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NATO uses both deterrence by denial & punishment- distinction is irrelevant in this context.

Paulauskas ‘16, PhD in Philosophy & International Relations and is Senior Strategy Officer in the Allied Command Transformation as well as a former NATO employee. “NATO Review - On Deterrence” NATO Review, 08/05/2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/08/05/on-deterrence/index.html

Deterrence is a relatively simple idea: one actor persuades another actor – a would-be aggressor – that an aggression would incur a cost, possibly in the form of unacceptable damage, which would far outweigh any potential gain, material or political. The involvement of at least two actors makes deterrence a complicated social interaction. It is very much about human nature, psychology and basic human emotions: fear, courage, trust, lust for power, and revenge. Elevate all this to the level of state actors, with all the intricacies inherent in statehood and statesmanship, add the stakes of national survival, add nuclear weapons to the mix, and deterrence becomes a highly complex, volatile, intangible, but also combustible concept. From deterrence by denial to denial of deterrence – and back. During the Cold War, NATO pursued deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment was based on the notion of ‘unactable damages’, including through massive nuclear retaliation for any Soviet attack – conventional or nuclear. Deterrence by denial was about making it physically difficult for the aggressor to achieve his objective, which NATO pursued through forward defense at its eastern border with the Soviet Union.

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