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Alliance cohesion over cybersecurity key to prevent exploitation of internal disagreements

Author?? 21 (author, “The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass,” 2021, https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/the-v4-towards-a-new-nato-strategic-concept.pdf)-lh

This issue, over which there are no major disagreements among V4 states, comprises cybersecurity and the development of the alliance’s resilience in cyberspace. All member states agree that this new operational domain has become vital in all types of conflicts, and therefore must be a key area of cooperation amongst NATO members. Our experts also noted that cyber resilience is an area where cohesion can be achieved at the lowest cost. This does not diminish the importance of the topic at hand; rather, it shows us that there are still key challenges which have to be overcome in the near future. Despite the fact that it is not a physical area of operations, cyberspace cannot be separated from the aforementioned geopolitical tensions. It is also connected with the question of the alliance’s stance towards Russia and China; both of these countries have robust capabilities in cyberspace, which they are keen to utilise in the developing great power competition. This factor is also relevant on a lower level, connected to other disruptive and hostile powers such as Iran or North Korea, as well as non-state actors such as international terrorist organisations. The V4 countries naturally have lower levels of readiness in cyberspace than the great powers do; however, it is entirely possible for small and medium-sized powers to enhance their resilience against cyberattacks. For example, Estonia reacted (with the support of NATO) to Russian cyber aggression, and developed robust defensive infrastructure and practices, which should be emulated by other countries.

Due to its limited size, resources, demography, and industrial capacity, Estonia could not aspire to such a power position in terms of conventional warfare. International cooperation in cyber resilience is also a force multiplier, and no country can or should rely solely on itself. Thus, it is in the interests of security and political stability to have more pronounced cooperation in this field. The V4 can be a champion in this area: Poland is a great example of the rapid development of the cyber industry, deeply anchored in the transatlantic alliance.

The security environment in the 21st century is fundamentally different to any time in the past. The geopolitics of today is not about the possession of territory and material resources, but about the interdependence of economies and companies, as well as the incorporation of new technologies, such as 5G networks and AI, often developed either in the US or China. In such an environment, NATO should incorporate defence capabilities into the fields of cyberspace, countering fake news, human trafficking, and weaponising migration. NATO must be prepared for future challenges; however, this is a much harder task to accomplish in the V4 region than it is in Western Europe. This can and should be seen as an opportunity. While the V4 countries have neither the population bases nor the resources to compete with global leading players, the knowledge-based economies of tomorrow create a solid chance even for small and medium-sized states to catch up with wealthier and bigger states.

1.1.6. Resilience In order to tackle these challenges, NATO members have to be resilient, but there is also a need for a terminological debate on the merits and meaning of resilience. We need to differentiate between the classical understanding of resilience as civil preparedness relating to crisis response and management; democratic resilience relating to institutions, values and commitments; and cyber resilience. While cyber resilience and civil preparedness are low-hanging fruits from a cooperation perspective, democratic resilience will be a subject of heated political discussion.

In the coming years, NATO will begin to see more and more so-called “homeland deployments”. These will be mainly in response to climate change and caused by extreme weather events such as floods, wildfires and heavy storms. With the increasing intensity of such events, civilian agencies responsible for crisis response and management will not have sufficient capabilities, leading to the need for deployment of armed forces. On a mass scale, we witnessed such a scenario in 2020, where armed forces were deployed to support the countering of the COVID-19 pandemic. Central topics in Alliance discussions on how to adapt to these coming challenges should include enhancing the interoperability of armed forces with civilian agencies in crisis situations, reviewing the adequacy of national legal frameworks, and refocusing CIMIC efforts from peacebuilding missions abroad to “home front” deployments. Of course, all this is directly connected to the need for enhanced resilience building and civil preparedness.

The NATO 2030 report by the Secretary General outlined some necessary reforms in terms of political decision-making processes; it suggested changes to the fundamental underpinnings of NATO and, therefore, alliance cohesion itself. The report, written among others by Wess Mitchell, is a thought-provoking document. However, it is highly unlikely that the decision-making process will truly undergo a fundamental procedural change, nor is it clearly in the Alliance’s interest to reform this aspect. NATO’s current decision-making process reflects decades of tradition and political will. It maintains and underpins internal cohesion, to the benefit of all NATO allies. The V4 countries share the positive sentiment that the current consensus-based process is within the group’s best interest. Leaving consensusdecision-making behind in any area promotes a perception of decreased cohesion to our adversaries and a potential angle where internal disagreements might be exploited to undermine the alliance. This is a risk factor that all NATO allies – particularly the V4 member states, which are reliant on NATO’s traditional threat response capabilities – want to avoid.

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