4. It fortifies collective defence and conventional warfare.
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/strategyandsecurityinstitute/pdfs/mstrat/James_Prideaux.pdf. //AN
The benefits of a joint offensive cyber capability for conventional collective defence are far easier to discern than cyber-deterrence. NATO could use it for tactical operations to support combat operations and shape the battlefield.149 The most obvious scenario this could be used in is if NATO were attacked by Russia, the only state whose conventional forces pose a threat. Offensive cyber capabilities would be an important force multiplier in the event of a Russian attack on the Baltic states, where local force ratios would favour the attacker.150 Battlefield NATO commanders could use cyber effects to disrupt Russian C2 networks or the software on advanced weapons, like surface-to-air missiles or fighter aircraft.151 Anti-access/ area denial operations (A2/AD) like these seek to deny attackers the ability to bring their assets into a contested region and prevent them from operating freely within it.152 Offensive cyber capabilities have already been used in this way to great effect. In 2007, the Israeli Air Force allegedly used the Suter computer program to conduct an airstrike against a nuclear reactor in Northern Syria.153 This fed Syria’s air defence systems a false-sky picture, allowing Israeli fighter jets to successfully bomb the reactor without being detected.154 In many ways, cyber effects will become a basic necessity in conventional warfare. No modern air force would enter combat without electronic warfare (EW) capabilities; as cyber and EW merge into a single activity, air operations will require cyber support.155 Overall, since cyberweapons can be so effective on the battlefield, they would clearly aid NATO’s warfighting ability.
A joint capability would be the best way to fulfill this role. The CyOC is hoping to coordinate battlefield effects in a similar way.156 However, the secrecy of members’ capabilities and the persistence of sovereign operational authority will make it harder for SACEUR to quickly decide whether and how to use cyberweapons. This would be detrimental in a hot war scenario, the rapid pace of which demands decisions to be made ‘at the speed of relevance’.157 Additionally, offensive cyberweapons depend heavily on force integration to be effective on the battlefield.158 The greater the integration between conventional and cyber operations, the greater the multiplier effect achieved – as proved by Israel’s highly coordinated airstrike.159 However, it seems the current volunteer system is lacking in this regard. A senior NATO official has acknowledged the Alliance needs to get better at aligning its cyber assets with its Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics as part of an A2/AD strategy.160 This means it needs to improve coordination with the EFP’s graduated response plans and practise battlefield cyberattacks in a more realistic way during exercises.161 To this end, the improved C2, knowledge transfer and resource allocation that a joint cyber capability offers would augment not just cyber-deterrence but collective defence too.