The EU cannot fill in – failed on Ukraine and are reliant on NATO
Vicente 5/4/22 -- Adérito Vicente is PhD researcher in Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute. Published May 4, 2022. “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine” https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/ //DG
The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed Europe’s inability to protect the Ukrainians and to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, as happened in the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. Why did Europe fail to prevent this war?
First and foremost, due to security idiosyncrasies. Europe is not a collective security guarantor. It dismissed this opportunity in 1954 when France refused to establish a European Defence Community (EDC). Thus, despite continuous efforts ever since, Europe does not have an army nor a deterrent capability. It is, in fact, highly dependent on NATO and individual nuclear powers (predominantly the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK and France) to guarantee its collective security.
However, the Russo-Ukrainian war displays the Euro-Atlantic community’s inability to maintain security assurances previously given to Kyiv under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. In this political agreement, the US, the UK and Russia pledged not to use military force against Ukraine in exchange for it renouncing the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia violated this agreement at least twice – with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and the Euro-Atlantic guarantor countries failed to protect Ukraine.
However, the Memorandum’s greatest weakness lay in the fact that it was only politically, and not legally, binding. This is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy demands legally binding security guarantees instead of the Memorandum’s politically binding security assurances.
As a non-nuclear weapon state, which is not protected under a security guarantee by a nuclear weapon state or a nuclear alliance such as NATO, Ukraine was exposed to aggression or intended regime change carried out by an NPT-recognised nuclear weapon state. Hence, Europe and NATO could not have provided a nuclear umbrella to a non-allied state such as Ukraine. Without security guarantees or NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence, Ukraine was on its own in its direct confrontation against Russia.
Given the inability of major nuclear powers to uphold the Budapest Memorandum and the difficulty of enforcing credible security assurances due to Moscow’s actions, Ukraine proposed, on 29thMarch, security guarantees in which guarantor countries (such as the P5) must consult each other within three days after the beginning of military aggression or hybrid war. Within this scheme, after consultations, this group of countries must provide aid to Kyiv by sending troops, supplying weapons, and protecting Ukraine’s airspace. Ultimately, this proposal would exclude security guarantees potentially given by NATO or the EU and would ‘deresponsibilize’ Europe as a collective security guarantor of Ukraine.
The second reason Europe failed to prevent Putin’s war in Ukraine is because of nuclear policy choices. The EU is basically a non- actor (in proliferation not a nuclear deterrent one) who supports the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the EU has shown that its interests lie primarily in the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials of the former Soviet states, leading to the establishment of TACIS. Indeed, Brussels proved to be more concerned about the energy aspects of nuclear security, generated mainly by the outcome of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, than with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.
It was only in the aftermath of Moscow’s invasion of Crimea and Donbass in 2014 that the EU’s Russia policy took Ukraine’s security seriously into account. But Brussels did not provide nuclear deterrent capabilities against Russia for the reasons stated above and, most importantly, as it is a de facto NPT regime guarantor.
The EU is critical of the view that more nuclear weapons can induce stability and decrease the chances of crisis escalation (nuclear stability theory), prominently defended by neo-realist Kenneth Waltz. As an NPT regime guarantor, Brussels supports the idea that nuclear proliferation is potentially the greatest threat to international and European security, requiring a concerted and multilateral response. For example, the 2003 EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD stated that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states not only increases the likelihood of interstate nuclear conflict but increases the chances of nuclear material falling into the hands of violent non-state groups who are free from the threat of nuclear retaliation.
Therefore, the EU has been more politically engaged in ensuring Kyiv would not obtain nuclear weapons (mentioned, for example, in Article 11 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement) than in providing Ukraine with some kind of ‘security (nuclear) umbrella’.
The third reason is due to divergent political interests among EU member states. Since March 2014, the EU has adopted a strict non-recognition policy regarding Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. This policy led to substantive sanctions against Russia and prompted the EU to agree on five guiding principles to punish Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, these actions did not deter Moscow in Ukraine nor prevent the EU from negotiating trade and energy deals with Russia. A lack of coherence among EU members affected the effective implementation of the guiding principles and restrictive measures due to different political interests and positions towards Russia conditioned by threat perceptions, economic interests,and energy dependence.