1. It upskills all NATO members with cyber-intelligence and expertise.
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/strategyandsecurityinstitute/pdfs/mstrat/James_Prideaux.pdf. //AN
First, NATO’s cyber-deterrence would be more credible because a joint cyber capability would facilitate knowledge transfer between member states. For deterrence to be successful, NATO has to convince aggressors that it can retaliate against the right aggressor in a manner that imposes unacceptable costs. However, state and non-state actors, like the Fancy Bear cyber-espionage group likely associated with the Russian security services, know that the disaggregation of member states’ cyber assets makes this harder to achieve.89 The primary reason for this separation of effort is that intelligence on adversaries’ cyber vulnerabilities is closely guarded by national intelligence agencies.90 This intelligence is absolutely critical for effective cyber attacks, since it is necessary to understand the targeted systems in great detail.91 The CyOC will not go far enough in fostering intelligence sharing, even though it aims to ‘integrate cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations’.92 It is certainly a step forward, but of those states that have offered their cyber effects to NATO, France and America have clearly stated they will retain full control of their operations and capabilities.93 This lack of joint operational authority poses a significant challenge, as it appears the centre will serve to coordinate rather than oversee operations.94 It will prove very hard to achieve even this when members’ capabilities vary greatly in their maturity and development. Whereas Germany is said to have thousands of ‘information and cyber officers’, other European states have hardly any.95 Overall, NATO in its current state is not optimised for deterrence-by-punishment and the CyOC will do little to improve this.
Instead, pooling members’ cyber-intelligence and cyber-sabotage expertise would encourage intra-alliance knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer in organisations is the process through which one unit, like a department or division, is affected by the experience of another.96 Empirical evidence suggests that interconnected organisations like franchises and chains hold comparative advantages over their autonomous counterparts, due to the ability to transfer knowledge between their constituent elements.97
This would apply to NATO in two ways. First, organisational integration of cyber-intelligence would facilitate knowledge transfer, as demonstrated by the preparations behind Stuxnet.98 To design such a complex computer worm, the US National Security Agency (NSA) collaborated with Israel’s counterpart, Unit 8200, largely because it had deep intelligence about operations at Iran’s Natanz facility.99 This was vital for the attack’s success, because the individual control systems they targeted had unique configurations, making them harder to penetrate.100
Second, merging cyber-sabotage capabilities would similarly aid knowledge transfer. There are two types of knowledge required for cyber-sabotage operations. One type is explicit and can be transferred in a systematic manner, such as knowledge of how a SCADA system works or how to write code in a certain programming language.101 The other, more significant type is tacit knowledge, which is difficult to transfer to another person by verbalising or writing it down.102 This could include a hacker’s accumulated experience or knowledge of a cyber command’s implicit operational processes.103 Tacit knowledge can be shared, but this is done by performance and learning by example.104 A joint offensive cyber capability would provide an excellent opportunity for this to happen.105 Both forms of knowledge transfer would be especially useful for ‘upskilling’ those NATO members that lack the advanced technical expertise in America, Britain, France and Germany. In practice, this would make acquiring cyberattack tools and training personnel easier and cheaper.106 The importance of training technical personnel should not be underestimated, because all members are short of them but most lack the resources to attract them.107 Pooling capabilities is one way of alleviating this pressure. In turn, the cumulative benefits of knowledge transfer would likely make it easier to launch retaliatory attacks against the right aggressor and impose unacceptable costs more successfully. Overall, this would improve the credibility of a deterrence-by- punishment posture.