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Attribution is possible now through using past data, attacker’s mistakes, and political context, but if anything, a joint OCO bolsters it through freeing up available resources.

University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/strategyandsecurityinstitute/pdfs/mstrat/James_Prideaux.pdf. //AN

The main critique of deterrence-by-punishment is that it is hard to attribute cyberattacks. This reduces the credibility of deterrence because it is too difficult to tell which systems to retaliate against.122 Nevertheless, though attribution is costly and time-consuming, it is possible.123 On a technical level, malware’s source code and programming style can be mapped against previous incidents.124 In Iran, these forensics revealed similarities between Stuxnet and another virus developed by the NSA called Flame, intensifying accusations against US involvement in both tools.125

Furthermore, anonymity in cyberspace is not as pervasive as critics make out, because attackers do make mistakes. For instance, the Chinese hacker group APT1 is recognisable for its sloppy re-use of social engineering tactics and specific infrastructure.126 Additionally, attribution is facilitated by examining the history and politics surrounding an attack; in the case of Stuxnet, the tense relations between America, Israel and Iran narrowed down the list of likely sources.127 What’s more, Russia is increasingly likely to use its state security services to conduct attacks, instead of more anonymous but lower skilled non-state hackers.128 This suggests that attacks from NATO’s main adversary in cyberspace may become more traceable.

Most importantly, a joint offensive cyber capability would benefit NATO precisely because attribution is time consuming and costly. The quality of attribution is a function of available resources – the more there are, the more accurately one can attribute an attack.129 Although pooling NATO’s capabilities would not increase the quantity of resources available, it would improve resource allocation and thus allow NATO to ‘do more with the same’.130 In several countries, the growth of offensive cyber has already allowed for greater specialisation in cyber operations. US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) now has 133 teams, making it easier to dedicate teams to specific tasks.131 This division of labour, enabled by pooling capabilities, would hopefully allow NATO to devote specialised units to cyber forensics. This would likely increase their output, facilitating timely and accurate attribution.

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