Cyber Threats to NATO
Why I&W Against Cyber Threats?
Effective and timely I&W of cyber threats is a vital component of any cyber strategy because they can provide early detection and advance notification of cyber threats. This early warning can facilitate avoidance or mitigation of potentially harmful attacks by providing decisionmakers with needed time to consider options and authorize and implement preventive actions. Yet none of the cyber strategies released by the United States or its federal agencies discuss I&W in detail. National cyber strategies of other NATO members likewise do not elaborate on I&W of cyber threats, likely due to the lack of clearly established definitions or best practices on how to construct I&W frameworks in the cyber domain. The need to constantly refine and adapt these frameworks to the evolving threat actors provides further challenges for establishing a standardized cyber I&W model.
It is specifically because of these challenges that it becomes critical to identify the main parameters of an effective cyber I&W framework. For example, cyber I&W will help to ensure robust defense of the alliance’s cyberspace and continuous operation of NATO’s cyber infrastructure in support of strategic and operational planning. I&W capabilities for the cyber domain are also directly related to the functional areas of as described in Figure 1. To be effective at predicting and detecting threats to cyberspace, I&W frameworks require both horizontal (NATO-wide and across NATO members) and vertical (within NATO entities, nations, and sectors) integration and collaboration, including national contributions and collaboration between nation-states and national entities at multiple levels. Thus, designing rigorous I&W frameworks in cyberspace is a complex challenge that requires a number of key steps: crafting a strategy for cooperation and communication among NATO entities, NATO members and partners, and other public-private entities; developing information-sharing protocols that ensure timely and continuous data exchange; and integrating I&W cyber frameworks in joint cyber exercises to improve I&W applications.
Despite the significance of the field and some promising steps toward improving cyber I&W capabilities, frameworks for cyber I&W are still evolving and are not yet mature.58 The importance of I&W methods, combined with their relatively recent and underdeveloped application to cyberspace, suggests this issue warrants special attention.
In their process of designing a robust and adaptable cyber I&W framework, NATO entities may benefit from understanding how mature I&W frameworks from other domains in U.S. intelligence can be adapted to the cyber domain. Such I&W frameworks offer a way of thinking about security threats and provide methods for designing and structuring detection and response mechanisms.
In this section, we first define I&W, and then outline the publicly known progress that NATO has already achieved in relation to building its cyber I&W capabilities. We then propose a general framework for cyber I&W and discuss how NATO can further develop, adopt, and integrate cyber I&W capabilities within its current planning processes and operations. We conclude with an overview of several critical issues that we believe NATO entities should address to ensure that the alliance meets its missioncritical objectives in cyberspace.
What is Cyber Indications and Warning?
Cyber I&W focuses on collecting actionable information about threats to cyberspace that may provide early detection and warning of impending malicious cyberactivity. However, there is still no consensus regarding the concept of indications and warning. Some liken it to cyber threat intelligence and therefore focus on information directly pertaining to impending threats without analyzing broader strategic-level factors that can affect the behavior of a threat. Others define cyber I&W as a methodology that includes monitoring for indications of an impending threat, understanding the context in which this information is being collected, and performing strategic-level assessments of these indicators that can affect the behavior or nature of an impending cyberattack.5
Publicly available U.S. doctrine offers some insights applicable to the NATO context that can serve as a starting point for discussion. U.S. Joint Publication 2.0 stipulates that warning intelligence—a concept the DoD has recently adopted instead of indications and warning—includes “those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostile actions or intention.”60 Joint Publication 3-12 further stipulates that warning intelligence should be based on “all-source analysis in order to factor in political, military, and technical warning intelligence” and that “cyberspace threat sensors may recognize malicious activity with only a very short time available to respond.”61 While these definitions characterize the nature of cyber I&W concepts, they do not provide a full explanation of how to design an I&W framework.
The term indications and warning has a formal meaning in NATO and is supported through a set of processes governed by the member states with strong involvement by their intelligence communities.62 Yet NATO does not publicly offer a formal definition of what constitutes I&W in the cyber domain. Official public NATO documents provide only some insights; for instance, NATO’s 2018 Glossary of Terms and Definitions defines strategic warning as “[a] notification that hostilities may be imminent. This notification may occur at any time prior to the initiation of hostilities.” The document also defines tactical warning as “[a] notification that a local enemy attack is imminent. This notification may occur at any time from the indication of a probable attack until just prior to the target being struck or engaged.”63 The glossary defines indicator as “an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.”64 Although informative, these definitions provide only a general understanding of what activities constitute I&W. One distinction that can be made is separately defining indications from warnings. One may consider that there are indicators at various levels: strategic indicators (usually based on intelligence); operational indicators (combining intelligence and technical information); and tactical indicators (technical intrusion—malware, phishing, etc.). Warnings describe how and when to relay the indicators to the field.
