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Analysis of NATO countries proves opposite

Marrone and Sabatino 21 – Alessandro Marrone is the Head of the Defense Program at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome and Ester Sabatino is Research Analyst for Defence and Military Analysis at the The International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Cyber Defence in NATO Countries: Comparing Models” Published 2021. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65693094/iaip2105-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1656100418&Signature=GHDFg-q6Oy29igACe~s1a00WuObIobCutomMJMI5t90rwn8AItAiAmfGvzOiRtoREH2y1Pusv9Q6VI06Pa8zA0rtsxcza1XWLk-u2djuFKb~e86ZbgwJI7~YI~gKSeH3C9dPNWTc8ikBNkD4E7bdCwlX6JjhocJu0XXlzbPO5c89uOV7FkQlQgMB1OV1WTVXOEwept~mTrHrQGZJk~Ny2YiVdNuh4qmA8kyluwEMAF~TUIOfCM-qFria7gpup2Wz4O2bC4W-D6oBREg9lqeeuU7l53Aoog196oK7F1~Fh1dBEgsvQoEhkTuox18akvt-Ar90yOWFnnBR0qTgLjK1hA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA // DG

The analysis of five national case studies has resulted in the identification of different approaches towards cyber defence, as proof of how much has yet to be accomplished in defining shared doctrines and procedures. Among the countries taken into consideration, a substantial divide can be traced between states that envisage the possibility of carrying out exclusively defensive actions, and those that count on the ability to perform offensive operations also in the absence of a cyber-attack.

Among the first group are Germany and Spain, which envision cyber deterrence as the country’s ability to promptly and adequately respond to a cyber-attack, enacting what is defined as hack-back. Additional differences between Berlin and Madrid concern the possibility of deploying the armed forces on national territory in the event of an attack, which would need prior authorisation by Parliament in Germany. It is important to note, however, that this procedure poorly matches the speed of reaction necessary to limit or avoid the damage of a cyber-attack: parliamentary timeframes, in cases that require rapid and tailored actions, could mean the state’s inability to protect its primary interests and thus hinder national defence.

London, Paris and Washington, by contrast, have a different understanding of the possibilities deriving from an active use of cyber defence. For the three capitals, cyber defence and deterrence are about ensuring not only reaction capabilities in the event of a cyber-attack, but also the possibility of a preventive action against potential adversaries, be they state or non-state actors. Following this logic, for instance, the UK carried out a cyber-attack to the detriment of ISIS in 2016.

Despite these differences, it is possible to outline shared necessities among the five countries take into consideration, which can be summed up as follows: • Necessity to have a shared regulatory and doctrinal framework at the NATO, EU and international level; • Better integration of the cyber element in national and allied command structures; • More structured and strategic collaboration with enterprises and research entities; • Specialised training of military personnel devoted to protection from the cyber threat; and • Increased awareness about the use of cyberspace among state officials, critical infrastructure managers and the population in general.

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