Antitrust law restricts competition and the growth of the economy
Clyde Wayne Crews & Ryan Young 19, Clyde Wane Crews is vice president for policy and a senior fellow at the CEI, M.B.A. from William and Mary, B.S. from Lander College; Ryan Young is a senior fellow at the CEI, M.A. in Economics from George Mason University, B.A. in History from Lawrence University, “The Case against Antitrust Law”, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 4/16/2019, https://cei.org/studies/the-case-against-antitrust-law/, Accessed 24 June 22.
Antitrust regulation began as a populist reaction against big business and industrial concentration. Yet, it has proven ineffective at countering the perceive threat of bigness in business, while causing considerable harm to consumers, competition, and innovation. Moreover, many antitrust policies are based on faulty arguments that bear little relation to how real-world markets work. And throughout its history, U.S. antitrust law has created considerable uncertainty for businesses, as federal antitrust enforcers have tried different regulatory approaches over the last 130 years.
The “rule of reason” standard, which had no set criteria, became the standard for enforcing actions from fines to jail terms to firm breakups. During the New Deal, government policy turned in the opposite direction and actively encouraged cartel behavior. After a postwar change of heart, antitrust enforcement reached its peak in the 1950s and early 1960s. Around this time, economists’ arguments slowly earned mainstream acceptance in the legal profession. By the 1980s, a Chicago-style consumer welfare had become the dominant enforcement standard, and has remained so up to the present day. However, the combination of a populist presidential administration with a growing Neo-Brandeisian antitrust movement on the progressive side threaten to revert antitrust policy to something closer to an arbitrary rule of reason standard, which creates the potential for a sharp upswing in enforcement actions against large or politically disfavored firms.
While the Chicago school and the Neo-Brandeisians prefer different levels of antitrust enforcement, both believe that antitrust regulation is an effective tool for managing competitive market processes. In this, both are in error, for a number of reasons.
First, competition is a spectrum, not an on/off switch. That makes it difficult to set predictable standards that companies can work to avoid violating and plan around.
Second, regulators are prone to fall for the relevant market fallacy, in which a company appears to dominate a narrowly defined market but has little power in the larger market in which it actually competes.
Third, antitrust enforcement standards are so broad that they are useless as a guide to permissible behavior. Allowable behavior changes with the political winds. Cases, especially major ones, are sometimes prosecuted for publicity rather than merit.
Fourth, antitrust regulation creates rent-seeking opportunities for companies seeking favors from government to harm competitors. As a result, antitrust regulation, as actually practiced, has done far more to stifle competition than to protect it or promote it.
Finally, antitrust regulation takes a short-term approach to a long-term competitive process. The IBM case was in play for a dozen years before the government dropped the case. By that time, the technology at the heart of the case had changed and IBM’s competitive position had declined. A case against one of the FAANG companies would likely have similar competitive relevance by the time a major trial would be decided.
As noted, antitrust regulation harms competition, consumers, and innovation, and therefore should be repealed. Congress should repeal the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, as amended, including the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976. A market-based approach to competition would enable more powerful market regulation to replace flawed government regulation. This would reduce regulatory uncertainty and its chilling effects on innovation, reduce rent-seeking, and do away with the need for intellectual rabbit holes such as defining relevant markets or permissible levels of firm size or market share.
Aggressive antitrust enforcement can create considerable economic uncertainty, which can have a chilling effect on long term investment and innovation in both products and in business practices that could benefit consumers. Consumers and competition would greatly benefit from the repeal of antitrust regulations regarding restraint of trade and monopolization, horizontal and vertical mergers, collusion such as price fixing and market division, predatory pricing, price discrimination, minimum resale prices, exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, strategic predatory behavior, and technological lock-in. As the economy becomes more high-tech, specialized, and global, antitrust policies formed in the smokestack era are becoming progressively less relevant.