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Individual OCOs are bad–but a joint capability would increase NATO ability to control retaliation.

University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/strategyandsecurityinstitute/pdfs/mstrat/James_Prideaux.pdf. //AN

A third criticism is that retaliatory cyberattacks can easily cause collateral damage and are dangerously escalatory. Since the distinction between internal and external networks is often blurred, attacks directed at a defender’s network may spill over into external networks.138 Adopting a persistent engagement approach will also pose increasing risks for escalation.139 This is aggravated by the absence of international agreements determining unacceptable behaviour in cyberspace.140 This dissertation does not dispute these criticisms; on the contrary, they strengthen the case for a joint-NATO offensive cyber capability. This is because one of the main solutions to these problems is increased control of cyber operations.141 A joint capability would increase NATO members’ control, because it would facilitate agreement on how to integrate offensive cyber effects into a Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) package.142 FDOs are meant to allow for a gradual increase of pressure in response to threats, limiting the chance of uncontrolled escalation.143 Chapter 5 outlines how offensive cyber could be integrated into an FDO package in more detail. Leaving members to adhere to their own FDOs undermines the unity of NATO’s response to an attack. Similarly, the extra control that centralised C2 offers would allow NATO to reduce the risk of cyberattacks causing collateral damage.144 Though this risk cannot be eliminated entirely, joint C2 and standardised offensive cyber doctrine could add extra controls that seem unlikely to appear at the CyOC. For instance, doctrine could dictate that large attacks should only be launched against military networks; air defence systems are unlikely to be on the same network as hospitals, mitigating the chance of collateral damage.

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