Finally, the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), a U.S.-based nonprofit organization that facilitates collaboration between the private and public sectors concerning national security and intelligence,65 defines I&W against cyber threats as “an analytic process where an anticipated scenario in cyberspace is decomposed into indicators that can be continuously monitored to provide warning of the scenario coming to fruition.”66 We propose to adapt this definition to the NATO context and emphasize NATO’s primary area of responsibility and the political utility of I&W frameworks. We therefore define I&W for cyber threats as “an analytical process focused on collecting and analyzing information from a broad array of sources to develop indicators which can facilitate the prediction, early detection, and warning of cyber incidents relative to one’s information environment.”67 These indicators are then continuously monitored to provide warning of the scenario coming to fruition as much in advance as possible, allowing NATO to take preventive action.
Before we outline our framework, we first describe how NATO has already prepared its infrastructure for addressing, at least in part, cyber I&W
How Has NATO Already Prepared for Cyber I&W?
NATO has made significant progress in elevating the importance of the cyber domain and setting up the structural foundations for the effective adoption and integration of cyber I&W frameworks. In particular,
• At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO adopted an action plan for enhancing cyber defense, which was subsequently updated in February 2017.68
• At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO members agreed to prioritize the strengthening of the cyber defenses of their national infrastructure and networks.69
• At the Brussels 2018 summit, NATO members discussed collaboration between NATO entities and nation-level cyber capabilities and teams. In the Brussels Summit Declaration, issued by NATO’s heads of state and government, the allies asserted that NATO “will continue to optimise NATO intelligence to facilitate timely and relevant support to Allied decision-making and operations, including through improved warning and intelligence sharing, particularly on terrorism, hybrid, and cyber.”70
• NATO claims to continuously update its cyber policy and its action plan, which contains “concrete objectives and implementation timelines on a range of topics from capability development, education, training and exercises, and partnerships” to include, for example, allied nations agreeing to a Cyber Defense Pledge to prioritize maturing their security controls.7
NATO has made significant progress in standing up NATO entities and capabilities to implement or be involved in the implementation of I&W frameworks for cyber threats. Some of the principal NATO organizations include
NCIRC, operated by NCIA and based at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for protecting NATO’s networks. NCIRC monitors, prevents, detects, and responds to cybersecurity incidents and provides centralized cyber defense support to NATO sites.72 In 2006, NCIRC obtained its initial operating capability and started to build more robust cyber situational awareness for NATO’s networks. In 2013, NCIRC expanded its intrusion detection monitoring capabilities to more NATO critical sites under the Full Operating Capability program. The sites were expanded again in 2017.73
• NATO’s CyOC, established at the Brussels Summit in 2018 as a part of NATO’s Command Structure and located at SHAPE. Among other responsibilities, the CyOC acts as a focal point for planning, preparation, conduct, and coordination of cyberspace operations, which will involve the processing and analysis of data.74 The CyOC is established to support I&W decisions, though it does not maintain a separate cyberspace I&W framework.75
• ACO Task Force Cyber is a multidisciplinary team acting as a part of Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s task to provide the Council with advice on I&W on threats to NATO’s collective security.7
• ACT is NATO’s warfare development command and capability requirements authority, responsible for NATO common funded capability delivery.
