There is no alternative---traditional deterrence fails---black market zero-day exploits, weak inspection, and missing ilaw.
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/strategyandsecurityinstitute/pdfs/mstrat/James_Prideaux.pdf. //AN
Joint Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Cyber Deterrence-by-Punishment
It is necessary to explain the limitations of NATO’s current deterrence-by-denial policy to contextualise cyber deterrence-by-punishment. After all, one may ask: why not just bolster NATO’s cyber defences? While defensive measures are absolutely essential for stopping attacks that have already launched, they are severely limited at deterring potential attacks. This probably explains why NATO does not mention ‘cyber deterrence-by-denial’ in its policy documents, but rather cyber- deterrence more broadly.74 The main problem with deterrence-by-denial is that cyberattacks are very low cost for an aggressor, both in terms of the effort expended to launch an attack and the cost of penalties.75 The existence of a huge black market offering everything from zero-day exploits to off-the-shelf services to conduct DDoS attacks facilitates the ease with which cyberattack technology can be acquired.76 Meanwhile, the lack of an inspection regime and the infancy of international legal frameworks reduces the risk of penalties.77 This gives aggressors little incentive to stop attacking, even in the face of strong defences.
Meanwhile, defence in cyberspace is porous in nature.78 Every system has vulnerabilities and exploiting them is only a matter of time, means and determination.79 This permeability is a serious problem, because defenders must convince aggressors that an attack will have little to no effect for deterrence-by-denial to be effective.80 NATO’s deterrence-by-denial posture certainly makes attacks harder to conduct, but this has not deterred the hundreds of significant attacks it faces monthly. Clearly, a discussion over cyber deterrence-by- punishment is warranted.
The cyber deterrence-by-punishment that offensive weapons afford serves to bolster and complement deterrence-by-denial. This is because it threatens the imposition of costs where, in the absence of retaliation, there would be hardly any.