That unlocks a joint offensive cyber capability that deters conflict and increases operational strength---it facilitates knowledge transfer, improves attack coordination, and streamlines decision-making.
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/strategyandsecurityinstitute/pdfs/mstrat/James_Prideaux.pdf. //AN
With this established, it is possible to set out this chapter’s main argument: that a joint offensive cyber capability would enhance the Alliance’s cyber-deterrent posture. There are three reasons for this. It would: improve intra-alliance knowledge transfer of cyber-intelligence gathering and cyber-sabotage techniques; help coordinate attacks and mitigate fratricide; accelerate decision-making and streamline response scenario planning.
First, NATO’s cyber-deterrence would be more credible because a joint cyber capability would facilitate knowledge transfer between member states. For deterrence to be successful, NATO has to convince aggressors that it can retaliate against the right aggressor in a manner that imposes unacceptable costs. However, state and non-state actors, like the Fancy Bear cyber-espionage group likely associated with the Russian security services, know that the disaggregation of member states’ cyber assets makes this harder to achieve.89 The primary reason for this separation of effort is that intelligence on adversaries’ cyber vulnerabilities is closely guarded by national intelligence agencies.90 This intelligence is absolutely critical for effective cyber attacks, since it is necessary to understand the targeted systems in great detail.91 The CyOC will not go far enough in fostering intelligence sharing, even though it aims to ‘integrate cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations’.92 It is certainly a step forward, but of those states that have offered their cyber effects to NATO, France and America have clearly stated they will retain full control of their operations and capabilities.93 This lack of joint operational authority poses a significant challenge, as it appears the centre will serve to coordinate rather than oversee operations.94 It will prove very hard to achieve even this when members’ capabilities vary greatly in their maturity and development. Whereas Germany is said to have thousands of ‘information and cyber officers’, other European states have hardly any.95 Overall, NATO in its current state is not optimised for deterrence-by-punishment and the CyOC will do little to improve this.
Instead, pooling members’ cyber-intelligence and cyber-sabotage expertise would encourage intra-alliance knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer in organisations is the process through which one unit, like a department or division, is affected by the experience of another.96 Empirical evidence suggests that interconnected organisations like franchises and chains hold comparative advantages over their autonomous counterparts, due to the ability to transfer knowledge between their constituent elements.97
This would apply to NATO in two ways. First, organisational integration of cyber-intelligence would facilitate knowledge transfer, as demonstrated by the preparations behind Stuxnet.98 To design such a complex computer worm, the US National Security Agency (NSA) collaborated with Israel’s counterpart, Unit 8200, largely because it had deep intelligence about operations at Iran’s Natanz facility.99 This was vital for the attack’s success, because the individual control systems they targeted had unique configurations, making them harder to penetrate.100
Second, merging cyber-sabotage capabilities would similarly aid knowledge transfer. There are two types of knowledge required for cyber-sabotage operations. One type is explicit and can be transferred in a systematic manner, such as knowledge of how a SCADA system works or how to write code in a certain programming language.101 The other, more significant type is tacit knowledge, which is difficult to transfer to another person by verbalising or writing it down.102 This could include a hacker’s accumulated experience or knowledge of a cyber command’s implicit operational processes.103 Tacit knowledge can be shared, but this is done by performance and learning by example.104 A joint offensive cyber capability would provide an excellent opportunity for this to happen.105 Both forms of knowledge transfer would be especially useful for ‘upskilling’ those NATO members that lack the advanced technical expertise in America, Britain, France and Germany. In practice, this would make acquiring cyberattack tools and training personnel easier and cheaper.106 The importance of training technical personnel should not be underestimated, because all members are short of them but most lack the resources to attract them.107 Pooling capabilities is one way of alleviating this pressure. In turn, the cumulative benefits of knowledge transfer would likely make it easier to launch retaliatory attacks against the right aggressor and impose unacceptable costs more successfully. Overall, this would improve the credibility of a deterrence-by- punishment posture.
Furthermore, a joint capability would improve NATO’s offensive cyber C2, improving attack coordination and mitigating fratricide. This is because NATO’s ‘volunteer’ system and its CyOC mark a striking departure from the way it usually handles C2of members’ assets.108 The NATO Force Structure dictates that conventional forces like ships and tanks come under the full operational control of an assigned NATO commander.109 However, according to a retired USAF Colonel leading the implementation of NATO’s 2017 cyber policy, the C2 problems inherent in the volunteer system make it ‘far from ideal’.110 This is because NATO commanders do not know the details of capabilities available to them, such as their legal consequences, impeding the decision-making process.111 Commanders also want to know how using cyberweapons might conflict with other operations; without this they are left ‘flying blind’.112 Failing to coordinate operations can have far-reaching consequences. For instance, intelligence agencies’ reconnaissance of target networks needs to be coordinated with cyber-sabotage operations, so they do not interfere with each other.113 Disaggregated C2 can even result in fratricide on other allies’ networks, because the distinction between internal and external security threats is much harder to ascertain in cyberspace than in the other four domains.114 The CyOC is a step towards resolving this, but until a NATO commander has control over members’ capabilities, these problems will not be fully resolved.
Additionally, a unified offensive cyber C2 structure would aid scenario planning and speed up decision-making. This is important, because NATO needs to streamline its current decision-making process in the cyber domain.115 A single command would help members agree on appropriate forms of retaliation in cyberspace in different scenarios, bolstering the credibility of deterrence-by-punishment even further. Without a clear command structure, it is very difficult for the 30 NATO allies – who have different threat perceptions and suffer from a lack of cohesion – to agree on effective response scenarios in contingency planning.116 As a case in point, Estonia is willing to strike back when attacked online, given its memory of the 2007 attack and its proximity to Russia.117 However, Estonian officials do not know whether other allies will support them, validating some scholars’ arguments that NATO needs to find common ground in cyber contingency planning.118 The secrecy that shrouds allies’ capabilities and the uncertainty surrounding cyber scenario planning might explain why offensive cyber effects do not feature in NATO’s mission planning process.119 This is not to say that NATO needs to publicly agree on a ‘red line’ in cyberspace that could trigger an Article 5 response. If anything, NATO’s current strategic ambiguity is key for deterring attacks that fall just below a defined threshold.120 However, unifying cyber C2 would help them carry out scenario planning behind closed doors, improving the Alliance’s readiness. Speeding up the decision-making process is crucial given how long it can take to attribute and then launch a retaliatory attack.121 Overall, streamlined scenario planning and decision- making, augmented by improved coordination of cyberattacks, would strengthen the credibility of deterrence-by-punishment. Although aggressors like Fancy Bear would not know when a certain threshold has been crossed, it would tilt their risk-benefit calculus knowing an attack could trigger a faster, well-coordinated retaliatory attack.