• NATO’s Intelligence and Security Division, supported by SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre, NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, and the national representatives, is responsible for the NATO I&W System, which incorporates I&W capabilities in cyberspace.77
• NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, a multinational organization operating under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with SHAPE, provides the primary intelligence analytical support.7
NATO’s educational structures have also substantially evolved and expanded their cyber education and training. NATO’s principal educational institutions include
• the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia, a NATOaccredited research and training center providing education, consultation, research, and development in the area of cybersecurity
• the NATO Communications and Information Systems School in Latina, Italy, which provides training on operating and maintaining NATO’s communication and information systems to personnel from NATO members and allied nations79
• the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, which provides cyber defense education and training in support of NATO operations, policy, doctrine, strategy, and procedures
• the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, which emphasizes strategic education on cyber defense issues.80
NATO entities and allies have also recognized the importance of partnering with the private sector. Some of the benefits of such cooperation include establishing sharing of best practices and lessons learned and ensuring the timely supply and analysis of actionable cyber threat information. One of the primary channels through which NATO strengthens its collaboration with private partners is the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. The partnership includes NATO structures, national CERTs, and industry representatives of NATO members. The partnerships include information-sharing activities, training, exercises, and multinational Smart Defence81 projects.8
Adopting Strategic Intelligence Frameworks to Cyberspace in the NATO Context
Despite significant progress in building cyber capabilities and integrating them into existing NATO planning, operations, and C2 structures, I&W for cyberspace is still a relatively immature discipline. Therefore, NATO and its components can benefit by adopting well-established and tested frameworks from more mature disciplines, which provide actionable policy-relevant recommendations related to the detection and assessment of security threats. For instance, cyber I&W concepts can leverage the I&W frameworks used by U.S. strategic intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security, or Cyber Command. The U.S. intelligence community has been developing and improving these frameworks since World War II to assess and monitor potentially threatening actions by U.S. adversaries in an attempt to avoid surprise attacks, such as the attack against Pearl Harbor in 1941.83
Among the most well-known warning intelligence frameworks are former senior intelligence analyst Cynthia Grabo’s comprehensive methodology for warning intelligence, Jonathan Lockwood’s Analytical Method for Prediction, and the U.S. Defense Warning Network conceptual framework.84 However, the cyber I&W framework produced by INSA reflects components of these traditional I&W intelligence frameworks and provides an appropriate model that can be adapted to the NATO context.85 INSA’s framework is a useful starting point for building a cyber I&W foundation because it was based on tradecraft from the U.S. intelligence community in consultation with governmental, academic, and private sector representatives and is one of the only publicly available documents on this topic. INSA’s original I&W framework contains the following seven steps: (1) identify and prioritize assets, (2) refine the threat, (3) assess threat courses of action, (4) break down scenarios into indicators, (5) plan and exercise countermeasures, (6) align to the intelligence cycle (collect information for each indicator from Step 4), and (7) execute proactive countermeasures.
While this framework is valuable and While this framework is valuable and fills a gaping void for publicly available information on cyber I&W, its steps are too broad for our purposes. Therefore, we will adapt it to the NATO context and outline how NATO can apply these stages below. We closely adhere to the steps proposed by INSA but modify the sequence of Steps 5 and 6 to emphasize the need to establish data collection mechanisms for the indicators identified in Step 4 first, before planning and practicing countermeasures. In effect, one needs to be assured that the indicators are properly collected before responding to them.86 We further discuss establishing standard operating procedures, exercising the planned countermeasures, and aligning them to NATO’s communication and command structure in Step 6—this is necessary due to the tightly interconnected nature of these aspects of the process. For each step, we propose how NATO entities, allies, and partners can apply it to increase the effectiveness of their I&W capabilities by standardizing their operational protocols and decisionmaking processes. The RAND modified cyber I&W framework consists of the following steps:87
1. Identify and prioritize mission-critical assets.
2. Maintain an updated list of top cyber threats.
3. Construct scenarios of potential cyberattacks.
4. Decompose scenarios into observable indicators.
5. Establish data collection methods and sources and set up a collection requirement and prioritization matrix.
6. Establish standard operating procedures and exercise chain of communication and command in different scenarios.
Finally, it is important to recognize that some of the steps described below relate to common cybersecurity practices. However, the steps involving scenario development and identification of appropriate indicators are distinct and unique to a cyber I&W framework. This exercise is not meant to define a highly detailed framework but merely to highlight the key first steps the alliance should consider on its journey to operationalizing cyberspace.
Step 1: Identify and Prioritize Mission-Critical Assets
NATO’s high visibility and central role in the Western security architecture make it an attractive target for a variety of malicious cyber intrusions.88 The chief of cybersecurity at the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) asserts that NATO detects about 550 million suspicious events daily. Although NATO is constantly seeking to improve its cybersecurity, it is challenging to monitor, analyze, and act upon all of these events.89 NATO’s cyber I&W capabilities, therefore, must be able to differentiate between security alerts that represent a meaningful threat to the alliance (or are precursors to an attack) from activities that constitute operational noise that can be ignored.90
Suggested actions: To achieve this goal, NATO should leverage its mission assurance efforts to first determine a list of priority assets. The continued development of such a list should stem from NATO’s primary mission to ensure collective defense and security of all its members, including the protection of communications systems that are owned and operated by the alliance.91 NATO can further focus on supporting the protection of C2 nodes on NATO-based military sites that coordinate operations of major offensive military platforms, as well as telecommunications and electric grid systems, on which militaries heavily rely for intelligence, logistics, operations, and communications.92