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2NC – I/L – Resources Finite

NATO cyber resources are limited – we must pick and choose.

Waterman, '22 – journalist and communicator who has worked for the BBC, United Press International and POLITICO, and an expert on cybersecurity and counterterrorism (Shaun Waterman; "Cyber Troops Stretched Thin in Ukraine Response as NATO Builds Common Air Picture"; Air Force Magazine; https://www.airforcemag.com/cyber-troops-stretched-thin-ukraine-response-nato-common-air-picture/; 3-14-2022, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC

The war in Ukraine has provided a wake-up call for U.S. military cyber defenders, who are facing hard choices about how to deploy limited resources, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Chad D. Raduege, the chief information officer of U.S. European Command.

“There’s been a realization that, quite frankly, we can’t protect everything we have,” Raduege told a virtual luncheon hosted by the Gabriel Chapter of the Air Force Association on March 9.

He added that this realization had been growing for some time. In his prior job in 2021 as chief information officer of Air Combat Command, “we found ourselves … identifying the key [IT] components for us to fly, fight, and win. And we were applying mission defense teams from a cyber component against those weapon systems and saying, these are our crown jewels that we need to protect.”

But faced with a crisis that is demanding agile U.S. deployments alongside a wide variety of partners, meaning small teams operating from unfamiliar locations, there weren’t enough cyber defense teams to go around, Raduege said, answering an audience question from retired Maj. Gen. Burke E. ”Ed” Wilson, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, who previously commanded Air Forces Cyber.

“I think the area that we’ve got to continue to figure out is this idea that we were going [to] protect the weapon systems themselves, protect those smaller groups, with our mission defense teams. That’s a really great vision. What we found is we didn’t have enough capacity in the cyber realm to even stand up some of those capabilities,” Raduege said.

He said the Air Force is deciding which weapon systems it can afford to protect.

Cyberspace resources are scarce and on demand – prioritization is key.

Cavegn, '18 – Managing Board Of Saunders & Cavegn Übersetzungen und Texte (Dario Cavegn; "Director of cyberdefense center points to decision-makers' lack of skills"; ERR; https://news.err.ee/683497/director-of-cyberdefense-center-points-to-decision-makers-lack-of-skills; 2018, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-NoC

Authorities show lack of skills that needs to be addressed

In her article Maigre also pointed to the worrying global shortage of relevant skills. According to the White House's cybersecurity coordinator, the United States alone is short of some 300,000 personnel.

Adding to this are scarce resources and talent constraints in the public sector, along with a lack of coordination among agencies even of single governments and authorities in countries around the world only slowly reacting to developments that often happen at break-neck speed.

And though political leaders by now are making cybersecurity a campaign and policy issue, their understanding just how and why the subject should be approached in detail is often insufficient.

To make up for this lack of readiness and skills, organizations as well as governments should invest in preparation, which in turn requires knowledge. A solid knowledge base for cyber defense can only be developed in practice, which means that what is needed is a community of specialists and teams.

In practice, this means that both the military and civilian authorities need to know about cross-dependencies and the different systems in use. As it is already done at the cyberdefense center in Tallinn, exercises need to be based on scenarios that are as close as possible to real life.

Apart from the technological dimension there is also the legal and the diplomatic realm, both of which are important here. How should a country react to being attacked if it isn't immediately obvious where exactly the attack is coming from? Once the country of origin is identified, what then?

A hostile operation in cyberspace is taxed as an attack not based on whether it is directed against public or private infrastructure or against military or civilian personnel, but by the scale and effects of the operation. This is where international law comes in, as it is important to interpret an individual attack based on the existing legal means.

All of this is of great importance in a domain where politics can get lost in technical and legal matters. Identifying, spoiling, tracking, and reacting to cyberattacks takes skills and a level of preparation that in too many cases the current generation of decision-makers don't have.

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