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Cohesion over cyber norm-development reduces risk of cyberattack escalation

Davis 19 (Susan Davis, “NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 8/13/2019, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-09/148%20STC%20Davis%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE%20-%20fall%20revision%20-%20clean%2011.9.19.pdf)-lh

Policy circles within the Alliance and beyond continue to debate how cyber attacks affect stability during crises and armed conflict. Which types of cyber attacks would be de-escalatory, escalatory, or neutral? Would the answer differ depending on when, during a crisis or an armed conflict, they would be launched? And are there significant differences between various states on these answers? States most likely do not see a cyber attack as a viable option for a pre-emptive first strike. However, in a crisis or pre-war situation, they could perceive a significant “cost of going second” (Davis, 2014). In such situations, one side “may well be frightened of what would happen if the other side attacks and may be convinced that going first will be advantageous” (Davis, 2014). This could lead to high escalatory risks in a crisis. Another key problem is the difficulty of determining the intent of a cyber intrusion (Lindsay, 2015). When a defender detects a breach, he may not know whether the intruder wants to spy on him, conduct forward defence, gain a foothold for future defensive measures, or prepare for an imminent or future cyber attack (Slayton, 2017). It is extremely difficult to gauge intent in cyber space, and, in such cases, states tend to assume the worst (Hennessey, 2017). As a result, this can lead to misperception and an escalatory spiral (Slayton, 2017). In sum, escalation dynamics deserve considerably more attention. For now, however, the Alliance should seek to reduce escalatory risks through clear diplomatic messaging and engagement; a high level of transparency on cyber policies; examining escalation dynamics in exercises; as well as support to norm-development and confidence building measures.

III. NATO CYBER POLICY 23. At the political level, the Alliance continues to adapt its cyber security, defence, and deterrence policies through regularly updated action plans with concrete objectives and timelines. This section outlines NATO’s: - overarching strategies to counter cyber attacks; - cyber capability development; - the integration of cyber capabilities into NATO planning; - concrete cooperation in NATO; and - NATO’s cyber partnerships.

A. NATO’S OVERALL CYBER STRATEGY 24. As armed forces around the world, including in potential adversary states, build up their cyber capabilities, NATO and its member states must devise strategies and policies to counter the threat of serious state-directed cyber attacks. Overall, NATO is leaning heavily on the same general strategies it uses to counter other attacks: dissuasion by denial and deterrence by punishment. However, Allies should continue to support work on international norms and engage in serious discussions if and how strategies such as persistent engagement, as outlined above, can supplement overall NATO strategy.

1. Norms in Cyber Space 25. Due to the specific characteristics of malicious cyber code, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation measures very likely remain beyond reach for now, most importantly because verification seems impossible. However, the further development of norms in cyber space could become an important pillar of support against such attacks. NATO continues to argue that international law applies to cyber space, including international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter. This is also in line with the declaration of the 2013 Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE, 2013). The Alliance has declared its support for “work on voluntary international norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures regarding cyberspace” (NATO, 2016b). Allies furthermore made clear that they “stand to benefit from a norms-based, predictable, and secure cyberspace” (NATO, 2018a). However, it is unrealistic to expect that NATO, as an Alliance of 29 sovereign nations, could become the primary driving force for the further development of norms. Instead, individual Allies must continue to drive this effort in the international community and encourage other member states to do the same.

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