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Cyber cohesion key to preventing future military attacks

Namias 22 – Dominic Namias is a legislative fellow at the US House of Representatives. “U.S. Warfare Within the Fifth Domain: Deterring Russian Cyber Aggression” Published 2022. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1267&context=hsgconference //DG

NATO has been generally successful in implementing the private sector of their various nations into the cyber defense field and serves as an example of the private cybersecurity industry aiding the public sector. Through NCI Agency, the information technology, communications and cyber defense arm of NATO, billions of dollars have been invested in private companies from NATO countries to train and equip professionals in the public field to defend against attacks. This is an example of successful strategy that has also been used by the U.S. Department of Defense. These investments show a common strategy among NATO member states which has been extremely successful. Through sharing strategies and information, the U.S. and NATO can learn from one another the best means to deter cyber aggression.

Working with NATO Counterparts

NATO was founded in 1949 with the full intention to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law...to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”23 The 12 founding countries have since grown to 30 nations all with the same goal of furthering security and prosperity in the North Atlantic region. According to NATO, the alliance was formed to meet three objectives: “[to deter] Soviet expansionism, [forbid] the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent and [encourage] European political integration.” 24 The expansion of NATO has driven the alliance closer to its main aggressor, Russia, with the addition of four former Warsaw Pact members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and three former-Soviet states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). This has broadened NATO’s responsibilities and increased the threat from Russian interference in NATO activities.

NATO has focused heavily on cybersecurity since 2014 and as recently as January 2022 re-emphasized their commitment to security in the fifth domain: To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain robust cyber defenses, NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which were endorsed by Allies at the Wales Summit in September 2014. An updated action plan was endorsed by Allies in February 2017. The 2014 policy established that cyber defense is part of the Alliance’s core task of collective defense, confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace, set out the further development of NATO’s and Allies’ capabilities, and intensified NATO’s cooperation with industry.25 NATO has recently alluded to a policy of physical military action against any cyberattacks on member states: Appearing at the Atlantic Council’s headquarters in Washington ahead of NATO’s summit in Brussels, Stoltenberg said NATO did not distinguish between cyber intrusions and other forms of attacks. He noted that cyber aggression could trigger a military response through “other means.” “In a way, it doesn’t matter whether it’s a kinetic attack or a cyberattack, we will assess as allies whether it meets the thresholds for triggering Article 5. It sends a message that we regard cyberattacks as seriously as any other attack.”26

This has yet to be implemented based solely on an aggression against a member state, but the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis can be traced back to Russian cyberaggression against the Ukrainian central government. The response by the United States and NATO allies is the correct approach to a cyberattack from within the Russian Federation. According to intel from the Ukrainian Government, hackers from within the Russian Federation shut down major government websites on January 14, 2022, “The websites of the country’s cabinet, seven ministries, the treasury, the National Emergency Service, and the state services website, where Ukrainians’ electronic passports and vaccination certificates are stored, were temporarily unavailable on Friday as a result of the hack.” 2

Russia coincided this aggressive action by building a significant military force on Ukraine’s eastern border, furthering the idea of simultaneous kinetic and cyber aggression. NATO and the U.S. responded accordingly by deploying troops to eastern Europe to defend the NATO alliance and Ukraine from invasion: “Denmark, Spain, France and the Netherlands were all planning or considering sending troops, planes or ships to eastern Europe, NATO said. Ukraine shares borders with four NATO countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.”28

The 2021-2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis is revealing of Russia’s ultimate strategy in two ways. Firstly, it is now clear that a cyberattack will more than likely precede a kinetic attack, especially when there is little resistance to that aggression. Secondly, there will be more aggressive action coming out of the Russian Federation and NATO and the U.S. are not properly prepared on the cyber-defense front. The evidence for the latter point has been addressed earlier with the examples of successful cyberattacks against the United States such as the Colonial Pipeline and JBS infrastructure attacks as well as the Notpetya attack.

NATO has been primarily concerned with building up cybersecurity in member states. The next step, led by the United States, is to go on the offensive and accurately identify the sources of these cyber aggressions. On several occasions, Russia has been able to hide behind the idea that the cyber-attackers are not state-affiliated and fiend responsibility of aggressions from within the Federation: Three successive U.S. administrations have failed to develop any form of doctrine to adequately address increasingly problematic cyberattacks from unattributable sources that plague U.S. businesses and can even endanger lives. Instead, the private sector has been left to deal with ever more destructive and dangerous ransomware attacks unassisted, and Russia continues to do nothing about cyberattacks originating from Russian territory.29

This is an epidemic that can be cured by shifting from a conservative policy regarding the cyberworld and towards a more proactive position. If the United States were able to identify actors with precision, further measures could be taken to prevent attacks on the U.S. infrastructure and on the private sector. In addition, being able to identify these actors would allow the United States and its allies to expose the perpetrators worldwide through media with solid evidence, damaging the perpetrator state’s reputation with the international community. Once the United States can present solid evidence against cyber criminals, the United States and NATO allies can take conjoint actions voluntarily against the perpetrator state/entity. This can be done through intelligence sharing, public statements of support for actions taken following an attack, and participation in the charges taken against the perpetrator state/entity. This strategy is reliant upon the ability of the United States and its allies to accurately identify perpetrators with a proactive joint campaign.

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