The EU cannot fill in for NATO – the US is key to European defense capabilities
Meijer and Brooks 21 -- Hugo Meijer is CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies and the Founding Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, and Stephen Gallup Brooks is a Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Published 2021. “Illusions of autonomy: Why Europe cannot provide for its security if the United States pulls back” https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/4/7/1910610/isec_a_00405.pdf // DG
The European ambition to seek strategic autonomy amid rising concerns over U.S. commitments to the continent and over Russia’s revisionist behavior raises an important counterfactual question: Could Europeans develop an autonomous defense capacity if there were a complete U.S. withdrawal from Europe? Although a U.S. withdrawal from Europe is unlikely in the short term, it is hardly a far-fetched scenario for the longer term. Examining this counterfactual is useful for two key reasons. First, a complete U.S. withdrawal—one entailing an exit from NATO and the withdrawal of all U.S. conventional and nuclear forces from the continent—is the strongest possible incentive that could drive the Europeans to pursue strategic autonomy, and is therefore the best way to assess their capacity to do so. Second, examination of this counterfactual advances the U.S. grand strategy debate in light of the prominent theoretical argument from U.S. “restraint” scholars such as Barry Posen, who argue that a U.S. withdrawal is warranted on the grounds that Europe can quickly and easily create an effective deterrent to Russia.9 As we explain, Europe is the key fulcrum in the grand strategy debate between these restraint scholars and “deep engagement” scholars, who favor maintaining current U.S. security commitments in Europe and elsewhere.10
Determining whether Europeans could achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon if the United States were to pull back from Europe requires an examination of the historical trajectory and the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. Although existing studies have analyzed important elements of each, a more systematic analysis is needed.11 Regarding interests, this article provides the most comprehensive and thorough coding of national threat perceptions across all of Europe, showing where each country falls across a set of defined categories of threat prioritization. Concerning defense capacity, it adds to existing understandings of Europe’s deficiency by providing novel longitudinal data on European conventional defense capabilities over the past three decades and by outlining a series of four interwoven challenges that would greatly complicate the pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Our analysis shows that European efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will be hampered by two major constraints: profound defense capacity shortfalls that will be hard to close, and “strategic cacophony,” that is, profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.12 These mutually reinforcing constraints impose a rigid limit on the capacity of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon. Consequently, if the United States were to withdraw fully, the continent would become significantly more vulnerable to Russian meddling and aggression. Furthermore, if the U.S.-backed NATO were to disappear, this would undermine the only institutional framework that has fostered some degree of coordination in Europe (at the strategic, doctrinal, and capability levels) and partly contained Europe’s strategic cacophony. This, in turn, would make institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation appreciably harder.
Ultimately, we conclude that the notion that Europeans would be able to achieve defense autonomy following a U.S. pullback is illusory.13 And if even the major shock of a complete U.S. pullback would be very unlikely to move Europe away from its current strategic cacophony and capability shortfalls, a partial U.S. pullback—a much more likely counterfactual—would be more unlikely to do so. The policy implication is straightforward: if the United States wants European stability, it needs to stay in Europe.
European Defense Capacity Shortfall
European national assessments thus diverge profoundly regarding the prioritization among different threats. Significantly, Europe’s strategic cacophony greatly exacerbates a second overarching constraint on Europe achieving strategic autonomy: severe military capacity gaps that cannot be closed anytime soon. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s defense capacity has markedly decreased.88 Operationally, the 2011 European military action in Libya revealed a severe shortage of key enablers for offensive military operations: the United States had to provide critical capabilities that the Europeans otherwise lacked, such as air-to-air refueling; suppression of enemy air defenses; and intelligence, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.89 Indeed, a recent systematic study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations found that, because their capability shortfalls are so significant, Europeans would struggle to autonomously undertake operations even at the low end of the spectrum of conflict (such as peace enforcement missions).90