NATO’s info security is air tight---secrets will never leak
Alasdair Roberts 3, University of Massachusetts Amherst - School of Public Policy, 5/15/3, “Entangling Alliances: NATO's Security Policy and the Entrenchment of State Secrecy,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1307692, p. 350-355.
Penalties for unauthorized disclosure. The security policy adopted by the Council in March 1955 made clear that "disciplinary action" was to be taken "against any individual who is responsible for the compromise of NATO classified information."' 12 No comparable provision was included in earlier policies. However, a series of substantial leaks in 1952 and 1953 demonstrated the need for firmer rules, and resulted in increased pressure on member states to adopt criminal penalties for unauthorized release of NATO information.' 1
Frustration with leaks peaked after a meeting of the Council in April 1953.1 14 The main aim of the meeting was the resolution of the sensitive issue of how much each nation would contribute toward a £250 million defense infrastructure program. The New York Times published details of the proposed plan two weeks before the meeting.1 15 A week later, the Times, London's Daily Telegraph, and the Associated Press simultaneously published details of NATO's plans for production of fighter aircraft. Matters deteriorated during the meeting when Le Monde reproduced the agenda and provided a running summary of the talks, while the Times summarized American and British background reports on relations with the Soviet Union.' 16 Major press services transmitted the final communique hours before the NATO secretariat formally released it. Later, the Times excerpted a secret paper on Soviet-Chinese relations discussed at the meeting. ' ' 7
In May 1953, Secretary General Ismay told the Council that leaks such as these posed a "grave threat" to NATO's effectiveness. The NATO Council directed the Security Committee to study "the extent to which each member government could take legal action in respect of leakages of NATO classified information . .. [and] report to the Council as soon as possible with regard to any practical steps that could be taken to ensure that leakages of NATO classified information would not occur in future."'" 8
The Security Committee made a ten-month study of state secrets laws and reported to Council in March 1954. Only three countries-France, Italy, and Turkey-had clear criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of NATO classified information. (In fact, France recently had modified its law to address this issue, perhaps in response to the leaks controversy.' 19) Many countries were found to have state secrets laws that were deficient or ambiguously worded. Two of these countries, Belgium and the Netherlands, reported that they were contemplating amendments to address problems with their state secrets laws. The Security Committee recommended that governments consider "suitable supplementary legislation" to ensure that there would be criminal sanctions for leaking NATO information.' 20 The Council endorsed the recommendation.' 2'
In August 1954, the Standing Group considered the problem of leaks. Its draft overhaul of the NATO security policy included a new section dedicated to the problem of "leakages of information to the press."' 2 2 It proposed that national security authorities should have the duty to immediately investigate leaks and take "disciplinary action" against leakers. The Standing Group later added another proposal, giving the NATO Security Bureau the authority to coordinate with national authorities on leak investigations. 12 3 Comparable rules are found in the final version of the policy adopted by the Council in March 1955.
The subject did not rest there. The chairman of the Security Committee, apparently dismayed by governments' response to the Committee's 1954 recommendation on reform of national laws, returned to the subject in a January 1956 meeting. "To make the position quite clear," the chairman said, governments were to answer five questions about their state secrets laws:
1) Is a NATO secret considered to be a "State secret"? (2) Can any person guilty of disclosing a "State secret" be prosecuted whether he be a member of the Government, an official or a private citizen? (3) Is the charge the same for a person who intentionally discloses a secret and for one who does so by negligence? (4) Can a person who discloses a "State secret" or a NATO secret be prosecuted in a country when the offence has been committed outside that country? (5) Can a country prosecute a foreigner who has disclosed a NATO secret on its territory? 124
Most countries answered that their national legislation provided adequate protection. Denmark responded that its law had been modified in April 1955 to address these issues, while Belgium said that statutory changes had been introduced in April 1956. The Greek government also reported that "necessary steps to revise legislation to cover all possible cases" were being taken.12
Ironically, in the United States, sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of classified information remained weak. Congress refused to enact criminal penalties except in narrowly defined circumstances, such as the disclosure of atomic information or deliberate disclosure to foreign agents. 1 26 The American representative to NATO conceded the inadequacy of these measures in his report to the Security Committee. 127 In March 1955, the Department of Justice told Congress that it had broader penalties under "active consideration." ' 28 A bipartisan commission on government security established in August 1955 recommended wider criminal sanctions, 1 29 but Congress again failed to act.
III. EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING INFLUENCE
The tension between domestic policies on access to information and intergovernmental obligations continues to be evident among NATO's older member states. One critical conflict concerns the treatment of information received from other governments, or intergovernmental organizations such as NATO, under domestic access-to-information laws. Adopted after the establishment of the NATO security regime, these laws have been drafted to accommodate the principle of originator control that is entrenched in NATO SOI policy. Governments have resisted calls for loosening this rule in national access-to-information laws, but have rarely acknowledged that national policy is constrained by intergovernmental commitments. Consequently, many domestic policy actors continue under the misapprehension that the content of national policy can be decided in national fora.
Canada. Debate over Canada's Access to Information Act (ATIA) illustrates the problem. The law obliges the Canadian government to deny any request for access to information provided in confidence by other states or international organizations of states unless the originator consents to its release. ' 30 In 1987, a parliamentary committee recommended that the law be amended to give the government discretion to release such information when disclosure seemed unlikely to cause harm. 131 Canada's Information Commissioner later gave qualified support to the proposal. 132 The Canadian government has consistently resisted these proposals. In 1987, it argued that weakening the originator control rule would impair "[tihe willingness of other governments to continue to share their information." ' 33 More recently, it has said that any reform would "set Canada apart from its key allies."13 4 This may be an indirect way of making clear the fundamental problem: that reform of this part of the ATIA would create a conflict between national law and Canada's obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. Canada cannot explicitly acknowledge the potential conflict, because this would constitute a non-consensual disclosure of the substance of NATO's security policy. As a result, many Canadians continue to believe that reform is a matter that can be settled on the merits by domestic actors.
United Kingdom. The same misapprehension may prevail in other jurisdictions. In 1999, the British government was criticized for incorporating the originator control rule in its draft Freedom of Information Act. 135 The Campaign for Freedom of Information, a non-governmental organization, described this as an "indiscriminate" exemption that would allow the withholding of "harmless information." 13 6 Parliamentarians attempted to have the provision amended, but the government opposed these proposals on the grounds that they would violate a universally recognized norm of confidentiality. 137 It failed to explain that the government was constrained by more than convention: such an amendment would create a conflict between statutory and intergovernmental obligations. Similar complaints were made against a comparable provision in the new Scottish Freedom of Information Act.' 38 However, the Scottish government was explicitly constrained by the agreement governing the delegation of power to Scotland from the United Kingdom, which required Scotland to respect the terms of C-M(55)15(Final). 13
United States. In the United States, debate about the degree of protection to be given to information provided by foreign governments was stirred by the 1998 case of Weatherhead v. United States. 1 40 At the center of that case was the question of whether the judiciary should be permitted to consider the reasonableness of the U.S. government's decision to withhold a communication from the British government. Advocates for transparency argued in favor of the court's power to intervene, saying that it was indefensible in an open society to support a policy of absolute secrecy for inter-governmental communications, and that foreign governments could not reasonably expect total secrecy. 141
The case did not involve NATO communications, however, the transparency advocates' case was probably overstated. As the NATO policy shows, there are clearly domains where other governments do have a reasonable expectation of complete secrecy, based on the existence of an SO agreement. Furthermore, the capacity of the judiciary to intervene and impose the right balance on questions of disclosure is exaggerated. The effect of NATO's SOI policy is to deny domestic actors, including the courts, the opportunity to make their own decisions about the disclosure of information within a certain policy domain. 14 2